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An a n a l y s i s  was made o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  s t a t u t o r y ,  and j u d i c i a l l y  
imposed limits on t h e  power o f  government t o  make and e n f o r c e  laws p r o h i b i t i n g  
unsafe  d r i v i n g  behavior  i n  g e n e r a l  and t o  implement s p e c i f i c  countermeasures .  
E s s e n t i a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h e  American l e g a l  sys tem-- including t h e  impact of 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n s ,  elements of t h e  c r i m i n a l ,  c i v i l ,  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
law system, and t h e  methodology by which c o u r t s  r e s o l v e  l e g a l  d i spu tes - -were  
o u t l i n e d .  S p e c i f i c  l e g a l  p r i n c i p l e s  addressed i n  t h i s  document i n c l u d e :  
t h e  requirement  o f  s u b s t a n t i v e  and p rocedura l  due p r o c e s s  o f  law; t h e  guaran tee  
of equal  p r o t e c t  i o n  o f  t h e  laws ; t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n  a g a i n s t  unreasonable  a r r e s t s ,  
sea rches ,  and s e i z u r e s ;  t h e  p r i v i l e g e  a g a i n s t  compelled s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n ;  
and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  s t a t u t o r y ,  and common-law p r i v a c y  r i g h t s .  The r i g h t s  o f  
p r o b a t i o n e r s ,  and o t h e r  persons  conv ic ted  o f  o r  charged wi th  t r a f f i c  o f f e n s e s ,  
I 
I were a l s o  d i s c u s s e d .  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Law, Courts ,  T r a f f i c  
Law System, Laws and Ordinances,  
Dr iver  Licensing,  Drinking Dr ivers ,  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This is the first of a series of reports concerned with legal constraints  
t h a t  may a r i s e  in con junc t ion  with highway crash countermeasure 
implementation. This report  volume con t a in s  background m a t e r i a l  
describing general law-based constraints. Other reports in  the series will 
discuss in detail legal constraints that  apply to  specific countermeasure 
p rograms  c u r r e n t l y  under consideration by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 
The research leading to  preparation of this volume was conducted by 
staff  of the Policy Analysis Division of The University of Michigan 
Highway Safety Research Inst i tute (HSRI) for NHTSA under Contract  
Number DOT-HS-7-01536. 
1.1 Obiectives of Volume 
The implementation of highway crash countermeasures is a function of 
governmental bodies that will be carried out through the components of 
t h e  American l e g a l  system. Consequently, the rules and principles 
imposed on governmental act ivi ty by the U.S. and s t a t e  constitutions, 
federal  and s t a t e  legislation, and judicial decisions, will apply to-and 
possibly constrain-governmental activity i n  the field of highway safe ty .  
These rules and principles may in some instances limit the power of 
government to  a c t ,  ei ther because a particular governmental body is  
denied t he  power t o  a c t  or because certain of i t s  actions infringe 
protected individual rights. Governmental act ion taken in violation of 
these rules and principles, referred to here as law-based constraints, may 
be declared invalid by courts, and may even expose the government and 
i t s  o f f i c e r s  to civil or criminal penalties. Such consequences could 
hamper or even prevent governmental bodies from implementing certain 
countermeasure programs; therefore,  a planner or other public official 
should be made aware of possible law-based constraints on countermeasure 
activity. It is for that reason that these materials have been prepared. 
Many law-based constraints involve complex issues of constitutional law 
and judicial interpretations of those issues. Rigorous t rea tment  of these 
issues would be beyond the scope of these materials.  Rather,  these 
reports are designed for use by highway safety officials as guides that  
w i l l  e n a b l e  t h e m  t o  i d e n t i f v  a r e a s  i n  which c o u n t e r m e a s u r e  
implementation could pose lesa l  problems.  Once i d e n t i f i e d ,  t h e s e  
problems should be discussed with their legal counsel. 
Within this context, the purpose of this report is to provide a brief 
but relatively comprehensive review of those aspects of the legal system 
that  can have significant impact on countermeasure implementat ion.  
These materials are  also designed to serve as a general reference volume 
for the documents dealing with specific countermeasure programs. 
1.2 Proposed Countermeasure Programs 
A variety of driver and pedestrian countermeasure p rograms  a r e  
currently being considered by federal and state safety agencies. &lost of 
these a re  i n  the conceptual s tage  and have not been fully developed. 
Countermeasure programs and devices may be classified into four general 
categories: devices and systems; model legislation; c o m m u n i t ~  programs; 
and education and training programs. These will be discussed in order. 
1.2.1 Devices and Svstems. Automated devices and systems--m ost of 
which a re  st i l l  conceptual--are designed to reduce traffic law violations, 
especially driving while intoxicated (DWI), by employing various detection 
and warning techniques. This category of countermeasures includes the 
following: 
Drunk Driver Warning System (DDWS)--a system designed to 
test driving capability and warn an impaired driver not to 
operate his vehicle. 
Continuous Monitoring Device (CMD)--a device designed to 
warn a driver who is operating a vehicle that  his dr iv ing 
capability has fallen below some predetermined, safe level. 
Evidential Roadside Testing--evidence-producing devices that  
can be employed on the roadside to collect and/or analyze 
b r e a t h  samples  fo r  blood a lcohol  con ten t  (BAC). These 
countermeasures employ ei ther a portable breath analyzing 
sys tem known a s  an Evidential Roadside Tester (ERT), a 
portable collection device known as a Remote Col lec t ion  
Device (RCD), or both. 
Non-Cooperative Breath Tester (NCBT)--a device, not designed 
t o  produce ev idence ,  which can  be  e m p l o v e d  by l a w  
e n f o r c e m e n t  o f f i c e r s  t o  determine whether a driver has 
consumed alcohol. This device is designed to operate without 
the tested driver's cooperation. 
Sel f -Tester- -a  b r e a t h  t e s t i n g  dev ice  t h a t  can be self- 
administered by an individual to determine whether he has 
consumed too much alcohol to operate his vehicle safely. 
Operating Time Reco rde r  (0TR)- -a  dev ice  which when 
installed on a vehicle, will record the date and times during 
the day in which a vehicle is operated. 
Speed Measuring Devices (SMDs)--a class of devices, of which 
ORBIS 111 is one example, which will detect vehicles violating 
the speed limit and record identifying information about the 
vehicle and its occupants. 
1.2.2 Model Legislation. Countermeasures based on enactment of 
appropriate legislation include the following: 
Traffic Offenses Aggravated by Alcohol (T0AA)-a proposed class 
of unsafe driving acts which, when committed by drivers who have 
consumed alcohol, a re  punishable by additional or more serious 
sanctions than when committed by drivers who have not  used 
alcohol. 
Model Vendor Legislation--legislation set t ing forth mandatory 
equipment, vehicle colors, and t raf f ic  regplations applicable t o  
vendor vehicles, such as ice cream trucks. 
1.2.3 Community Programs. A group of proposed countermeasures 
rely on participation by persons other than law enforcement officers. 
These programs include the following: 
Citizen Reporting of Traf fic-Law Violations--a program 
involving the use of citizens to observe for unsafe driving 
behavior and report it to some central faci l i ty,  or to  the 
owners and drivers of offending vehicles. 
Media Reporting of Law-Enforcement Ac t i v i t i e s  and 
Traffic Crashes--a program in which television and radio 
stations and newspapers report traffic crashes, t raf f ic  law 
violations, and the actions of police officers to the public. 
Citizens Band Radio (C B) Dissemination of Information 
About Po l ice  Presence--a  program in which ci t izens 
themselves, or citizens cooperating with law enforcement 
agenc i e s ,  r e p o r t  t r u e  or false information about the 
presence and activi t ies of police on the highwavs using 
CB networks. 
1.2.4 Educa t ion  and Tra in ing  Programs. The final category of 
countermeasures involves programs aimed a t  educa t ing  and t r a i n ing  
members of the public. These programs include the following: 
Impairment Resistance/Reduc t ion Program (IRR P)--a 
training program designed to improve the resistance of 
individuals  t o ,  and r educe  t he  d e g r e e  of d r i v i n g  
impairment resulting from, fatigue andlor alcohol. 
Anti-Dart Out Training ~ r o g r a m ( A D 0 T P ) - - a  program 
designed to train preschool and elementary school children 
not to dart out into the street in  front of vehicles. 
1 . 3  Law-Based C o n s t r a i n t s  Tha t  Could A f f e c t  Coun t e rmeasu re  
The scope of the law-based constraints that might be encountered in 
the implementation of the types of countermeasure systems and programs 
listed is quite broad. Sources of these law-based constraints, as alreadv 
mentioned, include the U.S. and s t a t e  constitutions, l eg i s la t ion ,  and 
judicial decisions. The relationships among these sources are discussed 
more fully in Section 5.0 of these background materials. Implementation 
of countermeasure programs could be affected by one or more of the 
following: preemption (exclusive control) of a particular area of activity 
by the federal  government; limits on the police powers of s t a t e s  or  
municipalities; guarantees of fundamental liberties found in the U.S. and 
s t a t e  constitutions; s t a tu tes  regulat ing l aw-en fo rcemen t  p r a c t i c e s ;  
administrative regulations; and common-law protections of individual rights 
by the courts. These are discussed in more detail in Sections 2.0 through 
4.0 of these background materials. 
The impact of law-based constraints on a specific countermeasure 
program will therefore depend on the particular countermeasure under 
cons ide r a t i on  and t h e  s t a t e  in which the countermeasure is to  be 
employed. Also important will be the s t ructure  and operation of the 
c r im ina l  and c ivi l  law systems within that  s t a t e ,  the constitutional 
authorities governing these systems, and the statutory and common law of 
that  s t a te .  Thus, to provide some scope within which these constraints 
can be placed, i t  is necessary to develop some familiarity with the legal 
environment in which the constraints arise. 
1.4 Organization of the Volume 
It is the purpose of this report to provide a general legal background 
for the specific constraints that  will be identified and discussed in the 
volumes dealing with specific countermeasures. 
The remainder of this volume is divided into ten sections. Section 2.0 
discusses the bases of the American legal system. Section 3.0 describes 
the criminal, civil, and administrative law systems, and p roceeds  t o  
compare and contrast  them. Section 4.0 provides an overview of the 
legal reasoning process. Section 5.0 treats the relationship among federal  
and s t a t e  const i tu t ions ,  s ta tu tory  constraints, and judicial decisions 
interpret ing them. Sections 6.0 through 10.0 deal with t h e  p r inc ipa l  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  g u a r a n t e e s  a c t i n g  a s  cons t r a in t s  that  might a f fec t  
countermeasure implementation. Section 6.0 deals with the requirements 
of substantive and procedural due process of law. Section 7.0 treats the 
guarantee of equal protection of the laws. Section 8.0 is concerned with 
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Section 9.0 is 
devoted to the privilege against self-incrimination. Section 10.0 deals 
with the various privacy rights-constitutional, statutory, and common-law. 
Section 11.0 discusses the application of the constitutional guarantees 
discussed i n  the previous five sections, with respect to probationers and 
other individuals facing possible criminal sanctions as a result of their 
having committed, or having been charged with, traffic offenses. 
1.5 Note to the Reader 
The materials presented in this volume are  a distillation of many 
important areas of law. Fundemental concepts and p r inc ip les  t h a t  
underlie our system of government are also discussed. 
Many of these discussions a re  presented in simple language and a r e  
likely to remind a reader of topics f irst  encountered i n  grade or high 
school. They are raised again in  this context for much the same reason 
they a re  taught as a part of the basic education of each citizen. The 
concepts are essential elements of our way of life and form the basis for 
governmental actions. Thus, even though some concepts presented here 
may appear simple they a re  important to consider as highway s a f e ty  
programs are developed. 
0 t h e r  por t ions  of the report summarize extremely complex legal 
issues. An attempt has been made to be technically correct  and yet  to 
write clearlv. This goal has necessarily required simplification of both 
language and issues. It is hoped that the resulting document is one that  
will a ler t  the intelligent lay reader to important legal issues and will 
assist in  the discussion of those issues with legal counsel. 
This volume, however, is not intended as legal advice and should not 
be relied upon as other than a general presentation of important legal 
issues that  should be considered in developing and implementing highwav 
safety countermeasure programs. 
2.0 GOVERNMENTAL POWER AND CONSTRAINTS O N  ITS EXERCISE 
The materials presented in this and the following three sections a re  
intended to make the reader more familiar with the context in which 
countermeasures, and the law-based constraints upon their implemen tation, 
may arise. Reduced to  their simplest definitions, countermeasures are 
exercises of governmental power, and law-based constraints a r e  limits on 
the exercise of power. Essential to both concepts is an understanding of 
how power is allocated under the American system of government. 
This section begins by describing the process of creating a government, 
following which the  political and philosophical bases of the American 
system of government are explored. The governmental structure that has 
resulted from those bases will next be described, following which the 
a l l o c a t i o n s  a n d  l i m i t a t i o n s  of gove rnmen ta l  power under t h a t  
structure-which gives rise to law-based constraints-are set out. 
2.1 Bases for the American Svstem of Government 
Governments are created by individuals to real ize the benefits of a 
more efficient  and productive society. These benefits frequently include 
e f f i c i enc i e s  of s c a l e ;  ope ra t i ons  such  a s  na t i ona l  d e f e n s e ,  road 
construction, and education--which cannot effectively be carried out by 
individuals-are instead accomplished using the combined resources of the 
society. Another task assigned to government is the enforcement of 
certain agreed-upon standards of conduct by invoking the superior strength 
of a centra l  authority against individual violators. The latter function 
will be a chief concern of these materials, since t raf f ic  safety programs 
a re  for the most part directed at  enforcing standards of driving conduct 
by d e t e c t i n g  dangerous  d r i ve r s ,  and t ak ing  measures - - inc lud ing  
punishment-to improve their driving behavior. 
Essential to the creation of a government is the surrender of certain 
individual rights to a centra l  authority. This surrender is not to ta l ,  
however, and governmental authority is therefore limited or constrained. 
There a re  two classes of constraints on the exercise of governmental 
authority. They are  closely related yet  are  capable of being t rea ted 
separately. 
The f i r s t  class of constraints are  "politicalf1 in nature and deal with 
public acceptance and support of governmental action. These include 
public hostility to particular government programs, lack of commitment by 
government officials responsible for the i r  imp lemen ta t i on ,  and t he  
diversion of scarce government resources to high priority at  the expense 
of low priority programs. A classic example of political constraints  
occurred during the period of national prohibition: widespread defiance of 
the law, combined with governmental inabil i tv and some deg ree  of 
unwillingness to enforce it ,  constrained the government from achieving its 
goal, eliminating the use of alcoholic beverages. This was true even 
though the government possessed the legal power to do so. 
These m a t e r i a l s  will not  g ive  de t a i l ed  t r e a t m e n t  t o  po l i t i c a l  
c o n s t r a i n t s  on t he  imp lemen ta t i on  of government  pol ic ies .  The 
practicality and public acceptance of a proposed program is highly 
sub j ec t i ve ,  and difficult to gauge in advance. More important, this 
volume focuses entirely upon the legs1 feasibility of the proposed highway 
crash countermeasures. Practical and political constraints are the subject 
of separate analyses by NHTSA and by other NHTSA contractors. 
2.2 Law-Based Constraints on the Exercise of Governmental Power. 
Law-based constraints are formal statements of what types of actions 
governments a re  forbidden to take, and of the consequences that would 
follow such forbidden exercises of power. These constraints applv, even 
in cases where a proposed action is practical  or politicallv acceptable. 
There are, in the American system of government, three principal sources 
of law-based constraints: 
constitutions; 
legislation, including statutes enacted by popularly elected 
bodies and regulations enacted by administrative bodies; 
and 
court decisions, including interpretations of constitutions, 
s ta tutory  provisions, and administrative regulations, as 
well as application of common-law principles. 
Law-based const ra ints  a re  the result of allocations of power among 
governmental bodies and the people; t h e s e  c o n s t r a i n t s  in t u rn  a r e  
motivated by fundamental beliefs concerning the nature of governments. 
In the United States, constraints reflect beliefs in individual liberty and 
dignity, limitation of the scope of governmental powers, and neutral legal 
principles that apply equallv to  all persons. In other words, protection 
against abuse of governmental power is a  paramount consideration. 
There a re  two chief ways in which t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of Amer ican  
government guards against the abuse of governmental power. The first is 
by allocating powers among a number of governmental  bod ies ,  thus  
preventing any single body from accumulating a disproportionate amount 
of power. The second is to specify certain official actions that  a re  
forbidden. This may be done directly, such as by prohibiting unreasonable 
searches and seizures, or indirectly by listing individual rights, such as the 
f ree  exercise of religion, that cannot be infringed by governmental action. 
Both of these approaches are found in the United States Constitution. 
The U,S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and it binds all 
governmental bodies in the country. It is, therefore,  the primary source 
of law-based constraints. It formally grants certain enumerated powers to 
the federal  government, retains other governmental authori ty in t h e  
s ta tes ,  and reserves the remaining rights and powers to the people. Bv 
definition, these grants of power t o  gove rnmen ta l  bodies a l so  a r e  
constraints on their exercise. Some constitutions are another principal 
source of law-based constraints. Most s t a t e  constitutions a re  modelled 
a f te r  that  of the United Sta tes ,  and their provisions also constrain the 
activi t ies of s t a t e  and local governmental bodies. The r e l a t i onsh ip  
between the U.S. and s t a t e  constitutions is discussed further in Section 
5.0 of this volume. 
2.2.1 Checks and Balances as Constraints. The U.S. Constitution 
divides the federal  government into three branches, each of which is 
responsible for one broad aspect  of government. Lawmaking is entrusted 
to a legislative branch consisting of elected representatives. Enforcement 
of those laws is mad? the responsibility of the executive branch, headed 
by the  president. Interpretation of the laws--which includes deciding 
whether thev are consistent with the Constitution--is the function of the 
judicial branch, headed by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The three branches of the federal government a re  se t  up as equal to  
one other. Each branch is given power to check abuses by the other two, 
using tools such as impeachment, vetoes, and judicial review. -4buse of 
governmental authority is also guarded against by forbidding Congress to 
delegate its powers to the executive branch unless clear standards a r e  se t  
out for the exercise of the delegated power. The same considerations of 
maintaining equality among branches of government and preventing abuses 
of power have led states to adopt forms of government similar to that of 
the federal government. 
2 . 2 . 2  Federalism as a Constraint.  The United States government is 
federal: that  is, governmental power is shared between the  na t i ona l  
government, commonly referred to as the "federal government," and state 
governments. This allocation of power is set out in the U.S. Constitution. 
The Constitution grants the federal government exclusive powers in a 
number of specific areas. These include waging war, conducting foreign 
relations, and coining money. S ta te  governments are not permitted to 
exercise powers over those areas. 
O the r  powers are  concurrent, that  is, they are  exercised by both 
federal and state governments. Three chief areas of concurrent power 
a r e  t a x a t i o n ,  spending, and the regulation of commerce. The legal 
principles governing regulation of commerce a re  complex and will not be 
t rea ted in detai l  in  this volume. Put simplv, states may enact legislation 
that affects commerce but thev may not impose burdens on in ters ta te  
c o m m e r c e ;  nor mav they regulate aspects of commerce over which 
Congress has asserted exclusive control. 
The powers to make laws to promote the public health, safety, morals, 
or welfare-commonly known as police powers-are exercised by the s t a t e .  
These  powers  were  not  g r an t ed  t o  t h e  federal  government by the 
Constitution and therefore, may not be directly exercised at  the national 
level. However, federal programs to promote the public welfare mag be 
implemented by appropriating money for a specific purpose, and the 
federal government also may pass health or safety legislation that  af fects  
in ters ta te  commerce. Courts have allowed the federal government broad 
leeway in achieving policy goals by using the commerce and spending 
powers. For example, by granting funds only to recipients that agree to 
follow certain conditions--such as  se t t ing a 5 5  mph speed  l im i t  or  
eliminating certain discriminatory practices-the federal government can 
use its powers in effect to promote the public health, safe ty ,  morals, or 
welfare. 
2 . 2 . 3  The Bill of Rights as a Constraint. The concept of checks and 
balances is one way in which abuse of governmental power is checked 
under the American svstem of government. The other consists of a 
number of law-based constraints that forbid government from exercising 
its authority in a manner that infringes personal liberty. 
The principle source of these constraints is the Bill of Rights, the 
name given the f irst  ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution. These 
rights include, for example: 
the freedoms of religion, speech, and assembly; 
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures; 
e the privilege against compelled self-incrimination; 
the requirement of due process of law; 
the rights to  jury tr ial  and to counsel at  criminal trials; 
and 
e the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 
Additional protections of individual rights found in the U.S. Constitution 
include, for  example, the guarantee of equal protection of the laws and 
various protections of voting rights. 
The guarantees of the Bill of Rights were at  first applied only against 
the federal government. More recent  decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court,  however, have concluded that  the Bill of Rights also constrains 
state governments, This will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.1 of 
these materials. 
2 . 2 . 4  S t a t e  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  a s  C o n s t r a i n t s .  Nearly every s t a t e  
constitution contains provisions paralleling those of the Bill of Rights, the 
equal protection guarantee, the due process requirement, and various other 
protections of personal liberties. Some s t a t e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  con t a in  
additional protections not contained in the United States Constitution, 
such as explicit  protection of individual pr ivacy and proh ib i t ion  of 
imprisonment for debt. 
Because the U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land, state 
constitutional provisions may not be in conflict with i t .  S t a t e s  a r e  
forbidden from eliminating or limiting the protections of the United 
States Constitution. On the other hand, states may as a mat te r  of their 
own law grant  individuals additional protections not recognized by the 
United Sta tes  Constitution. This will be discussed in more detai l  i n  
Section 5.2 of these materials. 
2 . 2 . 5  Statutes  and Case Law as Constraints. In addition to those 
constraints  imposed by the  U.S. and s t a t e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s ,  add i t i ona l  
constraints may be imposed by legislation and administrative rules and, in  
effect, by judicial decisions interpret ing constitutional and legislative 
provis ions .  The relationship among federal  and s t a t e  constitutions, 
legislation, and judicial decisions will be discussed fur ther  i n  Section 5 . 0  
of these background materials. 
2.3 Summary 
Governments a re  created by people to carrv out functions agreed upon 
as necessarv but which could not effectivelv be carried out by individuals. 
One such func t i on  is t h e  enforcement  of agreed-upon standards of 
conduct, which includes enforcement of driving behavior standards. 
In the process of creating a government, individuals surrender some of 
their rights to a central authority. The grant  of power to government, 
by definition, also imposes constraints on its exercise of power. 
Constraints mav be political or law-based.  The l a t t e r  c l a s s  of 
cons traints--which are the focus of this volume-are formally expressed in 
constitutions, legislation, or court decisions. The purpose  of t h e s e  
constraints is to prevent abuses of governmental power. The desire to 
curb abuses  of power is r e f l e c t e d  in t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of Amer ican  
government. Two chief ways in which abuses of power are checked are: 
dividing power among a number of governmental bodies; and specifying 
those actions that governmental bodies may not take. 
The principal source of law-based constraints is the U.S. Constitution. 
S t a t e  constitutions, legislation, administrative regulations, and court 
interpretations of constitutional provisions or legislation also a re  sources 
of law-based constraints. 

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY FOR GOVERNMENTAL POWER AND 
CONSTRAINTS ON ITS EXERCISE 
Law-Based Constraints on the Exercise of Governmental Power 
The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST., art. VI, provides: 
The Constitution, and the laws of the United Sta tes  which 
shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all t rea t ies  made, or 
which sha l l  be made ,  under the authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges 
in eve ry  s t a t e  sha l l  be bound t he r eby ,  anything in the 
Cons t i t u t i on  or Laws of a n y  S t a t e  t o  t h e  C o n t r a r y  
nonwithstanding. 
This is t h e  a u t h o r i t y  under which cour t s  declare s t a t e  legislation 
unconstitutional. 
Provisions in the United States Constitution that prohibit governments 
from acting against individual rights include the following: a r t  I, 4 9 
[prohibiting Congress from, among other things, passing bills of attainder 
or ex post facto laws, or from suspending the right of habeas corpus in 
the absence of an emergency] ; art. I, S 10 [prohibiting states from, among 
other things, passing bills of attainder or ex post f ac to  laws] ; amend. I11 
[p roh ib i t ing  quartering of troops i n  homes during peacetime without 
owner's consent]; and amend. VIII [prohibiting cruel or unusual punishment, 
excessive bail, or excessive fines] . Constitutional provisions specifically 
guaranteeing individual rights include the following: amend. VI [guarantee 
of speedy and public trial,  t r ia l  by jury, confrontation of witnesses, and 
the assistance of counsel in a criminal prosecution]; and amend. VII 
[guarantee of jury trial in suits a t  common law]. 
Checks and Balances as a Constraint 
Provisions allocating powers among branches of the federal government 
and providing checks and balances include the  following: a r t .  I, S 1 
[vesting legislative power in Congressl; art. I, §§ 2-3 [powers of Congress 
to impeach and try civil officials] ; ar t .  I, § 7 [presidential veto power 
and a u t h o r i t y  of  Congress  t o  override vetoes] ; a r t  11, S 1 [vesting 
executive power in the President]; art  11, § 2 [presidential appointments 
to  the  Supreme Court and to executive departments, and treaties subject 
to approval by the Senate] ; art. 11, 5 4 [President, Vice President, and all 
civil off icials  subject to impeachment] ; and art. 111, 5 1 [judicial power 
vested in Supreme Court and in lower federal courts created by Congress]. 
Federalism as a Constraint 
Provisions allocating power between the federal and state governments 
include the  following: a r t .  I, § 8 [specifying enumerated powers  of 
Congress, including: taxation; borrowing; coinage of money; regulation of 
interstate and foreign coqmerce; waging war; and maintenance of armed 
forces]  ; art.  I, § 10 [specifying powers denied the states, including coinage 
of money and entering into treaties]; and amend. X [powers not delegated 
t o  the United S ta tes  by the Constitution, nor prohibited by i t  to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people]. 
Case s  dea l ing  wi th  t h e  delegat ion of power by Congress to  the 
executive branch of government include: Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 
546 (1963); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U S .  503 (1944); and - Field v. Clark -7 
143 U.S. 649 (1892); in this regard see  also, Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United Sta tes ,  295 U.S. 495 (1935); and Panama Refining Co. v. Rvan, I293 
U.S. 388 (1935). 
The federal  government has increasingly come to  use its powers to 
regulate commerce as a means of enacting health, safe ty ,  or welfare 
legislation. Cases upholding such exercises of federal authority include: 
Katzenbach v. McCluns, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) [nondiscrimination in places 
of public accomodationl ; Heart  of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241 (1964) [same];  Wickard v .  F i lburn ,  317 U.S. 111 (1942) 
[agricultural production] ; and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) 
[wages and hours]. 
The Bill of Rights as a Constraint 
The Bill o f  Righ t s  was originally held applicable t o  the federal  
government only. In this regard -- see Barron v. Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). In 1868 the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution was passed. This forbade s ta tes ,  among other 
things, to  deprive persons of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law. - See, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,  § 1. This provision has since 
served as a device through which provisions of the Bill of Rights were 
held applicable to the states; cases applying specific provisions a r e  c i ted  
in the bibliographic materials accompanying Section 5.0 of this volume. 
State Constitutions as Constraints 
Provisions granting additional constitutional protections of personal 
liberties include, for example, the  privacy provisions found in several  
s t a t e  constitutions: ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; CAL. CONST art. I, § 
1; and HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 5. One should see  also, the  following 
examples: MO. CONST. art. I, 5 29 [guaranteeing employees the right to 
organize and to bargain collectively through representat ives of their o1,vn 
choosing] ; and TEX. CONST. a r t .  I, § 18 [forbidding imprisonment for 
deb t ] ,  On the  question of s t a t e s  granting additional protections not 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, - see,  Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 
(1975); and Brennan, State Constitutions and the  Protection of Individual 
Rights, 9 0  HARV. L. REV. 489 (1976). Illustrative decisions, applying 
state constitutional provisions to  grant  greater  protection than the U.S. 
Cons t i t u t i on ,  include the following: Arp - v. Worker's Com~ensa t i on  
Appeals Board, 19 Cal.3d 395, 563 P.2d 849, 138 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1977) [sex 
discrimination; Equal Protection Clause] ; Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 
376 A.2d 359 (1977) [school funding; same] ;  and Southern Burl ington 
County NAACP v.  Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 
(1975) [zoning; Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses]. 
Statutes and Case Law as Constraints 
Numerous s ta tu tes  have been enacted to  protect  individuals from 
governmental action. Typical of these a r e  the  implied-consent s t a tu tes  
discussed i n  Sections 8.0 and 9.0 of this volume. These statutes not only 
protect drivers from being physically compelled t o  submit t o  a chemical 
t e s t  for blood alcohol content  (BAC) ,  but they frequently give drivers 
specific rights-such as the right to consult with an attornev-that a re  not 
guaranteed by the U.S. and most s t a t e  constitutions. Other statutory 
protections relevant to countermeasure implementation include the privacy 
s ta tu tes  that  are discussed in Section 11.0; privacy legislation also protects 
interests that are not recognized as constitutionally protected. 
3.0 THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
One of the  most important elements of the Amer ican  sy s t em of 
government is the American legal system. One important function of 
that system is to ensure compliance with certain agreed-upon standards of 
conduct. 
The American legal system is not a unitary system but an aggregation 
of systems. Its principal elements include: the criminal justice system 
(CJS), which includes the t ra f f i c  law system (TLS); the civil law system 
(cLS); and the administrative law system (ALS). 
The law-based cons t r a in t s  tha t  govern the exercise of power by 
governmental bodies also apply to elements of the legal system, especially 
those responsible for law enforcement. One element of the legal system, 
the courts, is also respons ib le  f o r  t h e  e n f o r c e m e n t  of law-based 
constraints that apply to all other bodies of government. 
This section first discusses the CJS and TLS, elements of which will 
implement the proposed driver and pedestrian countermeasure programs. 
The CLS, which is one means through which law-based constraints will be 
en fo r ced  aga in s t  gove rnmen ta l  a c t i v i t y ,  is  next  dealt  with. The 
ALS--which in most s t a tes  is responsible for driver licensing--is then 
treated.  
3.1 The Criminal Justice System (CJS) 
The c r im ina l  j u s t i c e  sy s t em ( c JS )  is  a sy s t em th rough  which 
gove rnmen ta l  a u t h o r i t y  i s  exercised in response to  conduct tha t  is 
considered especially harmful to society. Punishments, or sanctions, a r e  
imposed against those individuals by the CJS. One important reason for 
imposing criminal sanctions is retribution on the part of society. Another 
is special deterrence,  that is, to discourage the sanctioned offender from 
engaging in criminal conduct in the future. Sanctions are also imposed for 
other reasons, including: making an example of the punished offender to 
deter  other would-be offenders (genera l  d e t e r r e n c e ) ;  i n c a r c e r a t i n g  
dangerous offenders to remove them from society (incapacitation); and 
using s anc t i ons  t o  d i r e c t  o f f ende r s  i n t o  r ehab i l i t a t i on  p rograms  
(rehabilitation). 
3.1.1 Principal Functions of the CJS. A description of law systems 
based on function rather than administrative s t ructure  has proved useful 
in evaluating overall system performance. Prior study has identified four 
basic functional categories for a law system. These categories, which a re  




e adjudication, and 
sanctioning. 
These will be discussed in order in the following sections. 
3.1.2 Law Generation. Certain types of behavior a r e  judged so  
harmfu l  t o  s o c i e t y  t h a t  those  who engage  i n  them deserve to  be 
sanctioned by the government act ing i n  behalf of all of society. These 
types of behavior are  known as crimes. In most cases, categories of 
behavior come to be labeled crimes as the result of action by legislative 
bodies:  a cr iminal  s t a t u t e ,  se t t ing out the forbidden behavior, and 
specifying the punishment to  be imposed on those who engage i n  i t ,  is 
enacted. 
Many crimes, such as battery, larceny, and trespassing, are also torts. 
The victim of a crime may seek compensation from the offender throuqh 
a c iv i l  a c t i o n ,  and this action is separate from the criminal action 
brought by society to punish the offender. The law of tor ts  is discussed 
in more detail later in this section. 
3.1.3 Enforcement. Enforcement involves the detection, identification, 
apprehension, and arrest of those who commit crimes. This function, for 
the most part ,  is carried out by the police. The enforcement process has 
been found to be so susceptable to abuse, and the  threat  of such abuses 
to  individual liberty so great ,  that  the U.S. and state constitutions have 
addressed themselves to  law-enforcement practices; moreover, the courts 
recently have been vigilant in invoking these provisions against police 
agencies. Many of the law-based constraints discussed in sections 6.0 
through 10.0 of these background materials a re  directed a t  abuses in law 
enforcement. 
The  enforcement function ends when the suspected offender has been 
charged with a crime and brought before a member of the judiciary. 
Adjudication: The Criminal Trial Process. The particular 
procedures used to adjudicate a criminal case depend primarily on two 
f ac to r s :  t h e  c a t ego ry  of the offense being tried; and the rules of 
criminal procedure in that particular state. 
There a re  two broad categories of crime, felonies and misdemeanors, 
Most states define a felony as a crime punishable by a t  least  one yearfs  
confinement in a s t a t e  prison. Conviction of a felony also may result in 
other penalties such as denial of the right to vote, loss of professional 
l i c ense ,  or  d i squa l i f i ca t ion  f rom publ ic  employment. Only a few 
traffic-related offenses-such as manslaughter and leaving the scene of a 
t r a f f i c  crash--normally a re  classified as felonies. Misdemeanors are  
defined as criminal offenses other than those classified as felonies, and in 
most states this category includes moving traffic offenses. 
Within the class of misdemeanors, however, t h e r e  ex i s t s  s e v e r a l  
potentially confusing distinctions. First of all, many states have created 
subcategories of c r imes  known by var ious  t i t l e s ,  such as  "minor  
m i~ de rneano r s~~  or vviolationsn. Second, a growing number of states have 
moved to ffdecriminalize,u that  is, eliminate imprisonment as a possible 
penalty for committing, most moving traffic violations; these states have 
also eliminated from t raff ic  case adjudications the right to appointed 
counsel and other procedural safeguards. Third, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has distinguished between "pettyff and ffnonpettyff offenses, defining the  
l a t t e r  punishable by at least six monthsf imprisonment. This distinction is 
cri t ical  where the r ight  t o  jury t r i a l  is a t  s t ake .  Final ly ,  some 
misdemeanors a re  triable before so-called courts of limited jurisdiction, 
such as police courts and justices of the peace, a t  which some of the 
rules of criminal procedure are bypassed. 
Thus, a variety of proceedings a re  ~ o s s i b l e  in the  t r ia l  of a given 
criminal offense. For the sake of simplicity, only the two principal types 
of criminal proceedings-felony and misdemeanor proceedings--as well as 
admin is t ra t ive  or decriminalized adjudication of t raf f ic  offenses a re  
discussed in this section. 
3.1.4.1 Felony Proceedings. A felony proceeding may be started by an 
arrest (with or without a warrant) or by bringing a felony charge prior to  
arrest .  Under federal  procedure and in about half the states a felony 
charge must be brought by "indictment," tha t  is, a vote by a grand jury 
to  formally charge with a crime. In the remaining states felony charges 
a re  brought by flinformation,Tf that  is, a decision by the p ro secu t i ng  
attorney to formally charge. 
Baseless felony charges a r e  generally screened out by either of two 
means, depending on the state's rules of criminal procedure. One is the  
preliminary hearing, a t  which a judge or other judicial officer determines 
whether there is sufficient evidence of guilt to justify a trial.  A second 
is by requesting the court to quash, or declare invalid, the indictment or 
information; this, like the preliminary hearing, forces the  court t o  decide 
whether sufficient evidence exists to justify a trial. 
Following a preliminary hearing ( i f  one is granted under tha t  s ta te ' s  
rules), a defendant is arraigned, that is, formally notified of the charges 
against him; a t  that time he is given the opportunity to plead, or respond 
to the charges. He may a t  tha t  t ime ei ther plead guilty, or plead not 
guilty and insist that the prosecution prove his guilt. In practice,  manv 
felony defendants "stand muteff and decline to plead; in such cases, a not 
guilty plea is entered by the  judge. In some ca se s  a p lea  of nolo 
c o n t e n d e r e  (no contes t )  may be offered. A nolo contendere plea is 
equivalent to a guilty plea for the purpose of adjudication and sentencing, 
but is not considered an admission of guilt. 
In the event a defendant pleads not guilty, a tr ial  is conducted to  
determine guilt or innocence. The trial of a felony case takes place in a 
so-called court of general jurisdiction (one with authori ty to  decide the 
fu l l  r ange  of l e g a l  disputes) ,  The factfinding process involves the 
production of evidence to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. If each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt ,  a judgment  o f  g u i l t - - t h a t  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  c o m m i t t e d  a 
crime--follows. A defendant who is convicted at  the trial may appeal his 
conviction by requesting a higher court t o  determine whether any laws 
and rules of procedure governing trials were violated, and whether those 
violations led to an unfair result. A defendant also may appeal on the  
grounds that his conviction was based on insufficient evidence. 
3.1.4.2 Misdemeanor Proceedings. Visdemeanor proceedings may be 
s ta r t ed  by arres t  or by summons in lieu of arrest. As mentioned before, 
minor misdemeanors a re  tr ied in some s ta tes  before courts of limited 
jurisdiction, such as in municipal courts or before justices of the peace. 
When a misdemeanor case is t r ied before a criminal court of general 
jurisdiction, the rules of felony procedure apply--but with two major 
exceptions. First, formal charging is not done by indictment but ra ther  
by information. Second, where an offense is classified as flpettyfT by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the constitutional guarantee of jury tr ial  does not 
apply, although s t a t e  law may require it .  Appeal from a misdemeanor 
conviction, as in the case of a felony conviction, is taken t o  the next 
higher court. Appeal is further discussed later in this section. 
In many states, in the case of minor traffic-law violations, a driver 
may be issued a ci tat ion in lieu of ar res t ,  The ci tat ion requires the 
driver either to appear in court or in e f fec t  to plead guilty by paying a 
fine, in some cases by mail. The majority of traffic cases are disposed 
of in this manner; it is only rarely that a driver will demand a full-scale 
criminal trial of such a case. 
3.1.4.3 flDecriminalizedlT Proceedings. In a number of states, minor 
t r a f f i c  offenses are no longer punishable by imprisonment; i n  s om e ,  
administrative bodies have been established to adjudicate these offenses. 
Decriminalized proceedings differ from criminal p roceed ings  in two 
important respects: f i rs t ,  jury tr ial  is not guaranteed; and second, the 
s t a t e  may prove gu i l t  by a standard less demanding than beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Decriminalized adjudication of traffic cases is discussed 
further in Section 6 ,3  of this volume. 
3.1.4.4 Procedural Protections a t  the Criminal Trial. The potential 
impact of a criminal conviction, especially loss of liberty, has led to the 
establishment of rules and procedures to ensure that criminal trials are 
conducted in a fair and i m p a r t i a l  manner .  The chief  p rocedura l  
protections for the criminal defendant include the l1adversarylf nature of 
the trial process, the right to counsel, and the rules of evidence. These 
will be discussed in order in the following sections. 
3.1.4.4.1 The Adversary Nature of the Trial Process. By "adversary 
natureT1 is meant that  the fac t s  in controversy at  a trial are arrived at  
through the presentation of arguments by both sides before an impartial 
party--a judge or jury--which makes final decisions concerning the facts. 
Each side to the controversy is responsible for detecting and refuting any 
erroneous or misleading arguments by the other; this is usually done 
ei ther by at tacking opposing witnesses, that  i s ,  by con f ron t i ng  and 
cross-examining them, or by presenting one's own testimony and arguments 
in rebuttal. 
3.1.4.4.2 The Right to Counsel. Owing to the complexity of the rules 
and procedures governing a criminal trial, it is usually necessary that  the 
defendant be assisted by a professional trained in the law. This practical 
necessity of legal counsel is recognized by the courts, which have made 
the presence of an attcrney in criminal trials a constitutional right of the 
defendant. The so-called "right to counselu has two aspects. Fi rs t ,  
counsel may be required to  protect  the defendant's rights a t  certain 
llcritical stagesff of the criminal process, that is, those stages at  which his 
r igh t s  t o  a f a i r  t r i a l  could be a f f e c t e d .  Critical stages include: 
preliminary hearing; arraignment; plea; the trial itself; and sentencing. 
Some pretrial stages, which involve significant rights of the accused, also 
are considered 17critical.f1 Second, owing to the importance of counsel i n  
the criminal process, a defendant who lacks the funds to hire his own 
attorney must be provided one at  public expense. 
3.1.4.4.3 The Rules of Evidence. Further protections of the criminal 
defendant a r e  provided by various rules of evidence. These rules a r e  
com pli cated,  highly confusing to the nonlawyer, and often vary from state 
to state. The purpose of these rules is to ensure that decisions a re  made 
solely on the basis of reliable, relevant, and material evidence. Many of 
the more complicated rules of evidence revolve around the simple concept 
of reliability. 
One illustration of rules of evidence designed to assure reliability is 
the set of rules dealing with hearsay evidence, that is, the declarations of 
an individual who is not available to  be cross-examined in court. The 
difficulty with hearsay evidence is that because the person who made the 
s ta tements  is unavailable and cannot be cross-examined, the statements 
themselves cannot be tes ted  for reliability; for tha t  reason they a r e  
excluded. There are, however, a series of exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
They have one common character is t ic ,  namely that  the circumstances 
surroundinq each exception (for example, some s ta tements  made while 
startled or some statements against one's own interests) indicate reliability. 
Another illustration of the protection afforded by the rules of evidence 
is the set of rules governing scientific evidence, that  is, evidence which 
requires art if icial  means beyond an ordinary person's five senses. Many 
proposed countermeasure devices a re  designed to produce s c i e n t i f i c  
evidence that  could be used at  trial. Before any evidence obtained from 
a scientific device can be admitted a t  t r ial ,  the  device itself must be 
proved reliable. At first, proof of reliability requires the testimony of an 
expert a t  each tr ial  in which the  device is used. Once  c o u r t s  a r e  
\ convinced that  a device is reliable, they will accord it "judicial notice." 
Radar devices and a number of chemical test ing dev ices  have been  
judicially noticed; on the other hand, VASCAR and certain other speed 
measuring devices--owing to  the possibility t h a t  t hey  may produce 
inaccurate results-have not been judicially noticed. 
Whether a device is proved reliable by expert testimony or is judicially 
not iced  as  a c c e p t a b l e ,  any evidence obtained from i t  also must be 
established as reliable. Specifically, the device must have been i n  proper 
working o rde r ,  t h e  person who operated the device must have been 
properly trained and qualified to do so, and proper procedures must have 
been followed in generating the device. 
When physical evidence-such as a blood sample--is used a t  t r ial ,  i t s  
"chain of custodyH must be established to eliminate the possibility that it 
had been al tered,  tampered with, or replaced with s im i l a r  physical  
evidence. To establish the chain of custody, each successive individual 
w% handled the evidence must be identified and the whereabouts of that  
evidence must be accounted from the time it was taken until the time it 
was introduced at trial. 
Evidence must not only meet the test of reliability but must also be 
material and relevant. These requirements depend on the key issues in a 
particular trial.  Materiality requires evidence to have some connection 
with one of the key issues; relevance requires evidence to have some 
importance in  proving or disproving one of those issues. 
3.1.4.5 Appeal. A11 four functions of the C J S  must be conducted 
according to the rules and procedures established by law and designed to 
ensure fairness. Failure to c o m p l ~  with these rules and procedures may 
cause C J S  actions, such as judgments or sanctions against a defendant, to 
be declared invalid. 
In fe lony  prosecu t ions ,  decis ions  whe ther  law-based rules and 
procedures were violated are  made by courts of appeals, which oversee 
the operations of tr ial  courts and ensure that  laws and procedures are 
uniformly applied. Their function is to correct legal errors made by tr ial  
cou r t s ,  not  t o  r e t r y  cases .  I n  a number of  s t a t e s ,  misdemeanor 
prosecutions are appealed to the next highest court--which may actually 
be the court which normally tr ies felony cases. In ei ther event ,  the 
reviewing process is the same: if legal errors were serious enough to 
a f f ec t  the outcome of the trial,  the case is remanded to the trial court 
and a new trial is ordered; if no errors were made, or i f  the errors were 
ftharmless,tT the trial court decision will be affirmed and the conviction 
will stand. 
Some s t a t e s  have so-cal led  two- t i e r  s y s t e m s  fo r  trying minor 
misdemeanors or t r a f f i c  law violations. Typically, the f irst  t r ial  is a 
summary proceeding, bypassing some of the procedural guarantees of a 
criminal trial. If a defendant is convicted at  the summary proceeding, he 
may demand a tr ial  "de novoIf in the  next higher court. This second 
trial, which is not affected by the results of the first in any way, affords 
t h e  de f endan t  the protections that  apply to criminal proceedings in 
general. However, because the second trial is independent of the  f irst ,  
more  s e v e r e  sanctions can be imposed as a result of the l a t t e r .  A 
conviction in the second trial can, in turn, be appealed to the next higher 
court. The two-tier process for adjudicating minor criminal matters has 
recently survived a number of constitutional a t tacks  and continues t o  
exist in a number of states. 
3.1.5 Sanct ioning.  The re  a r e  a number of theories supporting 
punishment of those convicted of crimes. These include retr ibution,  
deterrence (special and general), incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Within 
the maxima and minima imposed by s ta tu tes ,  a wide range of sanctions 
can be imposed upon a convicted defendant. These include: suspended or 
deferred sentences; conditional release on probation; fines; con finem en t to  
jail or prison; and, in rare  cases, death, In traffic-law cases, however, 
the death penalty is not imposed and imprisonment is rare. Sanctions and 
the sentencing process will be discussed in more detail in Section 11.0 of 
this volume, 
3.2  The Traffic Law System (TLS): A Subsystem of the CJS 
The Traffic Law System (TLS) is in most s t a tes  a subsystem of the 
CJS.  The social control that  the TLS is intended to  promote is the 
reduction of driving behavior that poses the risk of t raf f ic  crashes. The 
TLS consists of four basic functions which are identical to those of the 
overall CJS. These functions may briefly be described as follows: 
law generation, which involves requiring behavior that  
minimizes the risk of t raf f ic  crashes, and forbidding 
behavior  t h a t  t r e a t e s  such  a r isk.  It also involves 
facilitating TLS operation by setting procedural guidelines, 
creating official bodies essential to system operations, and 
funding the overall system. 
enforcement,  which involves detection and apprehension of 
risk-takers, manipulation of human behavior to reduce 
risk, and collecting basic data to identify risk-taking. 
ad jud ica t ion ,  which involves  de t e rmin ing  whe ther  
apprehended individuals engaged i n  risk-taking prohibited 
by law, ascertaining whether the laws pertaining t o  risk 
a re  valid, and also ensuring the fundamental fairness of 
the TLS. 
sanctioning, which consists of TLS response intended to 
ensure that the sanctioned individual will not take similar 
risks i n  the future (special deterrence),  and provides a 
pattern of responses  t o  individual  r i sk- taking t h a t  
persuades other potential risk-takers not to engage i n  
such action (general deterrence). 
The importance of the TLS to  the specif ic countermeasure volumes as 
well as these background materials is clear: the implementation of 
highway c r a sh  countermeasures is a product of the four law system 
functions; and the law-based constraints discussed i n  these volumes a re  
clearly applicable to TLS activity. 
3 . 3  The Civil Law System (CLS) 
The CLS is a law system in which governmental power is exercised to 
decide disputes between individuals and to  ensure compliance with those 
decisions. The CLS enforces standards of conduct, although it does so i n  
a less direct  fashion than does the CJS. The CLS does not punish 
wrongdoers; ra ther ,  the CLS requires those who cause injury to others to 
compensate the victims of their actions. For example, one who promises 
t o  engage in some future behavior (such as, selling certain i tems or 
performing personal services) and then fails to  do so must compensate 
those who suffered financial loss as the result of his broken promise. 
There a re  several important distinctions between the CLS and the CJS. 
First, the primary function of the CLS is to resolve private disputes and 
to compensate persons injured by wrongdoing, not to punish or deter the 
wrongdoers themselves. Second, disputes brought before the CLS involve 
t h e  in ju red  p a r t y ,  r a t h e r  t han  a l l  of soc ie ty ,  against the alleged 
wrongdoer. While a private dispute may have  an  i m p a c t  on l a r g e  
segments of society, the court's decision of that dispute involves only the 
immediate parties to it. Finally, the CLS provides a means of preventing 
future  wrongdoing; an injured party can obtain a court order or injunction, 
prohibiting the recurrence of injury-producing action. 
There are ,  on the other hand, some similarities between the CJS and 
CLS. Most forms of misconduct, such as assault and trespassing, a re  both 
c iv i l  and c r im ina l  m a t t e r s .  Both systems also use the same court  
systems, decide cases using the adversary system, and employ similar 
rules of evidence. 
3.3.1 Principal Functions of the CLS. The CLS, being a law system, 
consists of four functions somewhat similar to those of the CJS and TLS. 





These will be discussed in order in the following sections. 
3.3.1.1 Law Generation. The body of so-called civil law is vast,  and 
includes a number of distinct legal areas. The most important of these 
are property, contracts, and torts, the l a t t e r  of which will be discussed 
later in this section. 
Depending on the area  of law involved, the lawgeneration function is 
performed by the courts, by legislatures, or by both. Most civil law was 
initially developed by the courts, which decided disputes on a case-by-case 
basis until principles of law evolved from those decisions. Civil law 
developed by courts is known as common law. The process of lawmaking 
through judicial decisions is discussed in more detail in Sections 4.1 and 
4.2. More recently, in many areas of law, such as sales and banking, 
court decisions have been replaced by legislatively enacted codes. Even 
in these areas, however, legal principles not made clear by legislation 
must be determined by court interpretation. 
3.3.1.2 Litigation. Litigation is the  enforcement of private claims 
against others. I t  differs from enforcement of criminal laws i n  two 
significant respects: f i rs t ,  i t  is not a function d e l e g a t e d  so le ly  t o  
governmental agencies; and second, no systematic program of enforcing 
civil laws takes place. Enforcement of standards of conduct under the 
CLS is usually l e f t  to the injured parties; whether action is taken against 
a wrongdoer depends on the injured party's willingness to do so. 
L i t i ga t i on ,  then, is an individual decision to  invoke the power of 
government, through the CLS, to enforce some disputed legal right. Such 
rights may be expressly granted by a contract or throuqh legislation, such 
as federal or s t a t e  laws against discrimination. Legal rights also may 
arise as the  result of another's conduct-for example, a person's negligent 
driving that causes injury to another-which creates for the  injured party 
the right to  sue to obtain compensation. Whatever its source, s legal 
right must be one tha t  a court can and will enforce; unless a dispute 
involves enforceable rights i t  will not be heard or decided by a court. 
An enforceable leqal right is known as a cause of action, 
A lawsuit to  enforce a cause of action is known as a civil action, the 
person bringing the action is known as the plaintiff,  and t h e  person 
against whom the action is brought is known as the defendant. 
A civil action is formally begun when the plaintiff files a complaint 
describing his lawsuit with the proper court. The defendant is forced to 
respond to the  action once he is formally not i f ied  t h a t  i s ,  g iven a 
l f summons , f l  s t a t i n g  t h a t  he is being sued, and given a copy of the 
complaint stating why. At this point both parties are brought before the 
court,  which now has power to  make decisions binding them, and the 
process of adjudication begins. 
3.3.1.3 Adjudication. Civil procedure before trial includes a number 
of steps designed to screen out baseless actions. These steps a re  aimed 
more  toward  judicial economy and efficiency than protection of the  
defendant's constitutional rights. Improperly brought civil actions a r e  
disposed of by dismissal. 
Actions that  involve a dispute over some legal question, as opposed to 
an issue of f a c t ,  a r e  decided before tr ial  through summary judgment. 
Under summary judgment procedure, both sides agree to the facts in a 
dispute, but disagree as to their legal consequences. A decision regarding 
the applicable law is made by the judge, and this in turn decides the 
dispute. 
Civil procedure frequently allows for a great deal more discovery, that 
is, gathering of evidence from one's opponent before tr ial ,  than does 
criminal procedure. A party t o  a civil action may compel the  other 
party to test ify,  answer questions, or furnish documents, or else face  
court-ordered sanc tions for failing to do so. 
In a civil trial, the rules of evidence usually a r e  less res t r ic t ive  than 
in criminal trials,  especially (as is common in civil cases) if there is no 
jury. More importantly, the plaintiff's burden of proving a civil case is 
lighter than that of the prosecution in criminal cases: a preponderance, or 
majority, of the evidence is sufficient; proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
not required. 
Findings of f a c t  a r e  made a f te r  presentation of the  evidence. The 
verdict in a civil action consists of two elements: a finding of whether 
the  defendant has committed a wrongful action (violated plaintiff's rights 
or acted unreasonably); and the determination of the appropriate remedy, 
usually paynen t  of a sum of money. A judgment based on that verdict 
then follows; this is a formal statement that the plaintiff is enti t led t o  a 
remedy. 
3.3.1.4 Compensation. The CLS equivalent of a criminal sanction is a 
judgment ordering the  defendant to  compensate the  plaintiff f o r  h i s  
injuries, usually by paying a sum of money. Judgments may also focus on 
future as well as past injuries and may therefore order the defendant to  
f r a i n  f r o m ,  or engage in, certain conduct, The various forms of 
compensation in civil cases, called remedies, a r e  discussed l a t e r  in this 
section. 
3.3.1.5 Appeal. As is the case i n  criminal prosecutions, legal errors 
made i n  the course of a civil a c t i o n  may be c o r r e c t e d ,  and c ivi l  
judgments may be reversed, by courts of appeals. Both trial and appeals 
courts may also modify civil judgments by increasing or decreasing the 
amount of compensation to which the plaintiff is entitled. 
-\ 
3.3.2 Basic Aspects of the CLS. The term "civilf1 applies t o  a broad 
range of disputes. The bulk of civil litigation takes place in the areas of 
property, contracts, and torts. 
There also exists a class of legal disputes labeled lfcivil" but which 
amount to challenges to the exercise of governmental power. Such actions 
generally seek: f i rs t ,  a determination tha t  some governmental action is 
taking place in violation of law-based constraints; and second, a remedy 
p u t t i n g  a s t o p  t o  t h e  c o n s t r a i n e d  a c t i v i t y .  Coun t e rmeasu re  
implementation, being a function carried out by governmental bodies, is 
subject to attack in the form of these actions. 
Civil law, like criminal law, is ultimately based on certain values and 
principles held by society. These include, for example: holding wrongdoers 
responsible for their conduct; enforcing promises of fu ture  conduct made 
by others; compensating injured parties; and shifting the risk of losses to 
those best able to bear them. Because civil law includes a number of 
s e p a r a t e  l ega l  areas,  and because those areas themselves consist of 
separate categories of disputes, civil actions will differ  f r o q  one another 
in terms of applicable rules and procedures. These differences can be 
found in the various tort actions to be discussed later in  this section. 
Social values and principles give rise to certain defenses to liability, 
which will be discussed later  in this section. Social policy also shapes 
the civil remedies applied by courts. 
Types of Civil Actions. The great  majority of civil actions 
are  disputes involving individuals. The term "individual" also includes 
corporations and even units of government acting in some private capacity 
( for  instance, as a party to  a contract) .  I t  also includes two or more 
individuals acting together. The principal classes of civil disputes include 
disputes over property, contract actions, and tort actions. Disputes over 
property involve questions of ownership. The contract action arises out of 
an agreement made by two individuals, which was allegedly "breached," 
that is, broken, by one of them. A tort action arises out of a wrongful 
action, other than a crime or breach of contract, that results in injury to 
another. Contract and tort actions seek compensation equal in amount to  
the  damage suffered; disputes over property also seek a decision as to 
who is its legal owner. 
Civil actions involving challenges to  the exercise of governmental 
power will be discussed later in this section. These may most effectively 
constrain the implementation of countermeasure programs and therefore 
are for the purposes of this volume, the  most important civil law-based 
constraints. Tort actions, however, are likely to be the most frequently 
litigated; as a result, most of the remaining discussion in this section is 
devoted to the law of torts. 
3.3.2.2 Standards for Imposing Tort  Liability. Social policies have 
given rise to  standards by which an individual is held responsible for 
conduct resulting in injury to  others. Standards which center  on the 
concept of blameworthiness or 71faultfl will be discussed in the  following 
sections. 
3.3.2.2.1 Intent. For the purpose of imposing tort liability, f7intent7' 
does not involve hostility, an evil motive, or a desire to  bring about 
harm. Rather,  what is required is an intent to bring about a result-such 
as touching another or entering onto his land--that will invade  t h e  
interests  of another i n  a way not permitted by law. Thus, a practical 
joke or even a misguided attempt to help another might be accompanied 
by the intent required to impose tort liability. 
3 . 3 . 2 . 2 . 2  Negligence. Negligence may be defined as conduct that 
poses an unreasonably great  risk of harm to  others, that  is, conduct  
falling below some standard of care established by law for the protection 
of others. The legal standard of care is normally the degree of care  and 
p rudence  t h a t  a reasonab le  person would exe rc i s e  under similar  
circumstances. This standard is external, or objective; thus i t  is normally 
not material whether an individual is aware of the risk created by his 
conduct, or even whether he had exercised his own best judgment. It has 
been sa id  t h a t  two elements must be considered in determining the  
reasonableness of an individual's actions: on one hand, the magnitude and 
probability of harm posed by his actions; on the other, the burden (the 
cost and inconvenience) of avoiding the risk of harm. 
Not only must one's conduct fall below the legal standard of care, but 
it must also be the '1proximate71 or direct cause of harm to  another. In 
o t h e r  words, the connection between negligent conduct and resulting 
damage must be close enough that society will consider the actor legally 
responsible. 
3 . 3 . 2 . 2 . 3  Liability Without Fault. Liability without fault is liability 
irrespective of how much care is exercised by the  actor.  All that  is 
required is that  the act ivi ty in question be the cause of damage. A 
narrow range of activities considered abnormally dangerous, such as using 
dynamite or keeping wild animals, are governed by liability without fault, 
More recently, a growing number of activities involving manufacturing and 
marketing, particularly of food and other goods used by consumers, also 
have been brought under the standard of liability without fault.  This 
ref lec ts  social policies that  an individual consumer should not be forced 
to suffer all of the economic loss resulting from a product related injury, 
and that  a manufacturer is be t t e r  able to  distribute any losses over all 
consumers in the form of higher product costs. 
3 . 3 . 2 . 2 . 4  Vicarious Liability. Tort law generally requires that  a 
wrong-doer be personally responsible for  causing harm before he can be 
held liable. However, the law recognizes a number of situations in  which 
one individual may be held vicariously liable, that is, for the actions of 
another. Vicarious liability normally is imposed only where the  vicarious 
p a r t y  has some  kind of c o n t r o l  ove r ,  or  r espons ib i l i ty  f o r ,  t h e  
wrong-doer's actions. Thus, an employer could be held liable for  injuries 
resulting from the on-the-job actions of his employees, or a vehicle owner 
for the injuries caused by another who drives it. 
3.3.2.3 Specific Torts. There are four categories to which torts may 
be assigned. The first three correspond to the types of llfaultfl: in tent ,  
negligence, and liability without fault.  The fourth category consists of 
torts that combine these standards of fault. These are discussed below. 
3.3.2.3.1 Intentional Torts. All of these torts require an intentional 
act causing injury to another, Intentional torts include: 
Assault, an a c t  intended to put another person in fear of 
bodily harm. 
Battery,  - an intentional, offensive contact  with another 
person who did not consent to it. 
False imprisonment, the confinement of another person by 
means of physical barriers, force, or threats  of force, by 
one acting without legal authority to confine. This tort 
also includes false a r res t  which likewise is an i l l ega l  
denial of another's freedom to move. 
Intentional infliction of mental distress, an outrageous 
course of conduct (a  single a c t  is usually not sufficient) 
that causes nonphysical injury t o  another. A number of 
s t a tes  st i l l  refuse to compensate those who suffer mental 
or psychological injury without accompanying physical  
harm. 
Trespass, an intentional and unconsented-to entry upon the 
land of another, whether or not damage is done t o  the 
1 and. 
Conversion, the intentional and unconsented-to use of the 
personal property of another, This to r t  includes the f t  of 
operty as well as i t s  loss, destruction, or unauthorized 
use. 
Of the international tor ts  listed above, only the first three are likely 
to occur in the course of highway crash countermeasure programs. 
3.3.2.3.2 Negligence. As s ta ted  earlier,  negligence is a failure to 
exercise reasonable care, and almost any activi ty can be performed in a 
negligent manner. Examples of negligence abound, and these include a 
variety of unsafe driving acts, such as failing t o  yield the right of way, 
turning without signalling, and inattention to other traffic. 
One special class of negligence i s  m a l p r a c t i c e ,  or  p rofess iona l  
negligence. A professional is held, i n  the practice of his profession, to 
the standard of care and prudence exercised by the average practitioner 
in his field. 
3.3.2.3.3. Liability Without Fault.  Torts not requiring fault on the 
actor's part include those mentioned earlier,  as  well as those aspects of 
products liability, which are discussed below. 
3.3.2.3.4 Torts Combining Standards of Fault. A nurnber of tor ts  
cannot  be c l a s s i f i ed  according to  their governing standard of faul t  
because, in the course of their development, multiple standards of fault  
were applied to separate aspects of the same tort. The principal torts in 
this category include: defamation, invasion of privacv, products liability, 
misuse of legal process, and nuisance. These are discussed in order in 
this section. 
3.3.2.3.4.1 Defamation: Libel and Slander. Defamation is the making 
of a public s ta tement  about an individual that  harms his repu ta t ion ,  
exposes h im  to  public contempt, or causes others not to associate or do 
business wi th  him. Two major categories of defamation, libel and slander, 
have been recognized. 
Libel is written defamation or defamation through the mass media. 
Slander is spoken defamation. The procedures for establishing and proving 
damages caused by libel a re  less restr ict ive because the potential for 
harm is much greater  when widely broadcast or permanently recorded 
media are used to defame. i 
Defamation requires that  three individuals be involved: the defaming 
individual; the defamed individual; and a third party to whom the  libelous 
o r  slanderous s ta tement  is 17published,yT that  is, made public. In the 
ordinary case of defamation i t  is not necessary to show that the defaming 
individual  in tended  t o  libel or slander, or even that  there was any 
negligence on his part; all that must be shown was that  he published the  
statement, and that damage resulted from it. 
However, recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have al tered the  
s t a n d a r d s  of  f a u l t  i n s o f a r  as they apply to  the news media. These 
decisions are based on the guarantee of freedom of the  press, found in 
the First Amendment to  the U.S. Constitution. When a news medium 
publishes or broadcasts material concerning a public official or a "public 
figure," i t  is necessary t o  show that the medium acted with f7malicet1 in 
order t o  establish tha t  defamation occurred. Malice is a legal t e rm 
which means that  the medium either knew that the report was false or 
that it had serious doubts as to whether it was t rue ,  but disseminated i t  
anyway. Legal malice does not require spite or a bad motive. 
When the subject of a media report  is a private figure, the malice 
standard does not apply; however, a medium cannot be held liable without 
at  least a showing that it was negligent with respect to  investigating or 
verifying facts in connection with the report. 
It is essential in any action for libel or slander that the s t a tements  i n  
question be false, for t ru th  usually is a complete defense. This is the 
case regardless of the motive for the defamatory but t rue  s ta tements .  
Consen t  by the individual claiming t o  have been defamed is another 
defense. 
The law recognizes as defenses several areas of "privilegeT7 whereby 
certain classes of people cannot be held legally answerab le  f o r  t h e  
consequences  of t he i r  publication of defamatory material.  Absolute 
privilege a t taches  to  s ta tements  made in the course of such off ic ia l  
proceedings as tr ials  and legislative sessions. "Qualifiedv privileges may 
exist in cases where a person makes statements as part of a reasonable 
effort to protect his own interests or those of certain third parties. A 
bad motive such as ill will or spite will defeat a qualified privilege. A 
privilege of "fair comment," permitting expressions of opinion about public 
figures, is also recognized. This privilege is also a qualified one, and 
thus is lost when accompanied by a bad motive. 
3 . 3 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 2  Products Liability. Products liability combines three 
theories of recovery: negligence, warranty, and liability without fault. 
The l a t t e . F t h e o r y ,  which has become prevailing law in most s ta tes ,  
requires the plaintiff to show only two elements: that  a product was 
defective when i t  was sold to him, and that the defect caused damage to 
him. 
3 . 3 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 3  Invasion of Privacy. Invasion of privacy is not a single 
tort but a group of four loosely related torts .  These are: intrusion into 
private places or matters;  disclosure of private facts; publicity placing 
another i n  a fa lse  light before the public eye; and appropr ia t ion  of 
another's name or likeness for commercial purposes. Because they are 
discussed in detail in the privacy materials in Section 10.0 of this volume 
they will not be discussed here. 
3 . 3 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 4  Illisuse of Legal Process. Misuse of legal process consists 
of two torts that somewhat overlap each other: malicious prosecution 
and abuse of process. The former tor t  involves initiating a criminal 
proceeding without having probable cause for doing so, and for an ulterior 
motive, such as extorting money. Abuse of process is more inclusive, and 
simply involves initiating any legal proceeding--civil or criminal--against 
another for  some ulterior motive. However, neither action is com monly 
brought; nor are they favored by courts, since to do so would discourage 
individuals from pursuing legit imate claims or assisting the police in 
apprehending lawbreakers. 
3 . 3 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5  Nuisance. Nuisance may either be public or private. A 
public nuisance consists of establishing a s t ructure  or conducting an 
activity that endangers the public health, safety,  welfare, or morals. .A 
p r iva t e  nuisance is  an i n t e r f e r ence  with the property rights of an 
individual holding an interest in land. Maintaining a public nuisance may 
also be punished as a crime. 
3.3.2.4 Defenses and Immunities to  Tort Liability. Proof of every 
element of a tort action ordinarily entitles the plaintiff to a verdict and 
judgment in his favor. Society, however, has recognized that the context 
i n  which actions take place may a f f e c t  t h e i r  l ega l  consequences .  
Principles of fair play and common sense may enter into consideration, 
along with considerations of overall social utilities and disutilities. The 
legal system has recognized these factors and has incorporated them into 
the law of torts. These factors frequently take the form of defenses and 
immuni t i es  t h a t  p r even t  l i ab i l i ty  from being imposed upon certain 
tortf easors. 
Defenses to tor t  liability are discussed first; immunity, because of its 
importance to tort actions growing out of governmental activity, will then 
be discussed separately. 
3.3.2.4.1 Defenses. The principal defenses to  tort liability are the 
following: 
Assumption of risk, which bars any tort action brought by 
a plaintiff who, after  having had actual  knowledge of a 
dangerous  condi t ion c r e a t e d  by others, continued to 
expose himself t o  i t  and became injured as a result of 
that  exposure. Underlying this defense is the belief that 
the legal system should not in e f fec t  reward those who 
bring injuries upon themselves. 
Authority of law, which protects from to r t  liability those 
who ac t ,  pursuant to  orders, within the scope of their 
lawful authority. This defense would, for example, bar  an 
action for bat tery  against a police officer who lawfully 
frisked a suspect. 
e Consent, which may be expressed verbally or by conduct 
reasonably taken to mean consent. On occasion, consent 
may be implied by custom. Actions outside the scope of 
consent are treated the same as actions not consented to. 
e Contributory negligence, which is negligence by an injured 
party tha t  helped c a u s e  t h e  in jury .  I t  is  bas ica l ly  
d e t e r m i n e d  using t h e  s a m e  s tandards  as negligence. 
Contributory negligence is no defense to  to r t s  involving 
intent  or recklessness (gross negligence), or to liability 
without fault.  I t  is, however, a de fense  t o  o rd ina ry  
neg l igence  by t h e  o t h e r  pa r t y .  In r e c e n t  years, a 
majority of states have replaced contributory negligence 
w i t h  c o m p a r a t i v e  neg l igence ;  under t h i s  d o c t r i n e ,  
negligence by the injured party is a partial defense which 
r educes  t h e  amoun t  of his r e c o v e r y  r a the r ,  than a 
complete defense that denies him the right to recover. 
Informed consent is a defense most frequently invoked i n  
cases of ba t t e ry  a r i s i n g  o u t  of medica l  t r e a t m e n t .  
Informed consent consists of two elements: knowledge of 
the  possible risks and consequences  of consen t ;  and 
consent based on that knowledge. 
Privilege, which justifies otherwise tortious conduct when - 
i t  is done to protect  cer ta in  interests. Aspects of this 
de f ense  we re  d i scussed  e a r l i e r  in connec t i on  wi th  
defamation. 
There also exist a number of defenses independent of the part iest  
conduct in a particular case. These include: 
e th requiring actions to be brought 
within a given t ime period a f t e r  the  alleged injurv had 
occurred; 
capacitv to  sue, requiring the plaintiff to  be of proper 
age and be mentally competent; 
ju r i sd ic t ion ,  requiring the case to  be filed in a court  
having power to  bind all part ies to  i t s  decision and to  
decide that particular class of dispute; 
compliance with court rules; and 
d o c t r i n e s  such  a s  standing, case and controversy, and 
mootness, which deal with the app rop r i a t enes s  of t h e  
a c t i o n  and which a r e  discussed in Section 4.1 of this 
volune. 
3.3.2.4.2 Immunities. There are two principal immunities enjoyed by 
the government: sovereign immunity, which protects governmental bodies 
from suit;  and official immunity, which protects  governmental officers 
themselves. These will be discussed in order. 
3.3.2.4.2.1 Sovereign Immunity. Sovereign immunity is a doctrine that 
bars individuals from suing the  government unless the government has 
g iven i t s  consent to  be sued. A number of justifications have been 
advanced for this ancient doctrine. These range from the  assertion t ha t  
government by its very nature can do no wrong, to the determination that 
beneficial public functions should not be impeded by lawsuits. The recent  
trend in most states has been to eliminate sovereign immunity entirely, or 
to weaken its application by creating numerous exceptions to the doctrine, 
on the theory that  an individual injured by governmental activity should 
not be required to bear the entire loss alone. 
The best known example of this trend is the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
which is a limited waiver of federal sovereign immunity. It permits an 
individual  plaintiff to  sue the United Sta tes  for the ac t s  of federal  
officers who, while acting in their official capacity, intentionally (with a 
few exceptions) or negligently cause damage to the plaintiff. It does not 
apply to state or local officials,  or to  tor ts  involving liability without 
fault ;  furthermore,  remedies are limited to money damages. Most states 
have also waived, a t  least in part, their immunities, but many s t a t e s  have 
placed restrictions on suits. 
3.3.2.4.2.2 Official Immunity. Official immunity, a doctrine of 
relatively recent  origin, protects  individual officers and employees of 
government  from liability for actions in the course of their  official  
duties. This doctrine is based on two de te rmina t ions :  f i r s t ,  good 
government requires that policy-making officials be free to make sensitive 
decisions wi thou t  t h e  f e a r  of being held l i ab l e ;  and s econd ,  t h e  
performance of vital public functions should not be hampered by repeated 
suits against those who perform them. Official immunity depends on the 
character  of the acts  i n  question, not the identity of the actor; in other 
words, a public official or employee who commits a to r t  i n  his capacity 
as a private citizen--such as a l e t t e r  carrier who negligently causes an 
automobile accident while on vacation--is not immune and can be held 
1 iable.  
The immunity of s t a t e  officers and employees has been weakened by 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871. That statute permits an individual plaintiff 
to  sue a s t a t e  officer who, while acting in his official capacity, violated 
a constitutional right of the plaintiff. I t  has recently been extended by 
the U.S. Supreme Court to permit suits against municipal governments for 
"continuing violations" of civil -rights. However, the Act does not permit 
suits for violations of civil rights by federal officials. Instead, a remedy 
against federal officials is apparently ava i l ab le  where  t h e  a c t i v i t y  
complained of also violates a provision of the United States Constitution, 
such as the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. Here, however, good fa i th  by the defendant is a valid 
defense; therefore, the application of this remedy is apparently limited to  
malicious intentional torts. 
3 . 3 . 2 . 5  Challenges to  the Exercise of S ta te  Power. There exists a 
class of actions labeled lfcivil" which are aimed a t  challenging the manner 
in which gove rnmen ta l  power is exe r c i s ed  r a t h e r  t han  obtaining 
compensation for a specific injury. The principal actions in this class 
include habeas corpus, mandamus, declaratory judgment actions, and any 
of a number of actions in which injunctions against governmental bodies 
are sought. 
Habeas corpus is an action by a person in custody (normally jail or 
prison, although confinement to  a mental hospital or being placed on 
probation a re  also considered "in custodyu) brought to challenge the legal 
basis for the restriction of his liberty. In this action, the governmental 
agency is commanded to  bring the confined person before a court, which 
then determines whether the confinement has violated some law-based 
constraint.  For example, imprisonment following an unfair trial might be 
attacked by a habeas corpus action. 
A declaratory judgment action is an action in which an individual 
seeks a judicial declaration of his legal rights in some controversy. This 
d i f f e r s  f rom t h e  c ivi l  a c t i on  in that  the court does not order any 
remedies. Declaratory judgment actions are not limited t o  controversies 
between individuals; one may seek a declaration of his rights wi th  respect 
to some governmental body. Where an agency of government is brought 
into such an action, the subject matter of the dispute frequently involves 
individual civil or constitutional rights. 
Agencies of government may be subject to suits in which an injunction 
is sought. The injunction, a court order prohibiting or commanding some 
conduct under penalty of law, is discussed more fully later in this section. 
This remedy may be sought in a tort action, or i t  may, for example, be 
sought in conjunction with an action seeking a declaratory judgment. 
3 . 3 . 2 . 6  Remedies. A plaintiff who prevails in a c iv i l  a c t i o n  is  
e n t i t l e d  t o  a remedy  t h a t  will compensate h i m  for the damage he 
suffered. Where the damage involves added expenses, loss or destruction 
of p r o p e r t y ,  o r  l o s s  of p r o f i t ,  t h e  m a t t e r  of compensa t ion  is  
straightforward: money damages a r e  awarded, and the  de f endan t  is  
ordered to  pay to the plaintiff the sum of money determined by the judge 
or jury to be proper. Some forms of damage, such as disfigurement, pain 
and suffering, or the loss of a spouse or relative, cannot be compensated 
in kind; instead, money damages are awarded as a substitute. 
Orders to pay money damages are  not "self-enforcing," that is, i t  is 
the  plaintiff's responsibility to collect the sum owed to him. If the  
defendant fails or refuses t o  pay, the court will assist the plaintiff; it 
will, if necessary, compel payment by ordering the  defendant's property 
seized and sold to raise the necessary funds. 
There a re  cases in which damages are partially or totally ineffective 
as a remedy. Damages are inadequate in a continuing to r t  such as air 
pollut ion:  t hey  ne i t he r  p r even t  nor compensate for fu tu re  harm. 
Damages may provide no remedy at  all where a defendant's conduct, i f  i t  
takes place, would cause permanent damage. In such cases a court might 
issue an injunction, that is, an order commanding the defendant to  stop 
engaging in t h e  to r t ious  conduct, or even to  take certain remedial 
actions, under penalty of contempt of court. A defendant found to  be in 
contempt is subject to fines and even incarceration until he agrees to 
obey the court'?injunction. Similarly, disobedience of mandamus and 
habeas corpus orders is punishable by court-ordered sanctions against those 
failing to comply. 
3.4 The Administrative Law System (ALS) 
The ALS is a law system in which governmental power is exercised to  
develop and enforce standards of behavior, and to resolve disputes, within 
narrowly defined and specialized areas. Author i ty  over  a l i m i t e d ,  
s p e c i a l i z e d  s u b j e c t  is  t h e  dis t inguishing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of t h e  
administrative bodies which make up the ALS. 
Administrative bodies, commonly referred to as lfagencies,fT are created 
by other governmental bodies that cannot themselves conduct the highly 
specialized or detailed business of governing a particular activity. Such 
activities have included testing and approving drugs, promoting industrial 
safe ty ,  and licensing drivers. Agencies may be established at  the federal 
or the state level; and they are normally created by legislative bodies. 
Agencies derive their authority as the result of a delegation of power 
by the bodies creating them. Their powers a re  usually carefully defined 
in t e r m s  of  scope  and s u b j e c t  m a t t e r ,  and their enforcement and 
sanctioning practices. To govern the exercise of their authority, agencies 
normally promulgate rules and regulations consistent with the powers 
granted them by the legislature. Agencies are  constrained not only by 
t he i r  own ru les  and regulations but also by s ta tu tes  regulating the 
practices of that specific agency as well as those of administrative bodies 
in general. Agencies a r e  also constrained in the exercise of their power 
by the requirements of substantive and procedural due process, which are 
discussed in more detai l  in Section 6.0 of this volume, as well as the  
other law-based constraints discussed in Section 7.0 through 10.0. 
Most agencies exist primarily to  make and enforce regulations t o  
promote public health, safety, and welfare. Some agencies primarily award 
and distribute benefits to  appropriate parties. Thus most agencies in 
e f f e c t  enforce  some standards of conduct, ei ther directly by enacting 
appropriate regulations, or indirectly by establishing eligibility cr i ter ia  for 
benefits.  Denial of benefits as well as sanctioning for violation of agency 
regulations has some characterist ics of a punishment and is therefore 
somewhat similar to a CJS sanction. 
The four-function description applicable to other law systems is also 
descriptive of the ALS. The f i rs t  function, law generation, commonly 
involves the promulgation of agency regulations within the agency's scope 
of authority. Statutes regulating administrative procedures often require 
public notice and a reasonable opportunity for public comment before 
agency regulations become effective. 
Enforcement, which includes investigation, is generally conducted by 
agency employees. These persons frequently enjoy greater  la t i tude in 
gathering information than do police officers. Individuals or entities 
subject to an agency's authority a r e  often required to furnish pertinent 
i n fo rma t ion ,  permit inspections, or otherwise cooperate with agency 
personnel, or else suffer penalties levied by the agency. 
Adjudicat ion can  t a k e  any of a variety of forms, ranging from 
summary disposition to a proceeding resembling a criminal trial.  The 
complexity of an administrative adjudication proceeding depends on how 
severe an impact the agency's action will have on the  individual brought 
before i t .  If an administrative penalty approaches the severi ty of a 
criminal sanction (such as revocation of a license to  practice law or 
medic ine)  o r  i f  a deprivation of benefits threatens to  cause severe 
hardship (such as the termination of w e l f a r e  paymen t s )  t hen  many 
guarantees, such as counsel or cross-examination of witnesses, that apply 
to criminal proceedings will be required in the  agency proceeding. One 
important characteristic distinguishes the administrative from the criminal 
ad jud i ca t i on  process :  t r i a l  by jury is not guaranteed by the  U.S. 
Constitution to an individual facing possible administrative sanctions. 
Administrative decisions are reviewable by higher administrative bodies, 
by courts, or by both. Review normally involves determining whether the 
agency acted according to the law and whether its decision was supported 
by substantial evidence; only in rare instances will a court in e f fec t  re t ry  
t h e  o r ig ina l  proceeding. The issue of appropriate procedures to  be 
followed by agencies a r e  discussed in more detai l  the  procedural due 
process materials found in Section 6.3 of this volume. 
When an administrative regulation has been violated the agency t ha t  
enforces i t  may normally impose a penalty--in effect a civil fine-upon 
the violator. The size of the penalty often depends on the  severi ty and 
willfulness of the  violation. Where an administrative scheme involves 
licensing, sanctions may also include license suspension or revocation. 
3.5 Summary 
The American legal system is a key element of the American system 
of government .  I t  is  no t  only t h e  m e c h a n i s m  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  
c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s  will be implemented, but also the  means by which 
law-based constraints a r e  enforced against government a1 bodies t h a t  
implement countermeasures. 
The American legal system is not a single system but the combination 
of several law systems. These include: the criminal justice sys tem 
(cJS), which includes the  t ra f f i c  law system (TLS); the civil law system 
(CLS); and the administrative law system (ALS). The principal objective of 
the CJS is to  reduce the incidence of conduct that poses risks to others; 
the specific goal of the  TLS is to  reduce the  incidence of dangerous 
driving that poses the risk of traffic crashes. 
The TLS must operate within the law-based constraints  governing i t s  
four functions: law generation, enforcement, adjudication, and sanctioning. 
Actions taken in violation of these constraints may be declared void by 
courts. 
The CLS is primarily a mechanism for resolving private disputes; 
however, governmental bodies may become part ies to  civil disputes. The 
CLS a l so  provides  two  methods  of enforcing law-based constraints 
governing the implementation of highway crash countermeasures. First ,  
governmental bodies or officers may abuse their powers and thus commit 
torts for which they may be held liable. Second, a number of actions 
labeled ffcivilfl  may in f a c t  be challenges t o  governmental action; these 
challenges include reviewing the  legali ty of certain actions, seeking a 
d e c l a r a t i o n  of one's  r i g h t s  with r e s p e c t  t o  governmental  bodies, 
commanding public officials to take actions required of them by law, and 
enjoining (p roh ib i t ing)  i l legal  official actions from taking place or 
continuing. 
The ALS consists of agencies responsible for governing specialized 
a r e a s  of a c t i v i t y ,  s o m e  of which r e l a t e  t o  t r a f f i c  s a f e t y  a n d  
countermeasure  implementation. Administrative agencies, like other 
governmental bodies, a re  subject t o  law-based c o n s t r a i n t s  on t h e i r  
a c t i v i t i e s .  
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should -- see  also, Annot., 127 A.L.R. 1513 (1940). The prerequisites for 
admission of chemical t e s t  results a t  t r ia l  a r e  discussed generally in 
Myrick v. City of Montgomery, 54 Ala. App. 5, 304 So.2d 247, cer t .  
denied, 293 ,41a. 768, 304 So.2d 248 (1974) [breath t es t  results] ; Mason, 
M.F., and Dubowski, K.M. 1974. Alcohol, traffic, and chemical testing in 
the  United States:  A resume and some remaining problems. Clinical 
Chemis t ry  20(2):126-40; Fisher, E.C. 1967. Legal aspects  of speed 
measurement devices. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University, Traffic 
Inst i tute;  Kopper, The Scientif ic  Reliability of Radar Speedometers, 33 
N.C.L. REV. 343 (1955) [ radar] ;  S t a t e  v. Kolander, 236 Minn. 209, 5 2  
N.W.2d 458 (1958) [blood alcohol content]; and Pruitt v. State, 216 Tenn. 
686, 393 S.W.2d 747 (1965) [same]. The qualifications of the operator of 
a s c i e n t i f i c  dev i ce  a r e  discussed in Annot., 77 A.L.R. 2d 971 (1961) 
[chemical testing for intoxication] ; and in Janson v. Fulton, 162 N.W.2d 
438 (1owa 1968) [samel. 
A su spec t ' s  guil t  of a criminal offense must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In this regard - see, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
Violations of constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules of evidence or 
procedure may provide grounds for appeal. In this regard see  generally, 
28 U.S.C.A. 5 1291 (West 1966) [right to appeal]; and FED. R. CRIM. P. 
52 [errors that do not affect substantial rights a r e  harmless and shall be 
disregarded on appeal]. 
The Traffic Law Svstem (TLS): A Subsvstem of the CJS 
The concept of a T r a f f i c  Law Sys tem (TLS) ,  and a f unc t i ona l  
description of the TLS, were introduced in Joscelyn, K.B., and Jones, R.K. 
1972. A systems analysis of the t raf f ic  law system. F ina l  r e p o r t .  
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration report FH-11-7270. 
The Civil Law Svstem (CLS) 
Principal Functions of the CLS 
For general discussion of the relationship between civil and criminal 
law and, more specifically, between torts and crimes, one should - see,  the 
following: Prosser, W.L. 1971. Handbook of the law of torts. 4th ed. 
pp, 7-11, 14-15. S t .  Paul:  West Publishing Company ;  a n d  H a l l ,  
Interrelationship of Criminal Law and Torts, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 753 
(1943). 
Much of civil law has been developed through court decisions; however, 
uniform codes governing certain areas have been widely enacted.  In this 
regard - see, for example, the Uniform Commercial Code (u.c.c.) (1972 
version), prepared by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform S t a t e  
Laws and the  American Law Institute. Adopted by 49 states, the U.C.C. 
regulates sales, banking, invest rn ent securities, and secured transactions 
o ther  than mortgages. Another widely-followed code is the Uniform 
Vehicle Code (u.V.C.), prepared by the  National Committee on Uniform 
Traffic Laws and Ordinances. 
A civil action is begun by filing a complaint with the court; -9 see 
e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 3. Sta tutes  explicitly creating causes of action 
include, for example, 15 U.S.C.A. S 15 (west 1976) [treble damages suit by 
private individual inujured by antitrust law violations] and MICH. COMP. 
LAWS A N N .  S 554.613 (Supp. 1978-79) [double damages suit by tenant upon 
landlord's failure to comply with the laws relating to security deposits]. 
Rules of procedure governing civil actions include the following: FED. 
R.  CIV. P. 26-37 [discovery p r o c e d u r e s ] ,  and FED. R .  CIV. P. 5 6  
[summary judgment]. For a general discussion concerning the burden of 
proof in a civil action -7 see  Botta -v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 
(1958). 
There a re  two exceptions to  the general rule of compensation. One 
involves a pro rata reduction in the judgment in those s ta tes  that  apply 
t h e  r u l e  of l f c o m p a r a t i v e  negligence1I where the  plaintiff had contributed 
t o  his injury by his own negligence; in this regard - see,  WIS. STAT. ANN. 
S 895,045 (Wes t  Supp. 1978-79) [ c o m p a r a t i v e  n e g l i g e n c e  s t a t u t e ] ;  and 
P l a c e k  v. C i t y  of S t e r l i n g  H e i g h t s ,  ---Mich.---, ---N.h7.2d---(1979) 
[discuss ing t h e  t h e o r y  underlying the  comparative-negligence doctrine and 
t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h a t  d o c t r i n e ]  . T h e  s e c o n d  e x c e p t i o n  is  p u n i t i v e  
d a m a g e s ,  which a r e  awarded t o  t h e  injured party t o  punish the  wrongdoer. 
In this regard - see, Prosser, W.T. 1971. Handbook of the  law of t o r t s .  4 t h  
ed. pp. 9 4 .  St. Paul: West Publishing Company. 
Basic Aspects of t h e  CLS 
T h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  f a u l t  a n d  t o r t  l i a b i l i t y  i s  discussed in the  
following: Holmes, O.W. 1881. T h e  c o m m o n  law.  pp. 144-63. Boston: 
L i t t l e ,  B r o w n ,  a n d  Company;  S m i t h ,  T o r t  and  Abso lu te  L iab i l i ty ,  30 
HARV. L. REV. (1917); Prosser, W.L. 1971. Handbook of the  l a w  of t o r t s .  
4 t h  e d .  pp .  28-76 ,  79-97 .  S t .  Paul :  West Publ ishing Company;  and  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S S  13-45A (1965). M a t e r i a l s  d e a l i n g  
wi th  n e g l i g e n c e  include:  P r o s s e r ,  W.L. 1971. Handbook of t h e  law of 
t o r t s .  4 t h  ed.  pp. 139-235.  S t .  P a u l :  W e s t  P u b l i s h i n g  C o m p a n y ;  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O F  TORTS S S  281-309 (1965); and Vaughan v. 
Menlove,  3 Bing. (N.c.) 467,  132 Eng. Rep .  490 ( c o m m o n  P l e a s  1837) 
[de f in ing  negligence] ; see  also, Peti t ion of Kinsman Transit Co.  in ins man 
No. 2 ~ 9 ,  388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) [extent of liability f o r  c o n s e q u e n c e s ]  ; 
P e t i t i o n  of Kinsman Trans i t  Co. ( l l ~ i n s m a n  No. 111), 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 
1964) [same]; and United S ta tes  v. C a r r o l l  Towing  Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d  
Ci r .  1947) [magnitude and probability of risk] . Tort  liability without fault  
is d iscussed g e n e r a l l y  in P r o s s e r ,  W.L. 1971. Handbook of t h e  l a w  of 
t o r t s .  4 t h  ed.  pp. 492-540, S t .  Paul: West Publishing Company. St r ic t  -
liability or liability without fault  can be c rea ted  e i t h e r  by c o u r t  dec i s ion  
o r  by s t a t u t e .  One class of s t a tu tes  imposing s t r i c t  liability a r e  so-called 
"dram-shop acts," which in some s ta tes  m a k e  a purveyor  of l iquor  l i a b l e  
f o r  in ju r ies  c a u s e d  by a n  in toxicated person t o  whom he provided liquor. 
Typical provisions include: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.  4 3 ,  S 135 ( S m i t h - ~ u r d  
Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 436.22 (1978); and PA. STAT. 
A N N .  t i t .  47,  5 4-497 (Purdon 1969). Materials dealing with s t r i c t  
criminal liability include: La Fave, W.R., and Scott ,  A.W., Jr .  1972. 
Criminal law. pp. 26-33. St. Paul: West Publishing Company; Perkins, 
R.M. 1969. Perkins on criminal law. 2d ed. pp. 9-23. 'Vineola, New 
York: The Foundation Press, Inc.; and Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 
COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933). Sta tutes  imposing s t r i c t  criminal liability 
normal ly  involve  hea l t h  or s a f e t y  regula t ions ,  enacted to  protect  
important public interests, and usually are punishable by relatively minor 
s anc t i ons .  Vicarious civil liability often results where one party is 
considered responsible for the actions of another party, who causes injury. 
Whether a vicarious relationship exists usually depends on whether one 
party has control-or a right of control-over another. In this regard -7 see  
RESTATEMENT ( S E C O N D )  OF AGENCY S 220 (1958). In r a r e  
ins tances--such a s  pure  food and drug  laws--vicar ious  c r i m i n a l  
responsibility might be imposed; in this regard - see, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. S 5  
331 e t  seq. (west  1972) [sale of adulterated foodl.  Vicarious criminal 
liability requires that the vicarious party have some lTresponsible relation" 
to the wrongdoer; in this regard - see, United States v. - Park, 421 U.S. 65B 
( 1975). 
Ma te r i a l  dea l ing  with de f ama t ion  include: Prosser, W.L. 1971. 
Handbook of the law of torts.  4th ed. pp. 737-76, 777-801. St. Paul: 
West Publishing Company [defamation torts] ; - Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 
(1959) [privilege of executive officials] ; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964) [cons t i tu t iona l  privilege, public officials] ;  and 
RESTATEMENT ( S E C O N D )  OF TOHTS S S  600-602 (1965) [qua l i f i ed  
privileges]. One should see  also, Time, Inc. v. Hil!, 385 U.S. 534 (19671, 
which deals with false light invasion of privacy, and involves concepts 
similar to those underlying defamation. 
Materials dealing with products liability include: RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A (1965) [strict liability in  tortl ; Greenman v. 
Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 877, 2 7  Cal. Rptr. 697 
(1963) [str ict  liability in tor t l  ; U.C.C. S 2-318 (1972 version) [warranties 
imposed by law]; Henninqsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 
A.2d 69 (1960) [implied warranty, products other than food]; Mazetti v. 
Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913) [implied warranty, non-food 
products]; Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932) 
[implied warranty, food products] ; and MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 
217 N.Y. 382, Ill N.E. 1050 (1916) [negligence by manufacturer]. 
Defenses and Immunities to Tort Liability 
The concept of assumption of risk is dealt with in Prosser, W.L. 1971. 
Handbook of t h e  law of torts .  4th ed. pp. 439-57. St. Paul: West 
Publishing Company. Some states have chosen to abolish this defense and 
reso lve  c a s e s  so le ly  on t h e  bas i s  of neg l igence  and contributory 
negligence; - see, e.g., Fengler v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133 N.W.2d 136 
(1965); and McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238 
(1963). The authority of law defense is discussed in Prosser, W.L. 1971. 
Handbook of the  law of torts .  4th ed. pp. 134, 987-92. St. Paul: West 
Publishing Company; in this regard see  generally, Fisher, E.C. 1967. 
Laws of  a r r e s t .  Evanston Illinois: Traffic Inst i tute,  Northwestern 
University; Note, The Law of Citizens Arrest,  65 COLUM. L. REV, 5 0 2  
(1965); and Perkins, The Law of Arrest,  25 IOWA L. REV. 201 (1940). 
Consen t  is  d iscussed in t h e  fo l lowing  ma te r i a l s :  Schneck lo th  v. 
Bus t amon te ,  412 U.S. 218 (1973) [ i s sue  of consen t  depends on all 
surrounding fac t s  and circumstancesl;  OtBrien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 154 
Mass. 2 7 2 ,  28 N.E. 266 (1891) [conduct] ; and Mohr -v. Williams, 95 Minn. 
261, 104 N . W .  12 (1905) [ scope  of consen t ]  ; s e e  a l so ,  McCoid,  A -
Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. 
REV. 381 (1957). 
Poss ible  j u s t i f i c a t i ons  fo r  sovereign immunity a r e  discussed in: 
Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The 
Jurisdiction, and Part ies Defendent, 68 MICH. L .  REV. 389 (1968); 
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank,  205 U.S. 349 (1907); and Poindexter v. 
Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884); in this regard one should see also, Dalehite 
v. United States,  345 U.S. 15 (1953). The federal government has waived 
some aspects of its immunity through The Federal Tort Claims Act, the  
substantive portion of which is found a t  28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2671-2670 (west 
Supp. 1978). Typical court decisions dealing with sovereign immunity 
include: Davies v. City of Bath, 364 A.2d 1269 ( ~ e .  1976) [abolishing the 
defense] ; Jones v. S ta te  Highway Commission, 557 S.W.2d 225 (YO. 1977) 
[same] ; and IYhitney V. City of Worcester, - Vass. ---, 366 N.E.2d 1210 
(1977) [limiting the scope of the  defense]. One should see  generally, 
National Association of Attorneys General. 1976, Sovereign immunity: 
the liability of government and its officials. rev. ed. Raleigh: National 
Association of Attorneys General. Distinctions often have been made 
bet ween flgovernmental f unctions1' or lfdiscretionary actsI1 which cannot 
provide the basis for suitTand ltproprietary functions" or ltqinist erial acts" 
which may. In this regard - see: United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); and Weeks v. City of Newark, 
62 N . J .  Super. 166, 162 A.2d 314 (App. Div. 1960); see also, Dalehite v. 
United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). Statutes which permit suits against the  
government commonly exclude the performance of governmental functions 
from liability; typical provisions include: ALASKA STAT. S 0 9.5 0.2 50 (1) 
(1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS A N N .  S 641.1407 (Supp. 1978-79); and UTAH 
CODE ANN.  S 63-30-3 (Supp. 1978-79). One should see  also, Harley and 
Wasinger,  Governmental Immunity: Despotic Mantle or Creature of 
Necessity, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 12 (1976). In addition, many waivers of 
immunity explicitly declare the government immune as against certain 
tor t  actions; - see  e.g., 28 U.S.C.A. S 2680(a) (West  1965) [ r e t a i n ing  
immunity as against certain intentional to r t s ] .  Materials dealing with 
official immunity include: Stump v.  Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) 
[judges] ; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) [prosecutorsl ; Barr -v. 
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) [high executive officials] ; and Kilbourn v. 
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881) [legislatorsl ; one shollld see also, Jennings, 
Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263 (1937); 
and Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 
MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955). State officials may be sued under The Civil 
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 1983 (west  1974); in this regard -9 see 
Monroe v. Pape, - 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Counties remain immune from Section 
1983 suits; - -  see,  Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); however, 
municipal governments and their officials now may be sued under The 
Civi l  R i g h t s  A c t  f o r  "con t inu ing  violationsTT of civil rights; this principle 
was set out in Monell v. New York C i t y  D e p a r t m e n t  of S o c i a l  S e r v i c e s ,  
436  U.S. 6 5 8  (1978) .  F e d e r a l  o f f i c i a l s  may  b e  s u e d  f o r  i n t e n t i o n a l  
v iola t ions  of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t s  under  t h e  dec i s ion  in Bivens  v. - Six 
Unknown N a m e d  Agents of the  Federal  Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
Challenges t o  t h e  Exercise of S t a t e  Power 
Official actions may be challenged, in a p p r o p r i a t e  c a s e s ,  under  s t a t e  
t o r t  l a w ,  T h e  C i v i l  R i g h t s  A c t  of 1871, o r  under  Bivens.  A person  
unlawfully placed in custody may challenge his confinement by p e t i t i o n i n g  
f o r  h a b e a s  corpus ;  in  t h i s  r e g a r d  -7 s e e  28 U.S.C.A. 59 2241 e t  seq. (wes t  
1971); Fay v. Noia, - 372 U.S. 391 (1963); a n d  FED. R. CRIM. P. 81(a)(2). 
D e c l a r a t o r y  judgments  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  in federal  courts under 28 U.S.C.A. 
55 2201-2202 (West 1959); in this regard s e e  also, Skelly Oil Co. v. Phi l l ips  
P e t r o l e u m  Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1959) [ r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  valid declaratory 
action].  Mandamus and p roh ib i t ion  a r e  d i scussed  g e n e r a l l y  in Davis ,  K. 
1958. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  law treatise.  pp. 307-10. St. Paul: West Publishing 
Company. 
R e m e d i e s  a r e  d i scussed  in general  in Dobbs, D.B. 1973. Handbook of 
t h e  law of remedies. pp. 105-13. S t .  Paul:  West Publ ishing Company;  
and  Wright ,  T h e  Law of Remedies as  a Social Institution, 18 U. DET. L.J. 
376 (1955). 
The Administrative Law System 
I n t r o d u c t o r y  materials  in the  Administrative Law System include Davis, 
K.C. 1972. Administrative l a w  t e x t .  3d ed.  S t .  Paul:  West Publ ishing 
Company;  H u t t ,  Phi losophy of R e g u l a t i o n ,  28 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 
177 (1973); and Robinson, The Making of A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  Pol icy:  A n o t h e r  
L o o k  a t  R u l e m a k i n g  a n d  Adjud ica t ion  a n d  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  P r o c e d u r e  
Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1970). 
S t a t u t e s  c r e a t i n g  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  bod ies  inc lude ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  
fol lowing:  42 U.S.C.A. S 2000c-4 ( w e s t  1 9 7 4 )  [ c r e a t i n g  t h e  E q u a l  
E m p l o y m e n t  O p p o r t u n i t y  Commiss ion]  ; 15 U.S.C.A. SS 1381 e t  seq. (West 
1974) [creating the U.S. Department of Transportation] ; and MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. SS 18.351-18.368 (Supp. 1978-79) [creating a Crime Victims 
Compensation Board]. Delegation of power also may take place within an 
agency; in this regard - see, 49 C.F.R. 5  1.51 (1978) [delegation of authority 
from U.S. Department of Transportation to  National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration]. Examples of regulations enacted pursuant t o  
s ta tu tory  authority include the  motor vehicle safety standards set out in 
49 C.F.R. SS 571.1 et  seq. (1978). 
Administrative procedures a re  regulated a t  the federal level by the 
Federal Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.A. S S  551 e t  seq. 
(wes t  1977). An example of an equivalent s t a t e  a c t  is the Michigan 
Administrative Procedures Act of 1969, MICH. COVP. LAWS A N N .  S S  
24.201 e t  seq. (Supp. 1978-79). APA provisions deal with a number of 
topics including: notice and hearing, - 9  see  5 U.S.C.A. S S  554(b), 554(c), 
556-57 (West Supp. 1977); and judicial review, -7 see 5 U.S.C.A. 5 5  702, 704, 
706 (west Supp. 1977). 
Examples of inspections carried out with respect to regulatory schemes 
are found in the following cases: United Sta tes  v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 
(1972) [gun control] ;  Wyman v. James,  400 U.S. 309 (1971) [welfare] ; 
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United Sta tes ,  397 U.S. 72 (1970) [liquor]; 
and United Sta tes  v. Thrif t imart ,  Inc., 429 F.2d 1006 (9th ~ i r . ) ,  cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 296 (1970) [health]. Regulatory inspections a r e  discussed 
fur ther  i n  the search and seizure materials found in Section 8.0 of this 
volume. Typical provisions imposing penalties on violators of regulatory 
s ta tu tes  include the motor vel-licle defect  recall provisions found in 15 
U.S.C.A. S S  1381 et  seq. (West 1974); and provisions permitting revocation 
of f e d e r a l  f u n d s  f r o m  e d u c a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i ons  p r a c t i c i n g  sex  
discrimination, found in 20 U.S.C.A. S 1682 (West Supp. 1978). 
4.0 LEGAL METHODOLOGY 
Many of the legal issues giving rise to constraints on governmental 
act ivi ty are  the product of judge-made law. The bulk of the materials 
presented in Sections 6.0 through 11.0 of this volume were developed by 
court decisions interpreting the U.S. and state constitutions, legislation, 
and prior court decisions. These decisions were the product of a formal 
decision-making process used by judges deciding cases and by attorneys 
arguing cases before judges. Familiarity with this process is therefore 
helpful in understanding the remainder of this volume. 
This section first introduces the principles of common, or judge-made 
law, discusses the important principles used by judges to  decide cases 
brought before them, and finally deals with the legal principles used by 
judges in construing and interpreting statutes. 
4.1 Introduction to the Common Law 
One of the most important features of the American legal system is 
its use of common law principles. This remains true even though much 
of the law has been codified. Two factors contribute to the importance 
of the common law. First ,  because legislatures cannot anticipate and 
deal with every conceivable s e t  of facts ,  courts a re  frequently called 
upon to interpret statutes, applying them to  fac t  situations not clearly 
t rea ted in the s ta tu te .  Second, courts must decide whether legislation is 
consistent with the U.S. and state constitutions, and their decisions may 
result in their modifying or even overruling existing laws. Both of these 
tasks are carried out by courts with the aid of common-law principles. 
4.1.1 Development of the Common Law. Common law is judge-made 
law; it originated in feudal and medieval England and was retained by the 
s ta tes  when they achieved independence. It developed in large part as a 
means of establishing centralized control of England; such control was 
made easier by ensuring that  all judges i n  the kingdom applied uniform 
legal standards. Common law results from numerous decisions of disputes, 
each of them setting out the facts of the dispute, i t s  resolution by the 
court, and the legal reasons supporting the resolution. 
In addition to ensuring uniformity, common law principles also provided 
both courts and parties to lawsuits some measure of predictability, that 
is, a given set of facts would likely lead to  a certain legal conclusion. 
This p r ed i c t ab i l i t y  a l lowed persons  t o  know in advance the legal 
consequences of their actions. It also aided judges called on to  make 
rulings under given sets of facts. 
When common-law judges were faced with novel fact situations, thev 
decided them by analogy. Prior rulings made in analogous fac t  situations 
l ed  t o  similar  rulings in l a te r  cases brought before courts. Not all 
decisions were so straightforward; some, for example, involved f a c t  
situations governed by two opposing se ts  of legal principles. In such 
cases, courts examined the competing social policies supporting each of 
the  opposing rules of law and then chose the rule supported by the more 
s trongly-held policy. 
To permit access to  prior decisions it became necessary to record and 
collect reports of earlier cases. These were assembled in volumes called 
reporters, Today, decisions of most courts of record, federal and state, 
are collected and published; and elaborate digesting and indexing methods 
have been developed to  aid in researching cases dealing with a specific 
topic. 
4.1.2 Reliance on Precedent. Earlier cases relied upon to support 
later rulings in related f a c t  situations a r e  collectively referred to  as 
precedent. An earlier case that best articulates a specific legal principle, 
and which is followed by l a te r  courts, is commonly referred to  as the 
leading case dealing with that  principle. The overall process by which 
courts use prior judicial decisions as the basis of their rulings is known as 
stare decisis. 
Courts follow the principle of s t a re  decisis i n  the great majority of 
cases brought before them. They have, however, departed from precedent 
where the social conditions that  supported earlier cases were found no 
longer  t o  apply .  An example  of this is the Supreme Court's 1954 
school-desegregation decision, which explicitly overruled an earl ier  case 
permitting segegation on a tlseparate-but-equalTT basis. The law involving 
civil liberties, criminal procedure, and tor ts  is especially susceptible t o  
changes  in prevailing social policy and is therefore likely t o  involve 
departures from precedent. In addition, in all areas of law, s t a tu tes  rnay 
be enacted which overrule established precedent. 
4.2 Construction of Statutes 
C o u r t s  a r e  called upon to  construe, or in terpre t ,  s t a tu tes  in two 
situations: first, when there is an apparent  conflict between a s t a t u t e  
and some higher legal authori ty (usually a constitutional provision); and 
second, when the language of a statute does not clearly apply t o  a given 
set of facts. 
Courts will not overturn s ta tu tes  unless they represent exercises of 
power clearly forbidden the legislature by the  U.S. or s t a t e  constitution. 
More frequent are  cases where the exercise of legislative power itself is 
constitutional, but under the statute would be carried out in such a way 
as to  violate the Constitution. (Examples of this a re  discussed in the 
materials  in substantive due process in Section 6 . 2 . )  Even where  a 
s t a t u t e  v iola tes  the Constitution, courts a re  reluctant  t o  declare i t  
entirely void; instead, where possible, a court will invalidate only the  
unconstitutional sections of the s t a t u t e ,  or will in terpre t  the s ta tu te  
tlnarrowly,TT that is, in such a way as to rule out any forbidden exercises 
of governmental power. 
Sta tutes  cannot possibly anticipate all fact situations that might arise 
under a statute; courts a r e  therefore  called upon to  decide disputes to  
which the s t a t u t e  provides no clear answer. Here, statutory construction 
involves an examination by the court of the goals and policies supporting 
the legislation, and application of those considerations to the particular 
dispute before it. Courts often use maxims of s ta tu tory  construction t o  
a id  them in determining legislative policy. For example, legislation 
dealing with specific topics would take precedence over more general 
provisions; and more recent  legislation dealing with an issue would have 
greater weight than earlier enactments in that area. 
4.3 Choosing Disputes for Judicial Resolution. Because the decision 
of a lawsuit could a f fec t  part ies to future lawsuits as well as those in 
the action before the court, a number of rules have been developed by 
c o u r t s  t o  a s su r e  t h a t  decis ions  would be made only a f te r  careful 
consideration of all facts and legal arguments on both sides. These rules 
include, for example: the case and controversy requirement, the principle 
of mootness, and the requirement of standing. 
Before any of these queCtions arise, however, the court must first be 
satisfied that the dispute brought before it is of a type tha t  a court will 
hear and decide. Courts will refuse t o  decide some matters,  such as 
so-called ?'political  question^^^ because these, as a practical  mat ter ,  a r e  
p roper ly  reso lved  by o t h e r  branches of government. At the other 
extreme, courts will not decide frivolous questions, or ones tha t  only 
remotely raise legal controversies, because entertaining such issues wastes 
time and detracts from the dignity of the judicial system. Once a court 
is sat isf ied tha t  the subject matter of a case is appropriate for decision, 
it will then apply such principles as case and controversy, mootness, and 
standing, which will be discussed in order. 
4.3.1 The Case  and Con t rove r sy  Requ i r emen t .  The c a s e  and 
controversy requirement seeks to  avoid binding courts and part ies t o  
premature decisions. I t  requires tha t  an actual  dispute be underway 
before a court will intervene to resolve i t ,  so that  both sides of the 
dispute a re  fully and fairly presented. A number of s t a tes ,  however, 
permit their appellate courts to issue so-called "advisory opinionsT1 upon 
request by appropriate governmental agencies; these opinions decide legal 
i ssues  be fo r e  an actual  controversy arises. This departure from the 
case-and-controversy policy has been justified by the  importance of the 
interests  that  could be affected by the decision, and the benefits of 
obtaining a prompt resolution of the question. 
4.3.2 The Mootness Principle. The mootness principle seeks to avoid 
unnecessary decisions of disputes that have progressed to an outcome that 
a judicial decision can no longer a f fec t .  For example, a student may 
allege that  he was denied admission to  a college on account of racial 
discrimination yet attend anyway because of preliminary decisions made 
while the  suit was pending. Should he die, transfer, or graduate before 
the discrimination issue is finally resolved, his claim would become moot: 
no ruling could possibly affect the fact that he was no longer enrolled. 
4.3.3 The Standing Requirement. The standing requirement exists t o  
avoid weak or ineffective advocacy of lawsuits by individuals who are not 
truly concerned with their outcome. To bring a suit  one must have  
standing to  sue, tha t  is, a financial or other stake in the outcome that 
would provide an incentive to effectively raise and argue all legal issues 
that apply to the case. 
4 . 3 . 4  Departures from Policy. Such rules as stare decisis, standing, 
case and controversy, and mootness exist to protect the quality of judicial 
decisions. In this way, the  possibility of parties to lawsuits being bound 
without having had any opportunity to  be heard is minimized, and the  
number of unfair rulings caused by poor advocacy on the part  of one 
party is reduced. These rules also permit courts  t o  avoid  dec id ing  
troublesome issues that they do not wish to confront. On the other hand, 
because the rules are not absolute, and because stronger social policies 
may outweight them, courts may choose to make exceptions, and hear and 
decide certain cases. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court disregarded 
the mootness rule when i t  decided the abortion cases. Because the pace 
of the judicial system virtually guaranteed that  such cases would not be 
reso lved  un t i l  long a f t e r  t h e  p r egnan t  wom en who brought suits  
challenging abortion restr ict ions would have brought a child to  term,  
s t r i c t  obedience t o  the mootness rule would have prevented the abortion 
issue from ever being resolved. The Court, recognizing stronger reasons to  
hear these cases than to follow its traditional rules, accordingly made an 
exception. 
4.3 .5  Other Principles of Decision. Once a court agrees to take a - 
case, i t  will attempt to reach a decision on the  narrowest legal grounds 
possible t o  limit the binding effect of its decision on other disputes. For 
example, where an action raises both constitutional and statutory issues, a 
court deciding the dispute will a t t emp t  t o  resolve i t  on the statutory 
issues alone and avoid making any constitutional rulings. 
A closely related principle is that courts will decide only the specific 
dispute brought before i t ;  they will not look beyond the f ac t s  of the  
immediate case and ant ic ipate  or resolve other disputes. The policy 
behind this rule is that the parties to other disputes should not be legally 
bound without f irst  having the opportunity to  raise and argue any new 
legal issues. 
4.4 Summary 
Many of t h e  l e g a l  i s sues  t h a t  may cons t r a in  c o u n t e r m e a s u r e  
implementation arise from common or judye-made law. Because i t  is 
irnpossi ble for constitutions and legislation to deal in advance with every 
conceivable legal dispute, decisions must be made by courts  on the basis 
of prior decisions as disputes occur. To aid courts in deciding, a set of 
legal principles have been developed. First  of all ,  decisions a r e  made 
consistent with prior rulings in similar fact situations. Precedent will be 
relied upon unless the social policies supporting prior decisions a r e  found 
no longer to  apply. Second, courts will decide only those disputes that 
are appropriate for judicial resolution. When i t  is not necessary for a 
c o u r t  to  decide a case,  when the danger exists that  persons may be 
affected by a ruling without having had an opportunity t o  be heard, or 
when a court does not wish to  confront an issue, it may decline to hear 
and decide a case. These se l f - imposed  r e s t r i c t i o n s  wi l l ,  in some  
instances, give way to  stronger social policies i n  favor of deciding a 
particular case. 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY FOR LEGAL METHODOLOGY 
Introduction to the Common Law 
The meaning of all  s t a tu tes  must, t o  some extent, be interpreted by 
courts. Some statutes lay down general standards tha t  must be applied 
by courts, such as the Sherman Antitrust Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. SS 
1-7 (West 1973), and the Clayton Antitrust Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. 
S S  12-27 ( w e s t  1973). Other s t a tu tes  in e f fec t  adopt court-created 
definitions; in this regard - see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 750.321 
(19681, which refers to manslaughter but does not define it. 
Since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1  ranch) 137 (1803), federal  courts  
have decided questions of whether legislation is in conflict with the U.S. 
Constitution. The following cases a r e  typical of those overruling s t a t e  
l eg i s l a t i on  a s  unconst i tu t ional :  Baker v. Carr ,  369 U.S. 186 (1972) -
[legislative apportionment statute] ; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663 (1966) [state poll tax]; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965) [s ta tu tes  regulating a c c e s s  t o  c o n t r a c e p t i v e s ]  ; and Near v .  -
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) [censorship statute]. 
A general discussion of reliance or precedent can be found in Burnet 
v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (dissenting opinion). 
An example of adherence t o  precedent is Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 250 
(19721, upholding earlier U.S. Supreme Court decisions exempting baseball 
from antitrust laws, even though other professional sports have been made 
s u b j e c t  t o  t h e m .  H o w e v e r ,  p r e c e d e n t  w a s  r e j e c t e d  in  t h e  
school-desegregation decision, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347  
U.S. 483 (1954), which overruled the "separate but equalyf doctrine of 
segregation set out earlier in IPlessv v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
Construction of Statutes 
I n t roduc to ry  m a t e r i a l s  on the construction and interpretat ion of 
statutes can be found in 73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes S S  142-341 (1974). 
Choosing Disputes for Judicial Resolution 
Cases in which the  concept of a TTpolitical questionTT is  d i scussed  
include: Baker v. Carr ,  - 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 
433 (1939); and Luther v. Borden,  48 U.S. (7  How.) 1 (1849). The 
requirement  of "case and controversyTT is dealt  with in the  following 
decisions: Poe - v. Ullman, 267 U.S. 497 (1961) [requiring tha t  
is, tha t  an actual controversy be underway] ; United States v. Johnson, 319 
U.S. 302 (1943) [same]; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); and 
Chicago & Grand Trunk R.R. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892) [prohibiting 
ITfriendlyTT or collusive suits]. The doctrine of mootness was used t o  avoid 
deciding the merits  of a case is DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) 
[challenge to constitutionality of affirmative action program].  Cases in 
which the requirement of standing is dealt with include: Warth v. Seldin - -7 
422 U.S. 490 (1975) [standing to raise the rights of third parties] ; Sierra 
Club -v, Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) [standing to raise interests of the 
environment] ; - Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) [standing t o  challenge 
alleged violations of First Amendment, namely establishment of religion] ; 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) [standing to  raise the rights 
of third parties]; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) [standing of 
taxpayer and s t a t e  t o  challenge expenditure of federal  funds]. Other 
techniques of avoiding the unnecessary decision of constitutional questions 
are discussed generally in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority , 2 9 7 
U.S. 288 (1936). One should see  also, the following: Berea College v. 
Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) [decision of s t a t e  law i s sues  t o  avoid  
constitutional issues] ; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) [construction 
of s t a t u t e  so as t o  avoid constitutional question];  and Tyle r  v. The  -
Judges, 179 U.S. 405 (1900) [holding that  person bringing suit must show 
harm flowing from constitutional violation] . None of the  rules discussed 
in this section a re  absolutely binding, and exceptions have been made in 
appropriate cases. The l a t t e r  approach is i l lustrated by the  abortion 
cases, Roe - v. Wade, - 410 U.S. 113 (1973)~ and Doe - v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 
(1973). 
5.0 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY LAW-BASED CONSTRAINTS 
The materials appearing in Sections 6.0 through 11.0 of this volume 
discuss a series of specif ic law-based constraints on counte rmeasure  
implementation. Most of the discussion in those sections centers around 
provisions of the  U.S. Constitution, and this is so for three  reasons. 
First ,  the U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land and, therefore, 
is a potential constraint on all legislation and governmental ac t iv i ty ,  
including countermeasure implementation. Second, the guarantees of 
individual liberty found in the Constitution are minimum protections t ha t  
cannot be infringed by government a t  any level. Third, the protections 
afforded by state constitutions a re  for the most part  identical to  those 
afforded by the U.S. Constitution. 
However, the U.S. Constitution is not the sole source of law-based 




administrative regulations; and 
0 common-law decisions. 
I t  is  t h e r e f o r e  nece s sa ry  f o r  t h e  reader to  be aware that  cer ta in  
government activity that is not forbidden by the  U.S. Constitution may 
nevertheless be illegal because law-based constraints derived from other 
legal sources would be applicable. 
This section discusses three concepts tha t  underlie the materials in 
Sections 6.0 through 11.0. Discussion f i rs t  centers  on the  application of 
guarantees found in the  Bill of Rights; second, these materials deal with 
the development of additional guarantees under s t a t e  constitutions; and 
finally, this section treats legislative constraints derived from statutes and 
administrative regulations. 
5.1 Application of the Bill of Rights to the States 
The Bill of Rights consists of the f irst  ten amendments to  the U.S. 
Constitution. Their provisions, by their very terms, apply to the federal 
government. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court had long held tha t  specific 
guarantees found i n  the Bill of Rights bound the federal government only, 
and not the states. 
However, the Fourteenth Amendm ent-enacted shortly after the Civil 
War-guaranteed individuals due process of law and equal protection of 
the laws, and specifically applied to  the states. Recent Supreme Court 
decisions have held that due process of law uincorporatesll most of the 
Bill of Rights guarantees and thus makes them applicable to the states. 
Today, most provisions of the  Bill of Rights constrain the activi t ies of 
state and local governments as well as the federal government. 
5.2 Additional Protections of Individual Rights Under State Constitutions 
The U.S. Cons t i  tu t ion l s  guarantees of individual rights represent 
minimum protections that cannot be infringed by any governmental bodv. 
This is because the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and is 
binding on every unit of government in the  country. Therefore, s t a t e  
courts cannot interpret  the U.S. Constitution differently than the U.S. 
Supreme Court, and this is so whether a s t a t e  court a t t empts  to  add to 
or subtract  from those protections of individual rights defined by the 
Supreme Court. 
S ta te  courts may, as a matter of state law, grant increased protection 
for certain individual rights. This has occurred in some s ta tes ;  major 
areas of s t a t e  court act ivi ty have included privacy, criminal procedure, 
and substantive due process. However, s t a t e  courts may never cut  back 
any of the protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, even if they 
claim to do so as a matter of their own law. 
5.3 Statutory Protection of Individual Rights 
Because the U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land, any 
s t a t u t e  or administrative regulation--federal or state--that comes in 
conflict with it will be declared unconstitutional. It follows that  rights 
anteed by the Constitution cannot be cut  back through legislation. 
On the other hand, it is possible for legislative bodies to  c rea te  rights in 
addition to those guaranteed by the Constitution, and these will have a 
constraining effect similar to that of the constitutional guarantees. I t  is 
only where a legislative body lacks the power t o  act-such as where a 
state legislature attempts to regulate in areas preempted by the  federal  
government or ac t s  in violation of some constitutional provision-that the 
creation of statutory rights would be held unconstitutional. 
5.4 Summary 
The U.S. Constitution provides minimum guarantees of individual rights 
to constrain all units of government. Countermeasure activi ty prohibited 
by one or more provisions of the U.S. Constitution is constrained from 
being 'carried out. On the other hand, countermeasure a c t i v i t y  not  
prohibited by the U.S. Constitution may nevertheless be constrained by 
state constitutions, as well as by s ta tu tes  or administrative regulations, 
all of which may provide additional protection of individual rights. 

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTOE1Y LAW-BASED CONSTRAINTS 
Application of the Bill of Rights to the States 
The leading case holding that the Bill of Rights, U.S. CONST. amends. 
I-X, was binding on the  federal  government only and not the states was 
Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 
(1833). In this mat ter  one should see also: Adamson v. California, 332 
U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); and Twining v. 
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
In Wolf -v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the U.S. Supreme Court held 
tha t  the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and 
seizures was made binding on the s ta tes  by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In Mapp v. Ohio, - 367 U.S. 642 (1961), the  
Court also imposed upon the states the exclusionary rule as a remedy for 
Fourth Amendment violations. Other cases holding provisions of the Bill 
of Rights applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause include: 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) [Fifth Amendment guarantee 
against double jeopardy] ; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) [Sixth 
Amendment right t o  jury tr ial  in criminal cases];  Klopfer  v. North 
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) [Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial]; 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) [zones of privacy guaranteed 
by various constitutional provisions1 ; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) 
[Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses a t  a criminal trial] ; 
Cox - v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) [Fifth Amendment freedoms of 
speech and assembly]  ; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) [ F i f t h  
Arnendm ent privilege against self-incrimination] ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1963) [Sixth Amendment right to  counsel]; and Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) [Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment] . 
Additional Protection of Individual Rights Under State Constitutions 
In Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) the Supreme Court held that 
state courts may, as a mat ter  of their own law, enlarge constitutional 
protections of individual rights. One should see  also, Brennan, State 
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. R E V .  
489 (1977). Examples of such state protections include: ALASKA CONST. 
art. I, 5 22 [protection of privacy]; TEX CONST. ar t .  I, 5 18 [prohibiting 
imprisonment for debt]; MO, CONST. art. I, 5 29 [guaranteeing employers 
the right to organize and bargain collectivelyl ; Ravin v. S ta te ,  537 P.2d 
4 9 4  (Alaska 1975) [privacy protections for so-called victimless crime]; Arp -
v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Board, 19 Cal. 3d 395, 563 P.2d 849, 
138 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1977) [discrimination on basis of s ex ] ;  Horton v. 
Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) [school funding s y s t e m ]  ; 
People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7 ,  210 N.W.2d 336 (1973) [criminal law and 
procedure; protection of defendant in e n t r a p m e n t  c a se s ]  ; Southern  
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 
A.2d 713 (1975) [exclusionary zoning] ; and Pennsylvania S t a t e  Board of 
Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 272 A.2d 487 (1971) [invalidation of state 
regulations fixing prices] . 
Statutorv Protection of Individual Ri~thts 
Protections afforded by state statutes but not guaranteed by the U.S. 
or  s t a t e  cons t i tu t ions  a re  numerous. In this regard one should see  -
generally, Fein, i3ruce E. 1978. Significant decisions of the  Supreme 
Court,  1976-77 term. pp. 6-11. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research. One class of s ta tu tory  protections 
that  will be t rea ted extensively in this volume consists of the rights 
granted drivers, in connection with chemical test ing for blood alcohol 
content  (BAC), as the result of implied-consent legislation. In this regard 
one should - see, Sections 8.0 and 9.0 of this volume and accompanying 
bibliographic materials. Another group of protections is found in privacy 
protection legislation, which regulates the  collection, maintenance, and 
dissemination of personal data. These statutes are discussed in Section 
11.0 of this volume and accompanying bibliographic materials. 
6.0 THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW REQUIREMENT 
The requirement of due p rocess  of law is a imed  a t  p r o t e c t i n g  
individuals from unfair or oppressive treatment by the government. Due 
process has two concerns: first, with the permissible substance or subject 
mat ter  of legislation; and second, with the manner in which legislation is 
applied. 
6.1 Introduction: Due Process Generally 
The due process requirement is specifically mentioned in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments t o  the U.S. Constitution. The former provision 
binds the  federal government, the l a t t e r  applies t o  s t a t e  and l o c a l  
governments. Both forbid deprivations of "life, liberty, and property 
without due process of law.ff What consti tutes !'due processff is no t  
defined in the Constitution, and has been a question left to the courts. 
The due process requirement, as interpreted and ap~ l i ed  by the courts, 
has taken on two distinct aspects. The f irst  of them, substantive due 
process, is concerned with the substance or subject mat ter  of legislation. 
It forbids legislation that serves no reasonable purpose and legislation that 
unnecessarily infringes personal liberty. The second aspect ,  procedural 
due process, is concerned with the manner in which otherwise valid laws 
a re  implemented, that  is, whether government is act ing fairly in i t s  
deal ings  with individuals. Because distinct bodies of law have been 
developed with respect to each aspect  of due process, they a re  t rea ted 
separately in these background materials. Section 6.2 will deal with 
substantive due process, while Section 6.3 will t r ea t  procedural  due 
process . 
In this section and in succeeding sections of these materials, emphasis 
is placed on the  law-based c o n s t r a i n t s  t h a t  bind s t a t e  and l oca l  
governments .  This is  because  most highway crash countermeasure 
programs are implemented by these governmental units, as an exercise of 
their police powers. 
6.2 Substantive Due Process of Law 
The  t e r m  f f subs tan t ive  due processrr is not mentioned in the U.S. 
Constitution. However, court decisions interpret ing the Due Process 
Clause  have developed a body of law forbidding unfair or oppressive 
legislation, or laws that unnecessarily infringe personal liberties. 
6.2.1 Introduction: Substantive Due Process 
The substantive due process requirement demands t ha t  government 
have appropriate authori ty t o  enact  laws affecting personal liberty, and 
that infringements of liberty-especially of rights guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution-be both reasonable and necessary. 
6.2.1.1 Substantive Due Process and S t a t e  Authority t o  Pass Laws. 
Substantive due process a f f e c t s  the subject  mat ter  of legislation; this 
means that states may not pass certain categories of laws, namely laws 
tha t  infringe aspects  of personal liberty guaranteed by the U.S. and state 
constitutions. 
This and succeeding sections of these background materials will place 
primary emphasis on the latter constitutional restr ict ion on s t a t e  power. 
This is because the implementation of the highway crash countermeasures 
is an exercise of the state's general authori ty to  enact  laws to  fur ther  
the public health, safe ty ,  morals, or welfare. With respect to highway 
crash countermeasures, constitutional a t t acks  on exercises of the  police 
power normally concede that  s t a t e s  may take steps to promote highway 
sa fe ty ,  but allege t ha t  a particular coun te rmeasure  is an  improper  
exercise of that power. 
6.2.1.2 ffLibertyfl  Guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. Substantive 
due process p r o t e c t s  t h o s e  f u n d a m e n t a l  a s p e c t s  of " l i be r t y "  no t  
specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights but nevertheless guaranteed by 
the U.S. Constitution. These include the  right to  pursue an occupation, 
marry, establish families, and raise children in a manner of one's own 
choosing. What aspects of "libertyv a r e  protected by the  Due Process 
Clause varies with the times. For example, the Due Process Clause was 
used by c o u r t s  dur ing  t h e  e a r l y  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y  t o  d e c l a r e  
unconsiti tuional many s t a t e  laws regulating business, on the grounds that 
they infringed the fundamental right to make contracts. Today, however, 
subs t an t i ve  due p rocess  app l ies  almost  exclusively t o  fundamental 
noneconomic liberties. 
6.2.1.3 Relationship of Substantive Due Process to Other Law-Based 
Constraints. Substantive due process, in addition t o  protecting personal 
liberty, also serves as the mechanism through which specific guarantees of 
the Bill of Rights have been applied to the states. It is now agreed tha t  
the following constitutional rights constrain government action a t  all 
levels: the freedom of speech, assembly, and worship; the  prohibition 
aga in s t  unreasonab le  s e a r c h e s  and s e i zu re s ;  t h e  privilege against 
self-incrimination; the various procedural rights associated wi th  t h e  
criminal tr ial  (except for the grand jury); and the prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment. All of these will be t rea ted more specifically in 
succeeding sections of these background materials. 
As mentioned in the previous subsection, substantive due p rocess  
protects  a variety of rights not specified elsewhere in the Constitution. 
Two such  r i gh t s  have p a r t i c u l a r  s i gn i f i c ance  a s  c o n s t r a i n t s  on 
countermeasure implementation. These are the right to travel, and the 
prohibition of police conduct that offends widely held concepts of justice 
and human dignity. 
6 . 2 . 2  The Nature of Substantive Due Process Issues. Challenges to 
legislation based on substantive due process essentially allege that  a s t a t e  
or  municipality has ac ted beyond i t s  police powers by pursuing some 
objective having nothing to do with the public welfare, or has improperly 
exercised those powers by using inappropriate means of achieving a valid 
public objective. These  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  means  inc lude  unnecessa ry  
infringement of individual liberties, and vague and overly broad legislation. 
This section will discusses these elements of substantive due process, 
following which i t  will t r e a t  a specific fundamental right, namely the 
r igh t  t o  t r a v e l ,  tha t  may constrain countermeasure implementation. 
Finally, the prohibition of unreasonable police conduct is discussed. 
6.2.2.1 Permissible Sta te  Objectives. The most basic challenge to 
legislation that may arise under the substantive due process requirement 
is that  the legislation in question is not related to  the public health, 
safety, morals, or welfare, and is therefore beyond the police powers of 
the s ta te .  If the individual challenging the law can prove the lack of a 
relationship between the legislation and some aspect  of public in teres t ,  
tha t  legislation may be declared unconstitutionzl. As a practical matter, 
however, i t  is very difficult to  do so: s t a tu tes  and regula t ions  a r e  
presumed by courts to be constitutional; the individual challenging a law 
must prove the legislation unconstitutional; and where the public in teres t  
justifying a law is not evident a court will frequently provide one, often 
by speculating what the public benefits of the legislation might be. 
Illustrative of this process is a series of court decisions upholding 
s ta tu tes  requiring motorcyclists to hear protective headgear. These  
so-cal led  f f h e l m e t  laws1' were  challenged on the grounds that  they 
protected motorcyclists from the consequences of their own folly and d id  
not further public safe ty  or welfare; therefore, they were alleged to be 
an unconstitutional i n f r i ngemen t  of pe rsona l  l i be r t y .  The c o u r t s  
hypothesized a variety of public benefits flowing from the helmet laws, 
and on tha t  basis proceeded to  re jec t  t h e  subs t an t i ve  due p rocess  
challenges. Helmet laws are discussed in detail later in this section. 
The normal practice of courts is to defer to legislative judgments that  
a re  at tacked on due process grounds. Where, however, a l!fundamentalll 
right-such as marriage or voting-is being restricted by legislation, courts 
will apply a different analysis. Not only will the state be required to 
justify the legislation, but two criteria must be satisfied. First, the s t a t e  
must demonstrate that  the restrictions are justified by some flcompellingf! 
public interest; and second, it must further establish that  the restr ict ions 
a r e  t h e  l e a s t  d r a s t i c  m e a n s  of ach iev ing  t h a t  i n t e r e s t .  The 
least-drastic-means requirement also is discussed below. 
6 . 2 . 2 . 2  The Least Drast ic Means Requirement. Given that  a 
statute or regulation furthers some aspect of the public welfare, i t  may 
s t i l l  violate the Due Process Clause if i t  res t r ic ts  some fundamental 
right, and if the  public objective jus t i fy ing t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  can  be  
fur thered through less res t r ic t ive  legislation. For example, promotion of 
public education is a valid public objective; however, i t  may no t  be 
a t ta ined by requiring all children to attend public (as opposed to private 
or parochial) schools, or by prohibiting the teaching of 'foreign languages 
in elementary schools. Not only would those means interfere with the 
fundamental rights of parents t o  direct  the upbringing and education of 
their children, but in addition, educational quality could be advanced 
through measures less restrictive of liberty. 
6 . 2 . 2 . 3  Vague and Overly Broad Legislation. Two specific means of 
carrying out otherwise valid s t a t e  objectives, tha t  have been held t o  
violate the Due Process Clause, a r e  vague and overly broad legislation. 
Because vague legislation fails to clearly differentiate between legi t imate  
and i l legit imate conduct, i t  fails t o  warn individuals of what conduct is 
illegal; therefore, such laws may deter  individuals from engaging in the 
exercise of fundamental rights. Overly broad legislation makes illegal the 
exercise of fundamental rights as well as engaging in illegitimate conduct, 
and may punish those who engage in the former. In addition, both vague 
and overly broad laws are susceptible to  being enforced in an arbitrary 
and discriminatory manner. 
The essence of vagueness is the lack of warning as to what actions 
a re  prohibited. However, the  Due Process Clause does  no t  r e q u i r e  
absolute certainty in legislation. It is only where ordinary individuals are 
forced to guess a t  the meaning of a statute or regulation, and there  is no 
agreement as to what the law prohibits, then it is unconstitutionally vague. 
The essence of overbreadth is the prohibition of lawful conduct by 
legislation aimed a t  a narrower class of behavior, such as a loitering 
ordinance whose language applied t o  lawful public gatherings as well. 
Overbreadth is most likely t o  occur when such protected l ibert ies as 
freedom of speech or assembly are a t  s take.  Vagueness and overbreadth 
are  so closely related that challenges to legislation raising one issue often 
will also raise the other. 
6.2.2.4 Infringing the  Right to  Travel. The right t o  travel freely 
from state to state, and to use the highways and other instrumentali t ies 
for this purpose, has been recognized as one of the rights guaranteed by 
the Due Process Clause. States may not forbid persons t o  enter ,  ei ther 
permanently or transiently, and they may not impose burdens upon new 
residents that in effect penalize them for having changed residence. 
On the  other hand, the right t o  travel  does not forbid states from 
regulating the  t ime,  place, and manner of travel  where necessary t o  
further some aspect  of the public welfare. Restricting a probationer's 
freedom to leave the state, requiring agricultural  products brought into 
the s t a t e  by travellers  t o  be inspected, and imposing weight limits on 
trucks are all examples of restrictions on the freedom to  travel  found by 
courts to be necessary and constitutional. 
6.2.2.5 Challenges Alleging Unjust Police Conduct. The Due Process 
C l ause  p roh ib i t s  po l ice  conduc t  no t  specifically prohibited by any 
constitutional provision but which offends commonly-held standards of 
justice. Specifically, the  U.S. Supreme Court held, i n  the 1954 case of 
Rochin v. California, that  the forced pumping of a suspected narcotics 
offender 's  s tomach to obtain drugs was "shocking to the consc i en~e ,~  and 
that it violated due process of law. Substantive due process has been 
recognized as a constraint on police conduct, but only on the most brutal 
and coercive practices of police officers. I t  does not by itself forbid 
police officers from using evidence-gathering techniques that result in the 
physical intrusion of drivers' bodies. Specifically, the  "shocking to  the 
conscienceyt t e s t  was held not to  apply to  compulsory blood testing for 
alcohol, ven without the tested driver's consent. 
6.2.2.6 Summary. The substantive due process requirement is a basic 
constraint on state legislation and law enforcement, but is one tha t  only 
infrequently results in legislation being declared unconstitutional. Courts 
a r e  r e l u c t a n t  t o  s u b s t i t u t e  t h e i r  views fo r  those  of legislatures, 
particularly in the  area  of economic regulation or in cases where an 
honest dispute exists as to whether public benefits flow from a statute or 
regulation. Courts require those who challenge legislation to  prove the  
absence of any public interest justifying it; and this burden is normally an 
extremely difficult one. 
Where, however, fundamental rights are infringed by legislation, courts 
will require the s t a t e  to  justify such restrictions: there  must  be  a 
  compelling^ s t a t e  interest  fo r  those restrictions; and they must be the 
least drastic means of achieving that interest .  This is a difficult burden 
for the state to meet. 
Two fundamental rights not specified in the Constitution are the right 
to travel  and freedom from unjust police practices. These may pose 
constraints to highway crash countermeasures. 
6.2.3 Application - of the  Substantive Due Process Requirement t o  
Highway Safety  Issues. Many forms of highway safety legislation restrict 
the freedom of vehicle owners and drivers. Licensing and insurance 
requirements, equipment regulations, and the rules of the road all limit 
the freedom of drivers to  a c t  a s  they please. Substantive due process 
a t t acks  directed at  these restrictions have for the most part failed. This 
is so for a number of reasons: the presumption of constitutionality given 
t o  s ta tu tes ;  the importance of the s t a t e  interest  in promoting highway 
safety; and the characterization of driving as a "privilegeff or a f 'qualified 
rightu rather than a fundamental right. 
A recent  and familiar issue involving substantive due process and 
highway safe ty  legislation has involved the constitutionality of so-called 
helmet laws, that is, statutes requiring motorcyclists and their passengers 
t o  wear protective headgear. Other challenges have been directed a t  
allegedly vague or overly broad s ta tu tes  or alleged infringement of the  
freedom to travel. 
6.2.3.1 Challenges to State Objectives: The Motorcycle Helmet Laws. 
During the past decade most states passed statutes requiring motorcyclists 
and their passengers to wear protective headgear. These helmet laws were 
challenged in the courts  on the  grounds tha t  they v io l a t ed  t h e  Due 
Process Clause. The reasoning behind the challenge is this: the helmet 
laws were aimed a t  protecting cyclists from the consequences of their  
own folly; they were forced self-protective measures that did not protect 
t h e  publ ic  a t  l a r g e ;  and ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e y  were  an  u n j u s t i f i a b l e  
infringement of the cyclist's liberty to choose what to wear while riding. 
To this allegation of "no public purposev supporting helmet laws, the  
courts responded by citing the financial consequences of serious injury to 
unprotected cyclists, that is, the  costs of caring for the  injured cyclist 
a r e  borne by all of society. Other courts hypothesized that unprotected 
cyclists posed a greater  risk of t r a f f i c  crashes, since they were more 
likely t o  be struck by flying objects and as a result lose control of their 
vehicles, possibly causing a crash involving other drivers. 
6 . 2 . 3 . 2  Challenges t o  Means of Attaining S t a t e  Objectives. -- The 
helmet law cases involved, for the most part, the  basic issue of whether 
any permissible s t a t e  objective was being served by the legislation i n  
question. Once a public purpose was shown to exist,  the  substantive due 
process challenges were rejected on the grounds that the cyclist's right to 
decide whether to wear a helmet is not fundamental. The courts stressed 
tha t  a relatively minor liberty interest was invaded by helmet laws; some 
indicated that they would find more serious intrusion, such as mandatory 
seat belt use laws, offensive to the Due Process Clause. 
Other attacks on safety legislation i n  e f fec t  conceded t ha t  the  s t a t e  
was pursuing a valid objective, but alleged that  the legislation was an 
improper means of at taining that  objective. Two se t s  of c a s e s  a r e  
illustrative: cases involving the transport of flammable liquids; and cases 
involving zoning regulations enacted to control traffic congestion. 
-4 number  of s t a t e  c o u r t s  have d e c l a r e d  unconsti tut ional  laws 
restr ict ing the  size of trucks carrying gasoline and other f l ammab le  
liquids. The purpose of these laws was t o  reduce the  hazard of fire, 
explosion, or spillage, thus promoting the admittedly valid public in teres t  
in safety.  However, these particular restr ict ions were held by some 
courts to  be unconstitutional because they bore no rational relationship to 
promoting safety. The fuel handlers established tha t  these laws would 
cause an increase in tanker traffic which would, in turn, increase the risk 
of accidents. Because the restrictions did not promote safe ty ,  they were 
found to violate substantive due process. 
Many municipalities have enacted zoning laws permitting dwellings to  
be occupied by fffamiliesv only. Such laws typically define a fffamilyff in 
such a way as to prohibit occupancy by more than a designated number 
of unrelated persons. One declared purpose of these zoning restrictions is 
to reduce the traffic and parking congestion that would result from overly 
dense population. A number of courts have declared such restrictions 
unconstitutional on the  grounds they were not r e a sonab l e  means  of 
promoting t ra f f i c  flow: not only did the challenged zoning restrictions 
infringe the  freedom of owners and renters  of property to use t h e i r  
p remises  as  t hey  chose ;  bu t  a l t e rna t i ve  means such as restr ict ing 
on-street parking could have accomplished the  s ta te ' s  purpose without 
infringing the rights of owners and renters. 
6.2.3.3 Challenges Based on Vagueness or Overbreadth. Most a t t acks  
on highway s a f e ty  legislation alleging vagueness or overbreadth have been 
unsuccessful. This is because the types of driving behavior prohibited by 
such legislation a re  familiar t o  the ordinary driver, and because their 
impact on such fundamental rights as freedom of speech and association 
is minimal. Thus laws prohibiting "driving while intoxi~ated,?~ ?careless 
driving," and driving at  speeds greater than are "reasonable and prudent,?' 
were  held  no t  to be unconstitutionally vague. Likewise a provision 
prohibiting "unnecessary exhibitions of speedu survived a vagueness attack. 
DWI s t a tu tes  have been attaked on a number of other grounds one of 
which is overbreadth; specifically, that they define intoxication i n  terms 
of blood aclohol content  ( B A C )  and as a result classify some competent 
drinking drivers as legally intoxicated. This challenge has become more 
significant now that  some s t a t e s  define driving with a B A C  of above 
.lo%-irrespective of actual impairment of driving ability--as an offense; 
however, no court has yet reversed a conviction on this theory, 
Not all laws dealing with drivers or motor vehicles will, however, be 
upheld against vagueness or overbreadth claims. For example, a s t a t e  law 
prohibiting modification of automobile suspension systems except for the 
installation of heavy-duty shock absorbers was declared unconstitutionally 
overbroad since i t  porhibited modifications that could not reasonably be 
classified as ''criminal acts.'' 
6 . 2 . 3 . 4  Challenges Alleging Infringement of the  Right t o  Travel. 
Courts have distinguished between the fundamental right to travel  and the  
qua l i f i ed  r i gh t  t o  o p e r a t e  a veh i c l e  on the public highways. The 
operation of vehicles has long been held by courts t o  be subject t o  s t a t e  
regulation in the in teres t  of public safety. Driving restrictions are aimed 
neither a t  the driver's mobility per s e  nor a t  penalizing him for leaving 
the  s t a t e  or migrating t o  another. Rather, restrictions are intended to 
ensure that he does not create the risk of a traffic crash. Even if s t a t e  
regulations result in the denial of an individual's ability to drive, that 
individual has not been denied the right to travel, since he retains access 
to public transportation as well as private vehicles driven by others. 
6.2.3.5 Challenges Alleging Unjust Police Conduct. Substantive due 
process has been recognized as a constraint only on the most brutal and 
coercive practices of law enforcement officers, It does not forbid police 
o f f i c e r s  from using evidence-gathering techniques that  result in the 
physical intrusion of d r i ve r s .  Spec i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  l l shocking t o  t h e  
conscience'' t e s t  was held not to  apply to  compulsory blood testing for 
alcohol, even without the  tes ted  driver's consent. The relatively mild 
intrusion involved and the  strong public interest in removing intoxicated 
drivers from the highways were the chief factors leading courts to  decide 
that blood tests were not offensive to common notions of justice. 
6.2.3 .6  Summary. Challenges to highway safe ty  legislation based on 
the  substantive due process have for the most part  been unsuccessful. 
Courts have usually found these s ta tu tes  to  serve some public purpose, 
even though i t  has sometimes been necessary to hypothesize their public 
benefits. Laws dealing with drivers or motor vehicles usually are found 
t o  be rationally related to the public purpose of p romot ing  s a f e t y .  
However, laws directed a t  other ends-such as the harassment of racial or 
political minorities-and laws that cause greater safety hazards than they 
prevent may be found to  violate substantive due process. Few if any 
ex i s t i ng  c o u n t e r m e a s u r e  p r o g r a m s  h a v e  b e e n  s t r u c k  down a s  
unconstitutional infringements of the right to  travel  or because they 
lfshock the conscienceff and offend widely held concepts of justice. 
6 . 2 . 4  Consequences of Substantive Due Process Challenges. S ta te  
action that is found to violate the  substantive due process requirement 
will be dec l a r ed  unconstitutional. This being the case, the normal 
response of a court would be to declare the entire law under challenge to  
be void. However, in some instances, a court might "savell a law by 
narrowing its coverage, eliminating i t s  application t o  lawful conduct or 
the exercise of fundamental rights, or declaring void only those sections 
that violate the substantive due process requirements. This is especially 
true of legislation found to be vague or overly broad. 
In light of these potential consequences, care must be taken that  a 
proposed countermeasure program respect the Due Process Clause, since 
the consequence of a successful attack could be the  future unavailability 
of that program. 
6 . 2 . 5  Resolving Substantive Due Process Constraints. A planner 
intending to implement a countermeasure program may take several s teps 
to  resolve potential due process challenges. Since the Due Process Clause 
app l ies  only t o  gove rnmen ta l  a c t i on ,  vo lun ta ry  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  
countermeasure programs may be encouraged. If this is impractical, or if 
a court finds s t a t e  involvement t o  exist despite the  flvoluntaryff label 
placed on the program, the proposed program should be tailored to meet 
substantive due process challenges. First of all, the relationship bet ween 
the countermeasure program and the public benefits flowing from such a 
program should be documented, as was done with the added lTsocial costsw 
of motorcycle crashes involving helmetless cyclists which were cited as a 
justification for requiring helmet use. Second, the least restrictive mode 
of implementation should be chosen, and the lack of less restr ic t ive 
alternatives to the proposed program should be stressed. Third, any 
s tatute  or regulation governing a countermeasure program shoilld be 
written as clearly as possible to reduce the danger of unfair enforcement 
and the infringement of protected rights. Legislation should be made 
comprehensible to the ordinary driver. Finally, if some aspects of the 
program cannot be applied to the entire driving population without 
infr inging the i r  fundamental  r ights ,  the program could instead be 
implemented on probationers and other sanctioned individuals having 
limited rights, Even here, however, infringements of personal liberty must 
be reasonable and must have some relation to the sanctioned individual's 
conduct. 
6 .2 .6  Summary and Conclusions: Substantive Due Process. The 
substantive due process requirement is aimed a t  preventing unfair or 
oppressive governmental action that infringes on fundamental liberties. 
Any exercise of s ta te  authority to further the public health, s a fe ty ,  
morals, or welfare involves the restriction of personal liberty, but the 
Due Process Clause prohibits only those restrictions that are unreasonable. 
Legislation that fails to further any public purpose clearly violates the 
Due Process Clause. Laws that restrict the exercise of fundamental 
r ights  violate substantive due process unless they are justified by a 
compelling state purpose and there are no less restrictive alternatives. 
Restrictions on nonfundamental rights will, on the other hand, be upheld 
if they are rationally related to some state purpose. 
In general, highway safety legislation will survive attacks based on 
substantive due process if they are bona fide efforts to reduce the risk 
and consequences of traffic crashes, are reasonably related to promoting 
traffic safety, and are clearly written. It is possible that countermeasure 
programs that greatly infringe personal rights, or those that cause more 
safety hazards than they prevent, would violate the Due Process Clause. 
6.3  Procedural Due Process of Law 
Like substantive due process, the term 'Tprocedural due process of lawTT 
is not mentioned in the  United S ta tes  Constitution. However, c o u r t  
decisions interpret ing the Due Process Clause have developed a body of 
law requiring government to act in a fair and impartial manner. 
6.3.1 Introduction: Procedural Due Process. The substantive due 
process requirement, discussed in Section 6.2 ,  does not p roh ib i t  t h e  
gove rnmen t  f rom in f r ing ing  l i f e ,  l i be r t y ,  or property interests;  i t  
constrains only arbitrary or unreasonable infringements of those interests. 
However, any t ime governmental action has a potential impact on 
important personal interests ,  two kinds of risks arise. First,  official 
decisions may be based on favoritism or vindictiveness, or may result 
from the government having taken unfair advantage of its size and power. 
Second, decisions may be erroneous because the information on which they 
were made was incomplete or inaccurate.  To minimize t he se  r i sks ,  
governmental bodies are required to follow certain procedures intended to 
ensure the fairness and accuracy of their decisions. 
6.3.1.1 The Flexibility of the Procedural Due Process Requirement. 
There exists a wide range of governmental decisions tha t  could a f fec t  
important personal interests .  For that  reason, procedural due process 
does not impose a single standard; rather,  i t  is a flexible requirement 
intended t o  ensure that  justice is done. The procedural safeguards that 
are required in any given case will depend upon a balance between the  
potential impact of an erroneous decision on an individual, and the public 
interest in  a swift and inexpensive resolution. 
6.3.1.2 Relationship of Procedural Due Process to the Procedures 
Required a t  Criminal Trials. Highway crash countermeasures involve 
several  types of official proceedings: criminal trials to adjudicate guilt 
or innocence of traffic-law offenses; decriminalized adjudication of certain 
other offenses; and administrative adjudication of driver licensing matters 
or (in a few states) certain traffic violations. This may lead to  confusion 
because specific constitutional provisions--aside from the Due Process 
Clause  i t se l f - -govern some aspects of these proceedings, especially 
criminal trials,  and i t  is therefore necessary to  discuss the s ? e c i f i c  
provisions together with the Due Process Clause. Specific criminal-trial 
issues covered in this section include the rights t o  a fair  t r ial ,  jury, and 
counsel. These are discussed later in this section. 
6.3.1.3 Relationship Between the Procedural Due Process Requirement 
and S p e c i f i c  Legislation Governing Procedures. The U.S. and s t a t e  
constitutions a re  not the so l e  s o u r c e  of law-based c o n s t r a i n t s  on 
procedures followed by governmental bodies. General statutes, such as 
the federal Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and s ta te  APAs modeled 
a f te r  i t ,  may impose upon governmental bodies procedural requirements in 
addition to those required by the  procedural due process requirement. 
Specific s t a tu tes  governing the practices of a governmental agency, rules 
and regulations governing agency procedures, court rules, and corn m on-la w 
decisions, are all possible sources of additional constraints. 
6.3.2 The Nature of Procedural Due Process Issues. Procedural due 
process challenges to  governmental action commonly allege two elements: 
first, that some interest in liberty or property has been infringed; and 
second ,  t h a t  some  procedure  or series of procedures had not been 
followed. As already s ta ted ,  the procedures urged by challengers a r e  
similar in form to  those required at  the criminal trial, even though they 
derive from different constitutional sources. In general, the  more the 
potential impact of a governmental decision approaches that of a criminal 
conviction, the more trial-type procedures will be required in making that  
decision. 
This section discusses the concept of what tfinterestsll are protected by 
the Due Process Clause, se t s  out the  procedural r e q u i r e m e n t s  of a 
criminal trial,  deals with the competing in teres ts  i n  a procedural due 
process case, and finally discusses the applicability of specif ic procedural 
requirements to  off ic ia l  proceedings that  may arise in the context of 
highway crash countermeasures. 
6.3.2.1 The  C o n c e p t  of an  " I n t e r e ~ t ~ ~  i n  L ibe r t y  or  Property. 
Noncriminal proceedings may affect a wide variety of in teres ts  in liberty 
or property, especially the latter. Consequences of civil or administrative 
proceedings include, fo r  example: extinguishment of property r i g h t s  
through judgments, repossessions, garnishments, and liens; harm to one's 
good name or reputation by being labeled a "problem dr inker ; "  t h e  
deprivation of one's livelihood through the revocation of a business or 
professional license; and the deportation of an alien. 
Not only must there  exist some l iberty or property interest that is 
a f f ec t ed  by the governmental act ion,  but the  individual holding t h a t  
interest  must sufficiently be 7tentitled'7 to  i t  for due process to apply. 
Governmental agencies have argued in the  past t ha t  thei r  g r a n t s  of 
benefits,  public employment, or licenses conferred ftprivilegesv to which its 
holders were not entitled; on that basis they argued that  procedural due 
process did not govern decisions to revoke them. This has been rejected 
by the  U.S. Supreme Court which has looked a t  the  importance of a 
pe rsona l  in teres t  and not i t s  label. Thus, the holder of an in teres t  
originally granted as a 7tprivilege71 may in time become enti t led to  i t ;  and 
his right to it may be protected by the Due Process Clause. 
6.3.2.2 Applicable Procedural Protections. There exist a wide variety 
of procedures that  a re  intended t o  ensure the fairness of a particular 
proceeding. Depending on the competing in teres ts  involved, some or all 
of the following procedures may be required: 
e timely and specific notice of the charges to be presented; 
0 the right to appear personally; 
the right to counsel; 
t h e  r i gh t s  t o  p r e s e n t  witnesses and to  confront and 
cross-examine opposing witnesses; 
the right to jury trial; 
a the right to an impartial decision-maker; 
written findings of fact and conclusions of law; and 
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In criminal trials,  most of these protections are required by specific 
constitutional provisions, while others have been recognized as essential to 
the fairness of a criminal trial and therefore have also been required. I n  
noncriminal proceedings, a person who alleges a due process violation 
frequently will argue that one or more of the protections that apply to 
criminal trials was not granted in his case, even though they should have 
been granted. 
6 . 3 . 2 . 3  Competing Interests in Procedural Due Process Cases. The 
individual interest in liberty or property is one factor determining what 
specific procedures will be constitutionally required at a given proceeding. 
Another factor is the risk that existing procedures will result in unfair or 
erroneous decisions. Against these factors, the public interests in cost 
reduction and speedy decision-making are weighed by courts; i n  the end, 
the specific procedures required by the court are the product of balancing 
the competing factors. 
The cost and delay caused by the procedures required at a criminal 
trial are regarded as necessary to protect individual i n t e r e s t s  from 
erroneous deprivation. Outside the criminal process, however, these same 
costs of affording the full range of procedural safeguards may in some 
cases outweigh their benefits, Protracted procedures also may create 
social costs where conditions potentially harmful to the public are allowed 
to persist until a final decision is reached. 
Administrative convenience and cost effectiveness by themselves are 
not sufficient grounds for abridging or denying procedural protections 
where the individual interest at stake is sufficiently important, or where 
the risk of an erroneous decision is great. On the other hand, where the 
interest at stake is relatively minor, or where the decision-making criteria 
are simple and objective, comprehensive procedures may not be necessary. 
Thus, the balance between the importance of the interest at  stake, the 
risk of an erroneous decision, and the public interests in cost savings and 
efficiency will determine what procedures will be applicable to a given 
noncriminal proceeding. 
A n  example of this  analysis is the treatment of habitual traffic 
offenders, which is discussed later in  this section. 
6.3.2.4 Specific Procedural Issues. In noncriminal proceedings, issues 
may arise regarding the  application of certain procedural protections. 
These include: the  right to notice and an opportunity to be heard; when 
a hearing must be afforded; the  existence of rights to  confront  and 
cross-examine witnesses; the right t o  have an attorney present; and the 
review of governmental decisions. ,411 of the  protections listed above 
apply t o  criminal trials; however, in criminal proceedings the following 
also may arise: the right to obtain favorable evidence for use a t  t r ial ;  
the right to  jury tr ial ;  and the right t o  have an at torney provided at  
public expense. These will be discussed in order. 
6.3.2.4.1 The Right to  Notice and Hearing. The two most essential 
elements of procedural due process a r e  notice and an opportunity t o  be 
heard. Notice informs an individual that the government is taking action 
to deprive him of some personal interest ,  and specifies the  reasons why 
action is being taken. The hearing permits the individual, if he chooses, 
to present evidence in his own behalf and to  correct  possible erroneous 
information on the basis of which the government may be acting. 
Notice and the opportunity to  be heard may be required anytime a 
sufficiently important personal interest night be infringed by government 
action, and where these requirements would not prevent the  s t a t e  from 
carrying out i ts  lawful objectives. For example, notice and hearing were 
required before a municipal police chief could post a person's name on a 
list of "problem drinkersn and prohibit tavern owners from selling him 
liquor. On the other hand, i t  was held tha t  a school official need not 
conduc t  a hear ing  p r io r  t o  administering corporal punishment to  a 
disruptive pupil, because the need to act swiftly outweighed the  individual 
interest  involved, and because any delay in act ing would frustrate the 
stat efs objective of controlling classroom disruption. 
6.3.2.4.2 Timing of the Hearing. Due process normally requires that 
a hearing (if one is appropriate) be held before adverse action is taken by 
the government. Where, however, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
l iberty or property is small and where the public welfare demands swift 
action, the government may act first and then hold a hearing as soon as 
poss ible  t h e r e a f t e r .  For example, the  license of a habitual t r a f f i c  
offender may be suspended by a licensing agency upon receiving abst racts  
of the  required number of convictions. There, the risk of erroneous 
action is small because the only issues are whether the convictions were 
properly recorded and counted, and whether they occurred within the 
prescribed period of time. In addition, the  risk to  the  public posed by 
the  presence of an habitual traffic offender is considered great enough to 
justify immediate action against him. 
6 . 3 . 2 . 4 . 3  Confrontation and Cross-Examination, Where governmental 
action is based on a person's testimony, due process requires tha t  the  
individual af fected by the  action be allowed to  rebut  tha t  testimony. 
This right normally ent i t les  the  individual to personally confront t h e  
a d v e r s e  wi tness  and ask ques t i ons  r e l a t i n g  t o  his qualif icat ions,  
recollection, judgment, and the like. Therefore, governmental bodies 
normally may not deprive a person of an important interest on the basis 
of written affadavits or hearsay statements. 
6 . 3 . 2 . 4 . 4  Right t o  Counsel. The term "right t o  counsel1' actually 
involves two separate rights. The first of these is the right to have one's 
own at torney present: this right is guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution 
at  all criminal trials; and, in many states, it is also guaranteed by s t a t u t e  
a t  administrative proceedinps, The second of these is the right of an 
individual, who is too poor to afford an attorney, to have one provided by 
the  s ta te .  This right to  appointed counsel is guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution in tr ials  of f e l on i e s  and  misdemeanors  punishable  by 
imprisonment. 
6 . 3 . 2 . 4 . 5  Review of Decisions. A decision made by a lower court or 
an administrative body is ultimately reviewable by courts on either of two 
procedural due process grounds: f i rs t ,  the  procedures followed by the 
court or administrative body did not adequately ensure f a i r n e s s  and 
second, even though adequate procedural protections existed, the decision 
the governmental body reached was contrary to the evidence presented to 
i t .  
Administrative procedures acts frequently provide that a decision that 
is supported by fTsubstantial evidenceu w i l l  be upheld by a cour t ;  
moreover, the rules of appellate procedure as well as appellate courtsT 
own decisions, provide for reversal of only those lower courtsT decisions 
that went against the great weight of evidence. 
Court review of administrative decisions is also discouraged by the 
requirement that one must exhaust administrative appeals before applying 
to a court. The procedures for appealing administrative decisions are  
generally set out by statutes. 
6 .3 .2 .4 .6  The Right to Obtain Evidence for Use at Trial. One aspect 
of procedural fairness is the right to gather and obtain favorable evidence 
for use a t  a criminal trial. This includes not only the right to call one's 
own witnesses, but also must include the right to conduct independent 
tests. Unreasonable denial of such a right might constitute a violation of 
due process. A second, r e l a t ed  r ight  r e l a t e s  to  the  in ten t ional  
suppression, by the prosecution, of material evidence that would be 
favorable to the defendant if introduced a t  trial; this practice also has 
been held to violate due process. 
6 .3 .2 .4 .7  Right to Court-Appointed Counsel. In trials of any offense 
punishable by imprisonment, a person who lacks the funds to hire an 
attorney is entitled, under the U.S. Constitution, to have one provided at 
public expense. This is because no person may be imprisoned unless he 
either was represented by an attorney, or knowingly and intelligently 
waived his right to one. 
6 . 3 . 2 . 4 . 8  Right t o  Jury Trial. There exists a class of offenses 
punishable by jail terms, but which have been l a b e l e d  by t h e  U.S. 
Supreme Court as "petty," and therefore not governed by the jury trial 
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has classified as "pettyt1 all offenses punishable by six 
months1 imprisonment or less. However, many states have, b y  t he i r  
constitutions, statutes,  or court rules, provided for jury trials of less 
serious offenses. 
6.3.3 Application of Procedural Due Process Requirements to Highway 
Safety Issues. Countermeasure programs a r e  concerned both with 
apprehending traffic offenders and with monitoring driverst compliance 
with license restrictions or terms of probation. These devices may 
therefore be used in connection with both criminal and administrative 
proceedings, and with both previously unsanctioned and previously 
sanct ioned drivers .  This section will treat  procedural due process 
pro tec t ions  as they govern t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s i t u a t i o n s  in  which  
countermeasure devices might be used: 
judicial proceedings to adjudicate guilt of traffic offenses; 
administrative proceedings to adjudicate guilt of traffic 
offenses; and 
judicial proceedings to revoke a driver's probation status 
on account of driving in violation of probation terms. 
6.3.3.1 Adjudication of Traffic Offenses. In this section the principal 
issues that might arise in the adjudication of traffic offenses by the CJS 
will be discussed. These include: treatment of traffic offenses as 
crimes; recent efforts to lldecriminalizetl minor traffic offenses; and 
imposition of probation upon traffic offenders. 
6.3.3.1.1 Criminal Proceedings. The majority of s ta tes  still t reat  
t raff ic  offenses as criminal i n  nature, and even those states that have 
decriminalized most moving traffic violations continue to t reat  serious 
traffic offenses--vehicular homicide, leaving the scene of traffic crashes, 
reckless driving, driving while intoxicated (DwI ) ,  and driving with s 
suspended license-as crimes. 
The full range of procedural protections set out earlier is available in 
criminal traffic proceedings, with two possible exceptions. First, most 
t raf f ic  law violations fall into the category of "petty offensesn defined by 
the U,S. Supreme Court; therefore, the U.S. Constitution does not require 
jury tr ial  in these cases. In some states, however, these rights may be 
afforded under state constitutions, s ta tu tes ,  or court rules. Second, a 
number of s t a tes  have two-tier adjudication systems for minor offenses 
such as traffic-law violations. Under these systems, which were described 
earlier,  the initial proceeding frequently bypasses many of the procedural 
protections afforded at  criminal trials. 
6.3.3.1.2 ltDecriminalizedtt Adjudication of Traffic Offenses. In recent 
years  a number of  s t a t e s  have comple t e ly  or  pa r t i a l l y  removed  
imprisonment as possible sanction for committing moving traffic offenses. 
Three states-Michigan, New York, and Rhode Island--have implemented 
administrative systems to adjudicate minor traffic cases; approximately a 
dozen others, including California and Florida, have introduced so  m e 
aspects of decriminalization. 
Serious t ra f f i c  offenses, including vehicular homicide, leaving the scene 
of a traffic crash, reckless driving, DWI, and driving with a suspended 
license, remain criminal offenses under these schemes, and imprisonment 
may be imposed upon convicted violators. 
Two other major departures from traditional criminal procedure have 
occurred in some of the states that have decriminalized traffic violations. 
First,  the requirement of proof ttbeyond a reasonable doubt1' has been 
modified to a less stringent standard: either Itclear or l tconvincing 
evidence or Ita preponderance of the e ~ i d e n c e . ' ~  Second, the inquiry and 
judicial functions often have been vested in the same individual. Courts 
in these states have upheld these modified procedures as constitutional. 
There has, however, been some dissenting judicial authority, and these 
procedures may not gain universal acceptance by the courts. One recent 
case, for example, the court reimposed jury tr ial  and other procedural 
r equ i r emen t s  in first-offense DWI trials,  even though the s t a t e  had 
tldecriminalizedll such offenses. The court reasoned that the  consequences 
of a f i r s t  D W I conviction--including license suspension and possible 
incarceration for subsequent offenses--were serious enough tha t  criminal 
trial safeguards were necessary. 
The exc lus ion  of s e r i ous  t ra f f i c  offenses from decriminalization 
schemes means t ha t  those highway crash countermeasure dealing with 
f lagrant  or habitual offenders will continue to be implemented through, or 
in connection with, the criminal process. 
.6.3.3.1.3 P roba t i on  and D e f e r r e d  P rosecu t i on .  One means of 
restricting a traffic offender's drinking and/or driving behavior is through 
the  sanctioning process. Restr ict ions a r e  most commonly imposed as 
terms of probation. Law-based constraints on probation a r e  discussed in 
Section 11.0 of these background materials. Procedurally, the imposition of 
probation is part  of the  sentencing process a t  a criminal t r ia l  and is 
therefore subject to  the procedural requirements governing the  tr ial ,  
including the right to counsel. 
Restr ict ions also may be imposed through pretr ial  diversion, under 
which a charged suspect agrees to abide by certain conditions in exchange 
fo r  a p r o s e c u t o r t s  dec i s ion  t o  hold c r im ina l  charges in abeyance. 
Deferred prosecution has so fa r  generated few, procedural due process 
challenges, although there is some question surrounding the legality of 
some aspects of this practice. Section 11.2 of this volume t r e a t s  these 
issues in greater detail. 
6 .3 .3 .2  Adjud ica t ion  - and Sanc t i on ing  - by t h e  Admin i s t r a t i ve  -
Driver-Licensing System. The licensing of drivers and determination of 
d r i ve r  qua l i f i c a t i ons  a r e  f unc t i ons  normal ly  ca r r i ed  out by s t a t e  
administative bodies, such as the  Division of Motor Vehic les  or  t h e  
Department of Sta te .  These systems operate under a statutory grant of 
power, which also se t s  out guidelines conce rn ing  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  and 
disqualification of drivers. With respect  to the removal of dangerous 
drivers from the  highways, s t a tu tes  vary in the  spec i f i c i ty  of t h e i r  
grounds for license revocation or suspension. Many s ta tu tes  establish 
"point systemsTf to identify habitual traffic offenders, set out a number of 
serious t raf f ic  offenses punishable by rnandatory license suspension, or 
both. Such statutes may in effect assign the sanctioning function to the 
courts, or make sanctioning a "ministerial" or mandatory duty of the 
agency, once certain facts are determined by the court. Subject to  these 
s ta tu tory  provisions, administrative bodies exercise discretion whether to 
sanction drivers, and what sanctions to impose on drivers. 
Admin i s t r a t i ve  bodies  a c t i n g  aga in s t  d r i ve r s  a re  bound by the 
p rocedura l  due p rocess  r equ i r emen t .  The major c o n s t r a i n t  on 
administrative bodies is the requirement of a hearing in connection with 
licensing sanctions. There has been considerable controversy over the  
t iming  of the hearing, that  is, whether the hearing must take place 
before sanctions become effective.  O the r  c o n s t r a i n t s  involve  t h e  
permissible scope of an agency's discretion, and what specific trial-type 
procedures are applicable to the agency proceedings. 
6.3.3.2.1 The Right to  Notice and Hearing. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has concluded that  a driver's license is an "important in teres t"  t h a t  
cannot be revoked or limited without due process of law. More recently, 
the Court also concluded that  unless an "emergency situationH exists,  
l i c ense  suspension or revocation must be preceded by a hearing on 
whether appropriate grounds for the sanction exist. 
Notice of possible administrative action is normally provided the driver 
by the agency, and is given a t  or before the time administrative action is 
initiated. Sometimes notice may be given by other governmental officers, 
such as by a police officer who explains to a driver the  consequences of 
refusal to  submit to  an implied-consent test, or by a judge who explains 
to a driver who pleads guilty that conviction of a certain traffic violation 
will result in mandatory license suspension. 
The opportunity to be heard before action is taken is granted in all 
but  a narrow class  of cases. One class of cases involves "habitual 
offenders1' subject to mandatory suspension upon the r eco rd ing  of a 
specified number of t raf f ic  convictions within a fixed time period. A 
prior hearing is held to  be unnecessary because the offender had an  
opportunity to  be heard, a t  each of the criminal proceedings leading to 
those convictions. In addition, the only mat ters  for dispute are  whether 
the convictions were validly recorded and counted. 
Another related class of cases involves mandatory license suspension 
imposed on drivers convicted of certain serious traffic offenses. Still 
another class involves mandatory suspensions for failing to answer traffic 
citations; here, no hearing is required prior to suspension because the 
driver had an opportunity to be heard but chose not to exercise it.  
Finally, there exists a class of cases in which administrative sanctions are 
delayed during the time the administrative action is reviewed by a court. 
Judicial  review, combined with the  delay in i m p l e m e n t i n g  t h e  
administrative sanction, in effect  produces a hearing on the principal 
issues before the administrative action becomes effective and therefore 
may satisfy procedural due process. 
6 . 3 . 3 . 2 . 2  Timing of the Hearing. The "emergency situationt1 exception 
to the requirement of a hearing before action is taken, has been applied 
to licensing sanctions taken against drivers. Three "emergency situations" 
justifying immediate action have been identified: accumulation of enough 
t r a f f i c  points to classify a driver as an I1habitual traffic offender;" 
conviction of an offense for which license suspension is a mandatory 
sanction; and refusal to submit to an implied-consent test. 
Several  e lements  a r e  common to  the  h a b i t u a l - o f f e n d e r  and  
suspension-upon-conviction cases. First of all, the presence of a habitual 
or serious offender is held to be so serious a threat to public safety that 
imm ediate action against h i m  is justifiable. Second, the action requires 
little discretion, merely a determination whether certain convictions had 
in fact occurred, so the risk of an erroneous decision is slight. Third, 
the administrative decision to suspend is not final but is reviewable by a 
court, and thus a check is provided against any mistaken decisions that 
are made. 
Summary action against those refusing to submit to implied-consent 
tests also has been justified on the grounds that this action is a response 
to an "emergency situation." This practice has been challenged in the 
lower federal courts, and is currently awaiting resolution by the U.S. 
Supreme Court .  However, even if the  Court  upholds prehearing 
suspensions, not all state courts may follow this reasoning. In  any event, 
those s ta tes  that do permit summary suspension provide for postsuspension 
hearings immediately following the decision to suspend. 
6 . 3 . 3 . 2 . 3  Standa rds  Governing Admin i s t r a t i ve  Act ion.  S ta te  
legislatures cannot describe in detail all driving conduct tha t  is deserving 
of administrative sanctions. The administrative body is therefore granted 
discretion concerning both the  class of drivers that  may be sanctioned, 
and the type or duration of those sanctions. This is normally accomplished 
by legislation delegating t o  the  agency authority t o  make appropriate 
rules. The relationship between legislative and administrative bodies is 
described in more detail in Section 3.4 of this volume. 
Lack of clear standards for administrative action, such as a statute 
authorizing a licensing agency to sanction drivers "believed to be unfit t o  
operate  a motor vehiclev might be held unconstitutional. But if the  
agency develops and applies its own reasonably objective standards, a due 
process attack alleging lack of standards might be avoided. 
Where an administrative body has been granted discre tion concerning 
the type or severity of a sanction, its exercise of discretion will normally 
be upheld provided some limits had been imposed by the legislature on 
the range of administrative action and the agency acted within those 
limits. Courts are likely to tolerate exercises of administrative discretion 
on the grounds that  an agency has more specialized knowledge of the 
facts and circumstances of cases brought before it. 
6 . 3 . 3 . 2 . 4  Appl ica t ion  of Spec i f i c  Procedural Protections. The 
minimum procedural requirements that apply to administrative proceedings 
inc lude  not ice ,  the opportunity to  be heard, and reasonably specific 
guidelines governing the agency's practices. 
Other protections that may apply in administrative proceedings include 
the rights to counsel, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses, 
the separation of "investigatoryff and "j~dicial '~ functions, written findings 
and conclusions, and speedy procedures. 
The right to  counsel in administrative proceedings is not required by 
the Constitution because the license suspension or revocation process is 
purely Mcivil'! and does not pose the  th rea t  of incarceration. However, 
state statutes or agency rules may permit individuals to  have counsel 
present. 
Where an administrative determination depends on the testimony of an 
individual, as  in a suspension proceeding for failure to  submit t o  an  
implied-consent t e s t ,  rights t o  personally confront or cross-examine that 
person become important, and likely will apply. On the other hand, where 
the  agency's act ion is "mini~terial , '~ that is, automatic once certain facts 
are shown to exist, the right of personal confrontation is not essential 
and likely will not be granted. 
The requirement of an uimpartial!' decision-maker does not forbid the 
same official from acting both as investigator and decision-maker in the 
same case,  provided there is no actual  bias, or danger of bias, on the 
official's part. For example, a police officer  who had ci ted the  driver 
for a t r a f f i c  offense may not sit on an appeals board judging that driver's 
fitness to drive; however, a hearing officer  from the  admin i s t r a t i ve  
agency that supervises driver licensing may make such a judgment. 
Written findings of fact are required of an administrative agency, but 
only to  the  extent  of set t ing out the reasons for its decision to sanction 
a driver. A formal opinion, or a transcript of administrative proceedings 
is not specifically required by the Due Process Clause. 
Another aspect  of p rocedu ra l  due p rocess  is t h e  avo idance  of 
unreasonable delay in ini t iat ing administrative proceedings. While there 
exists a right to a prompt hearing following administrative action,  there  
is apparently no right to an immediate administrative decision following 
the  hearing, nor does there  appear to  be a r ight  t o  demand  t h a t  a 
decision be carried out immediately. 
R igh t s  t o  counsel, personal confrontation, and cross-examination, 
separation of functions, the  requirement of writ ten decisions, and t ime 
limits within which action must be taken, all may be provided by statutes 
or agency rules even in cases when they are not specifically required by 
the Due Process Clause. 
Revocation of Probation. Probation as discussed here includes 
both  t h e  conditional release of a convicted t raf f ic  offender and the 
deferred prosecution of a driver arrested for a t raf f ic  offense. Both 
probation and deferred prosecution a re  granted on the condition that a 
driver obey certain restrictions on liberty, including r e s t r i c t i o n s  on 
drinking and driving. Violation of these may result in the revocation of 
probation and/or reinstatement of fine or imprisonment, or the resumption 
of a deferred prosecution leading to possible criminal sanctions. 
The termination of probation s ta tus  involves the  potential loss of 
l iberty or property, and for that reason the Due Process Clause applies to 
these proceedings. Timely notice of the grounds for revocation, a fair 
and impartial hearing, and the right to present and confront witnesses are 
among the applicable rights. Evidence in which the revocation decision is 
based must be reliable; for example, an actual  conviction of a traffic 
offense as opposed to  a mere ci tat ion,  might be required to  t r i g g e r  
revocation. A probation revocation hearing is not a criminal trial, and 
the full range of procedural safeguards that govern trials is not required. 
For example, violations may be established by proof less than beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Additionally, the right to have counsel present a t  the 
revocation proceeding is not absolute; ra ther ,  i t  may be granted on a 
case-by-case basis. 
Resumption of a deferred prosecution has been characterized as an 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion rather than the revocation of a liberty 
interest  to which the accused is entitled, Little case law has so far been 
developed concerning the application of p rocedura l  due p rocess  t o  
resumption of deferred protection, although it has been argued that the 
Due Process Clause should apply to such decisions. 
6 . 3 . 3 . 4  Summary. Both the adjudication of traffic violation cases and 
the sanctioning of traffic violators by administrative agenies a re  governed 
by procedural due process requirements. The adjudication of serious 
traffic offenses remains a criminal proceeding governed by the full range 
o f  p r o c e d u r a l  p ro t ec t i ons .  This is so even in s t a t e s  t h a t  have 
udecriminalizedll traffic offenses. Decriminalized adjudication proceedings 
are  governed by most protections applicable to criminal trials, except the 
requirements of counsel, jury trial, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Administrative (driver-licensing) proceedings a r e  governed by many--but 
not all-criminal trial protections. 
License restrictions affecting drinking, drinking before driving, hours of 
operation, and the like, may be imposed by courts, licensing agencies, or 
both .  Violation of licensing restr ict ions may result in more serious 
sanctions; these include possible fine or imprisonment resulting f rom 
revocation of probation and reinstatement of the original sentence. Both 
the imposition of restr ict ions and sentencing for v iola  t ion  of t hose  
restrictions are subject to the procedural due process requirements. 
6.3.4 Consequences of Procedural Due Process Challenges. Two kinds 
of challenges based on procedural due process can be brought against 
governmental action. The f i rs t  is an a t t a c k  d i r e c t e d  a t  an  e n t i r e  
p rocedu re ,  such  a s  l i c e n s e  suspension without prior hearing, and a 
successful challenge could invalidate the  procedure, possibly voiding the  
decisions resulting from the faulty procedure, 
The second type of challenge acknowledges t h a t  t h e  p rocedu re s  
themselves a re  valid, but that  the procedures were not followed in an 
individual case,  fo r  example, a violation occurs where a driver is not 
properly notified of a pending proceeding to  suspend his license, even 
though notice was required by s ta tu te .  A successful challenge on this 
basis will not void the s ta tu to ry  procedures themselves, although the 
action taken with respect to that particular driver nay be declared void. 
The i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  of p rocedu ra l  s a f e g u a r d s  in a judicial  or 
administrative process, whether required by the  constitution or provided 
by s t a t u t e  r egu l a t i on ,  also may add t o  the cost of countermeasure 
implementation. 
6.3.5 Resolving Procedural Due Process Constraints. A planner 
intending to implement a countermeasure program can take several  s teps 
t o  reduce the risk of successful procedural due process challenges. First 
of all, reasonably definite guidelines should be developed concerning the  
g r o u n d s  f o r  r e s t r i c t i o n  o r  r e v o c a t i o n  o f  d r i v e r s  l i c e n s e s .  
Mandatory-suspension offenses and point systems permit ffautomatic" 
disciplinary action and simplify the fact-finding process with respect  to  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  sanc t ion ing ,  in turn simplifying the hearing process. 
Second, similar guidelines should be developed to  govern the  entry  of 
d r i v e r s  i n to  i nnova t i ve  c o u n t e r m e a s u r e  p rograms  v ia  p roba t i on ,  
deferred-prosecution, or restricted-license programs. Probation and other 
sanctioning schemes are expected to be important means of implementing 
proposed countermeasure programs, and they a re  considered in detail in 
Sec t i on  11.0 of t h i s  volume. Finally, drivers should be informed in 
advance of the  consequences of their being found guilty of a t r a f f i c  
offense and of their rights concerning adjudication of the offense. 
6.3.6 Summary and Conclusions: Procedural Due --- Proces s .  The  
constitutional requirement of procedural due process is aimed at  ensuring 
fairness and consistency on the  part  of the government dealing wi th  
individuals. Procedural due process is a flexible doctrine, and the specific 
requirements i t  imposes on any given proceeding will va ry  wi th  t h e  
interest  in l iberty or property a t  stake, the risk of an erroneous decision, 
and with the public interest in speedy decision-making and cost reduction. 
The procedures afforded by the Due Process Clause are similar in form to 
those required a t  a criminal tr ial ;  however, not all of the  procedures 
governing tr ials  will be applied to  noncriminal proceedings through the 
Due Process Clause. 
The means  through which highway c r a sh  c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s  a re  
implemented include: the adjudication and sanctioning of offenders; 
administrative proceedings revoking, suspending, or restricting driversf 
licenses; and probation revocation proceedings. The Due Process Clause 
app l ies  with g r e a t e r  or l e s s e r  f o r c e  t o  a l l  of these  proceedings, 
Specifically, notice, hearing, definite criteria on which a decision must be 
based, and an impartial decision-maker are required. Development of and 
adherence to definite and consistent guidelines for  governmental action 
appea r  t o  be t h e  most  e f f ec t i ve  means of ensuring procedural due 
process. Observance of procedural requirements, both constitutional and 
legislat ive,  would reduce the number of challenges to  official action 
against drivers. 
B I B L I O G R A P H I C  ESSAY FOR THE DUE PROCESS OF L A W  
m 1 -  
Introduction: Due Process Generally 
A wealth of material exists on the due process of law requirement. 
An overview of the Due Process Clause is presented in  16 A M .  JUR. 2d 
Constitutional Law §§  542-84 (1964). Discussion of the history and scope 
of the clause can be found in: Griswold v. Connecticut,  381 U.S. 4 7 4  
(1965); - Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (19611, and Twining v. New Jersey, 211 
U.S. 78 (1908). 
Substantive Due Process of Law 
The leading case on the limits of the police power of the state is 
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). One should see  also, Goldblatt v.  
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); and Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 
(1885). In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 2 6  (19541, the concept of "public 
welfare" was given a broad definition by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Introduction: Substantive Due Process 
The following cases characterized specific constitutional provisions of 
the Bill of Rights as falling within the Due Process Clause and therefore 
applicable to the states:  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) [Sixth 
Amendment right t o  jury tr ial  in criminal cases] ; Klopfer v .  North 
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) [Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial]; 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) [Sixth  Amendment  r i gh t  t o  
confrontation of adverse witnesses]; Cox - v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) 
[First Amendment freedoms of speech and association] ; Malloy v. Hogan, 
378 U.S. 1 (1965) [Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination] ; 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660  (1962) [Eighth Amendment prohibition 
of cruel and unusual punishment] ; and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) - -
[Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable arrests ,  searches, and 
7'Libertyfl Guaranteed by the Due Process Guarantee 
The concept of "libertyu guaranteed by the  Due Process Clause is 
discussed in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 2 6 2  U.S. 390 (1923). This concept has been adopted in the 
l ead ing  modern c a s e  recogniz ing the fundamental right of privacy, 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
Substantive due process was a t  one time used by the Supreme Court 
to subject state economic regulation to rigorous review under the rational 
relationship t es t .  Key cases include Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
(19051, and Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). The  modern 
Supreme Court has handled challenges to pure economic regulation with a 
broad "hands off" approach. In this regard - see,  Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 
U.S. 726 (1963); and Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The 
court's reluctance to invalidate economic legislation on substantive due 
process grounds is discussed in %loore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
Relationship of Substantive Due Process to Other Law-Based Constraints 
The specific constitutional protections made binding in the  s t a t e s  
th rough  t h e  Due P roces s  C l ause  a re  discussed in the bibliographic 
materials accompanying Section 5.0. The relationship between substantive 
due process and the  equal protection guarantee is discussed in Angel, 
Substantive Due Process and the  Criminal Law, 9 LOY. CHI. L. J. 61 
(1977). The right to t ravel  is identified as one of those rights falling 
within the scope of the Due Process Clause in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 
116 (1958). One should see  also in this regard, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618 (1969). The sources of substantive due process protection and 
privacy protection of fundamental rights are similar. In this respect one 
should - -  see, Roe v. Wade, - 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The prohibition against cruel 
or unusual punishment was identified as falling within the Due Process 
Clause in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Police practices 
t h a t  a r e  "shocking t o  the  c o n s c i e n ~ e ' ~  were held to  violate the Due 
Process Clause in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
The Nature of Substantive Due Process Issues 
A general discussion of permissible state ends and means may be found 
i n  Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1975). The 
presumption of constitutionality enjoyed by legislation is illustrated by the 
Court ' s  reasoning in Ferguson v.  Skrupa,  372 U.S. 726 (1963), and 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). Judicial willingness to  supply 
justifications for statutes challenged on substantive due process grounds is 
also illustrated by recent court decisions upholding motorcycle helmet-use 
laws. Representative of these are Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277 (D. 
Mass.), affirmed, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972), and Bisenius v. Karns, 4 2  Wis.2d 
4 2 ,  165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 709 (1969). The opposite 
result was reached in People v. Fries -9 42 I11.2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969), 
which held the  helmet laws served no public purpose and unjustifiably 
infringed personal liberty. 
The Least Drastic Means Reauirement 
The examples described in this section are based on Pierce v, Society 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (19251, and Meyer v. Nebraska, 2 6 2  U.S. 390 
(1923). Other examples of impermissible means of promoting legitimate 
state interests are cited elsewhere in this section. 
Vague and Overly Broad Legislation 
Cases discussing the requirement that a statute must be written in a 
clear and definite manner t o  meet due process requirements include: 
Smith  v .  Gougen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Cramp v. Board of Public 
Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); and United Sta tes  v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 
(1946); one should see also, 16 ADA. J U R .  2d Constitutional Law S 552 
(1964). The requirement that  a s t a tu te  must be comprehensible to  an 
individual  of ordinary intelligence may be found in United Sta tes  v. 
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954). Vague s ta tu tes  that  tend to  inhibit the 
exercise of such fundamental individual liberties as freedom of speech or 
assembly are especially likely t o  be declared unconstitutional. In this 
regard one should see,  Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951). The -
danger of discriminatory or abusive enforcement of vague s ta tu tes  is 
discussed in Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). One should 
see also, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the  Supreme Court,  
109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960). 
Key c a s e s  involving o v e r b r e a d t h  i s sues  inc lude :  Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 60  (1973); Aptheker v. Secretary of S ta te ,  378 U.S. 
500 (1964); Edwards v.  South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); and Thornhill 
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). The relation between vagueness and 
o v e r b r e a d t h  is  i l lustrated by the  following decisions: Civil Service 
Commission v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Papachristou v. Ci ty  
of Jacksonville 405 U.S. 156 (1972); and Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 
U.S. 611 (1971). 
Infringing the Right to Travel 
Key cases involving the right to  in te r s ta te  travel include: Memorial 
Hospital v. Varicopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) [same, admission t o  
public hospital a t  public expense] ; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 
(1969) [durational residency requirements for welfare recipients] ; Edwards 
v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) [prohibiting the entry of indigents into 
the state] ; and Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867). 
Challenges Alleging Unfair Police Conduct 
One aspect of due process analysis has been a concern with improper 
po l ice  p r a c t i c e s ,  beginning wi th  t h e  Court 's decision i n  Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In Rochin the  Supreme Court  found  
unconstitutional the forcible pumping of the  stomach of an individual 
accused of illegal narcotics use. The court held tha t  due process of law 
is offended where the government uses methods in gathering evidence 
which "offend a sense of justice" in that they ?'shock the  conscience." 
l a te r  case, Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) seemingly limited 
Rochin to  situations involving coercion, violence, or brutal i ty to  t h e  
person. A third case,  Breithaupt v.  Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) further 
limited the Rochin holding, Breithaupt involved the  taking of a blood 
sample of an unconscious driver suspected of driving while intoxicated 
(DWI). The blood was drawn by a doctor s t  the  request of the police. 
The tak ing  of the  sample was found - not to violate the Due Process 
Clause even though it involved an intrusion into the body. The results i n  
Breithaupt and i n  a l a te r  case, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 
(19661, which also dealt with blood testing for alcohol content ,  strongly 
suggest that the Rochin principle may be limited to the facts of that case. 
Application of the Substantive Due Process Requirement to  Highway 
Safety Issues 
The state 's  plenary power t o  regulate highway traffic for the public 
safety is recognized in Hess -v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). The 
impor t ance  of t h e  s t a t e ' s  i n t e r e s t  in promoting highway safe ty  is 
universally recognized. Typical of the state decisions is Smith v. Wayne 
County Sheriff, 278 Mich. 91, 270 N.W. 227 (1936). 
Challenges to State Objectives: The Helmet Laws 
The motorcycle helmet-use laws provide a comprehensive review of the 
limits of the  state 's  police power and t h e  subs t an t i ve  due p rocess  
requirement. Illustrative cases include: Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 
277 (D. Mass.), affirmed, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972); City of Adrian v. Poucher, 
398 Mich. 316, 247 N.W.2d 798 (1976); and Bisenius v. Karns -7 42 Wis.2d 42, 
165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 709 (1969); but see,  People v. 
Fries -7 42 I11.2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969). The relatively small intrusion 
on l i be r t y  posed by he lme t  laws was a f a c t o r  l ead ing  t o  t h e i r  
constitutionality in State v. Cotton -9 55 Haw. 138, 516 P.2d 709 (1973), and 
in - State v. Mele, - 103 N.J. Super. 353, 247 A.2d 176 (Hudson County Ct. 
1968). These cases suggest that highway crash countermeasures involving 
greater intrusion on personal liberty might violate the Due Process Clause. 
Challenges to Means of Attaining State Objectives 
Restrictions on the size of trucks transporting flammable liquids were 
found unconstitutional in City of Colorado Springs v. Grueskin, 106 Colo. 
281, 422 P.2d 384 (1966), and Clark Oil and Refining Corporation v. City 
of Tomah, 30 Wis. 2d 547, 141 N.W.2d 299 (1966). 
Zoning laws employing a restrictive definition of "family" and limiting 
occupancy of dwellings to  families were struck down in City of Des 
Plaines v. Trottner, 34 I11.2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966), and Larson v.  
Mayor and Council of the Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 99 N.J. Super. 
365, 240 A.2d 31 (Law Div. 1968). In this regard one should see  also, 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
Challenges Based on Vagueness or Overbreadth 
The degree of vagueness necessary to make a law unconstitutional is 
great .  In S t a t e  v. Harris, 309 Minn. 395, 244 N.\V.2d 733 (1976) an  
ordinance prohibiting lTunnecessary exhibition of speed" was upheld. The 
Harris court held that for a statute to be held unconstitutionally vague, 
ordinary persons would have t o  guess a t  i t s  meaning and further, they 
would have to disagree among themselves as  t o  what the  s t a t u t e  meant. 
T r a f f i c  laws employ a number of terms that  do not precisely define 
driving conduct. For example, the term "driving while intoxicated" was 
held not to  be unconstitutionally vague in Synnott v. State, 515 P.2d 1154 
(Okla. Crim. 1973). Other decisions upholding language commonly found in 
t r a f f i c  laws against vagueness claims include: State v. Rich -9 115 Ariz. 
App. ll9, 563 P.2d 918 (1977) [Basic Speed Law, prohibiting speeds tha t  a r e  
not ureasonablell and fTprudentTfl; State v. Baldnado, - X.M. -, 587 P.2d 
50 ( ~ t .  App. 1978) [careless driving]; and Logan City v. Carlson, 585 P.2d 
449 ( ~ t a h  1978) [following too closely]. A so-called Ifper sefT DWI statute, 
making driving with a BAC of ,1006 or above an offense irrespective of 
driving impairment, was challenged as overly broad in Greaves v. -7 State 
528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974). That challenge alleged tha t  the  per s e  law 
punished competent  as well as dangerous drivers. The Greaves court 
rejected the overbreadth challenge brought by the driver in that particular 
case because he could not establish that  he was a competent driver a t  
the forbidden BAC level. The per se DWI law also was upheld in Coxe - v.  
S ta te ,  281 A.2d 606  el. 1971); and S t a t e  v. Hamza, 342 So.2d 80  la. 
1977). In People v. Von Tersch, 180 Colo. 295, 505 P.2d 5 (1973), the  
equ ipment  s t a t u t e  r e g u l a t i n g  a u t o  suspensions was held t o  be too 
lfsweepingtT a means of achieving a valid s t a t e  purpose  and t h a t  i t  
unreasonably prevented the improvement of production-model automobiles. 
Challenges Alleging Infringement of the Right to Travel 
The power of states to regulate travel on the highways is discussed in 
Berberian v. Lussier, 87 R.I. 226, 139 A.2d 869 (1958). The distinction 
between the fundamental right to  travel  and the qualified right to  use 
motor vehicles is made in: Wells v. Malloy, 402 F.Supp. 856 (D. Vt. 
1975); - State v. McCourt, 131 N.J. Super. 283, 329 A.2d 577 (,4pp. Div. 
1974); and Berberian v. Petit, - R.I. -, 374 A.2d 791 (1977). 
Procedural Due Process of Law 
Introduction 
Procedural due process issues a re  t rea ted in a general fashion in 16 
A M .  JUR. 2d Constitutional Law S S  548-49 (1964); Amsterdam, A.G.; 
Segal, B.L.; and Miller, M.K. 1975. Trial manual for the defense of 
criminal cases. student ed. Philadelphia: American Law Institute; Davis, 
K.C. 1972. Administrative law text .  3d ed. pp. 157-93 (opportunity to 
be heard), 194-214 (adjudication p rocedures ) ,  245-5 3 (b i a s ) ,  254-70 
(separation of functions), 271-90 (rules of evidence), 318-42 (findings, 
reasons, and opinions). St. Paul: West Publishing Company; and Reese, 
J.H. 1965. The legal nature of a driver's license. Washington, D.C.: 
Automotive Safety Foundation. 
The Nature of Procedural Due Process Issues 
The proposition that the more grievous the possible consequences of 
governmental  action the more comprehensive procedural due process 
protection is required is expressed  in Jo in t  Ant i -Fasc i s t  Refugee  
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). Discussion of the interests 
protected by procedural due process requirement may be found in Smith 
v, Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 
(1977) [foster parent s t a tus ] ;  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) 
[Social Security benefits] ; Arnett  v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) [public 
employment]; Wolff -v. McDonnell,  418 U.S. 539 (1974) [pr isoner ' s  
disciplinary status]  ; Bell -v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) [driver's license]; 
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1970) [reputat ion];  Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) [welfare benef i ts ] ;  and Sniadach v. Family 
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) [wages].  One should see  also, Van 
Alstyne, The Demise of the  Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional 
Law 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). -
Amlieable Procedural Protections 
Procedural protections a t  the criminal trial are discussed generally in 
Amsterdam, A.G.; Segal, B.L.; and Miller, M.K. 19'75. Trial manual for 
the defense of criminal cases. student ed. Philadelphia: American Law 
Institute; and in the cases dealing with constitutional safeguards governing 
c r i m i n a l  t r i a l s ,  which a r e  c i t e d  in t h e  b ib l iograph ic  m a t e r i a l s  
accompanying Section 5.0. Balancing of social costs  and benef i ts  is  
discussed in Dixon v. Love, - 431 U.S. 105 (19771, and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 
U.S. 254 (1970). 
S~ec i f i c  Procedural Protections 
Cases discussing the requirement of notice and an opportunity to be 
heard include: Ingraham v. Wright ,  430 U.S. 651 (1977) [ co rpo ra l  
punishment of school pupil]; Goss -v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) [suspension 
from school]; and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 6 7  (1972) [repossession of 
property by credi tor] ;  one should see  also, hllullane v. Central Hanover 
Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
Whether a hearing is required prior to  adverse government action is 
discussed in the fo l l o~~ ing  cases: ?(lathews v. Eldridqe, 424 U.S, 319 (1976); 
Bell -v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); and Goldberg v. Kellv -7 397 U.S. 254 
(1970). 
Confrontation of witnesses was discussed in:  Baxter v. Palmigiano, 
425 U.S. 308 (1976) [prison disciplinary hearing] ; Goss -v. -7 Lopez 419 U.S. 
565 (1975) [suspension f rom school ]  ; and Willner v. Committee on 
Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) [discipline of a t to rney] .  The 
r e q u i r e m e n t  of a n e u t r a l  decision-maker is discussed in Gibson v.  
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) [conflict of in teres t  on part  of professional 
licensing board] ; Ward - v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) [bias 
found where municipal functions were largely supported by fines levied by 
mayor's court] ; and Cinderella Career and Finishing School, Inc. v. FTC -7 
425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Bias on the part of the  decision-maker is 
also generally discussed in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). 
Although parties to civil suits "at common lawn a r e  enti t led t o  a jury 
tr ial ,  - see  U.S. CONST. amend. VII, this right has been held not to apply 
to administrative proceedings. In this regard - see, Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. 
v .  Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 442 
(1977); and Block -v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921). -
In Brady v. Maryland,  373 U.S. 83 (1963), i t  was held that  the 
prosecutionls intentional suppression of evidence t ha t  is material  t o  the  
accused's defense, and which was requested by the accused, violated due 
process of law. This is so whether the suppression was the result of good 
faith or bad on the prosecution's part. 
Statutory procedural requirements applicable to federal agencies are 
codified in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act ( AP A),  a s  amended, 
5 U.S.C. 55  551 e t  seq. (west  19771, and its s tate counterparts. MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. §S 24.201 et  seq. (Supp. 1978-791, is typical of s t a t e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p rocedu re s  a c t s .  S t a t u t o r y  provisions dealing with 
procedures in connection with license revoca t ion  o r  suspension a r e  
discussed in Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 361 (1974) and in Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 427 
(1974). 
Application of Procedural Due Process Requirements t o  Highway Safety 
Issues 
Adjudication of Traffic Offenses 
Decriminalization of traf fic-law violations is discussed generally in: 
U.S. Department of Transportation. 1977. Supplement t o  the 197 6 report  
on administrative adjudication of t r a f f i c  infractions. Washington, D.C.: 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; and U.S. Department of 
Transportation. 1975. Report on administrative adjudication of traffic 
infractions. Washington, D.C.: Na t iona l  Highway T r a f f i c  S a f e t y  
Administration. 
Typical s t a tu tes  decriminalizing traffic offenses include: FLA. STAT. 
55  318.11 e t  seq. (1978); N.Y. VEH.  & TRAF.  LAW $35 155, 225-228 
( ~ c ~ i n n e y  Supp. 1978-79); and R.I. GEN. LAWS S S  31-41-1 --- 31-41-5, 
31-43-1 -31-43-? (Supp. 1977). The New York and Rhode Island s ta tu tes  
a r e  l fpure l l  dec r imina l iza t ion  s ta tu tes ,  under which the adjudication 
function is placed in administrative hearing officers. The Florida system 
a n d  most  o t h e r  dec r im ina l i z a t i on  s chemes  con t i nue  t o  ves t  t h e  
adjudication function in the courts. Essential elements of both the  New 
York and Florida schemes have been upheld. In this regard see: Levitz - -
v. State, 339 So.2d 655  la. 1976); S t a t e  v. Webb, 335 So.2d 826 (Fla. - - -
1976); and Rosenthal v. Har tnet t ,  36 N.Y.2d 269, 326 N.E.2d 811, 367 
N.Y.S.2d 247 (1975). 
In a number of other s t a tes ,  certain nonserious traffic offenses have 
been classified as minor offenses, and imprisonment may not be imposed 
on offenders. In this regard - see: CAL. VEH. CODE § S  40000.1-40000.28 
(West Supp. 1978) [eliminating imprisonment except for  serious t raf f ic  
offenses and third and subsequent convictions of nonserious offenses] ; 
OHIO REV. CODE A N N .  S S  2929.21(D) (Page 19751, 4511.99 (Page Supp. 
1978) [ f i r s t  convic t ions  of minor t r a f f i c  offenses defined as "minor 
mi~demeanors,~ possibility of imprisonment eliminat edl ; and PA. STAT. 
A N N .  t i t .  75, S 6502 (Purdon 1977) [most minor traffic offenses defined as 
"summary offenses," same] . One should see also, - Sta t e  v. Laird, - 25 N . J .  
298, 135 A.2d 859 (1957) [characterizing traffic offenses as "quasi-crimes" 
to  which some aspects of criminal p rocedu re  app ly ] .  Most s t a t e s  
continue to  t r e a t  moving traffic-law violations as misdemeanors; typical 
provisions include: GA. CODE ANN.  S  68A-102 (1975); IND. CODE A N N .  
5 9-4-1-127 (Burns Supp. 1978); and TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. A N N .  a r t ,  
6701d, S 143 (Vernon 1977). 
In general,  rights t o  jury t r ia l  or t o  counsel a r e  not applicable to 
minor or petty offenses; standards are se t  out in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
407 U.S. 2 5  (1972) [right to counsel applies where offense is punishable by 
imprisonment], and Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 6 6  (1970) [right to  
t r ia l  by jury applies where offense is punishable by more than six monthsf 
A number of s t a tes  adjudicate traffic and other minor criminal cases 
using "two-tiern systems. In this regard - see, e.g., V A .  CODE 5 4  16.1-132 
e t  s eq .  (1975); a n d  WASH. REV. C O D E  ANN. S S  3.50.370-3.50.410 (Supp. 
1977). Even though t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e  of t h e  proceedings  i s  a s u m m a r y  t r i a l  
w i t h o u t  s u c h  s a f e g u a r d s  as j u r y  t r i a l  o r  a l a w - t r a i n e d  judge ,  t h e  
availability of a second o r  "de novorf  t r i a l ,  w i t h  a p p r o p r i a t e  s a f e g u a r d s ,  
m a k e s  t h e  e n t i r e  p r o c e s s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .  - See  in this  regard: Ludwig v. 
Massachusetts,  427 U.S. 618 (1976); North v. Russel l ,  427  U.S. 328  (1976); 
and Col ten  v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972). 
Nearly every  s t a t e  continues t o  t r e a t  s e r i o u s  t r a f f i c  o f f e n s e s  s u c h  as 
v e h i c u l a r  h o m i c i d e ,  l e a v i n g  t h e  s c e n e  of  a t r a f f i c  c r a s h ,  DWI, a n d  
reckless d r i v i n g  as c r i m e s .  T y p i c a l  p r o v i s i o n s  inc lude :  FLA.  STAT. S  
318.17 (1978); a n d  N.Y. VEH. & T R A F .  LAW S S  6 0 0 ,  1190, a n d  1192(5) 
( ~ c K i n n e y  Supp. 1978-79). A smal l  minority of s t a t e s  have d e c r i m i n a l i z e d  
t h e  f i r s t  o f f e n s e  of  DWI. In this  regard  - see , OR. REV. STAT. 5 464.365 
(1977); and WIS. STAT. ANN. 346.65 (West Supp.  1978-79). E v e n  w h e r e  
a s t a t u t e  udecr iminal izes l f  a n  offense,  t h e  consequences of an  adjudicat ion 
of guilt  may remain  similar  t o  those  of a c r imina l  c o n v i c t i o n .  If t h i s  i s  
t h e  c a s e ,  c o u r t s  m i g h t  i g n o r e  t h e  l f n o n c r i m i n a l f f  l a b e l  a n d  s t i l l  requi re  
procedural  due  process pro tec t ions  s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  a f f o r d e d  a t  c r i m i n a l  
t r i a l s .  T h i s  w a s  d o n e  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  f i r s t  o f f e n s e  DWI in  B r o w n  v. 
M 4  280 Or. 85, 570 P.2d 52 (1977). 
W h e r e  a p a r t i c u l a r  t r a f f i c  of fense  is defined as a c r ime,  guilt  must be 
p r o v e d  b e y o n d  a r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t ;  t h i s  i s  r e q u i r e d  i n  a l l  c r i m i n a l  
p r o c e e d i n g s  by In re  Winship,  397 U.S. 358 (1970). However, in a number 
of decriminal ized systems,  lesser  burdens of proof a r e  necessary,  S t a t u t e s  
r e q u i r i n g  p roo f  by  o n l y  " c l e a r  a n d  conv inc ing f1  e v i d e n c e  include: N.Y. 
VEH. & TRAF. LAW S 227(1) ( ~ c K i n n e y  Supp. 1978-79); R.I. G E N .  LAWS S 
31-43-3(1) ( S u p p .  1 9 7 7 ) ;  a n d  WIS. STAT.  A N N .  S 345.45 ( w e s t  S u p p ,  
1978-79). S t a t u t e s  requiring proof by a n  even less  demanding s t a n d a r d ,  "a 
p r e p o n d e r a n c e  ( m a j o r i t y )  of t h e  evidence," include: N.D. CENT. CODE S  
39.06.1-03(4) (Supp. 1977); and  OR. REV. STAT. 5  484.375(2) (1977). 
Even  w h e r e  t h e  a d j u d i c a t i o n  of traffic-law cases is removed from t h e  
cr iminal  just ice sys tem,  many of  t h e  r u l e s  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  
c r i m i n a l  p r o s e c u t i o n s  s t i l l  may apply t o  t r a f f i c  cases;  in this  regard  s e e  
-9  
S t a t e  v. Clayton, 584 A.2d 1111 (Alaska 1978); and S t a t e  v. Mi l l e r ,  115 N.H.  - -
The Brady doctrine was applied to chemcial tests for BAC in People 
v. Hitch, - 12 Cal.3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr .  9 (1974). The Hitch 
court held that  breath t es t  ampoules were material evidence, and that 
their intentional suppression by the  prosecution was a violation of due 
process; consequently, failure to preserve the ampoules could result i n  the 
suppression of breath t es t  results  a t  t r ial .  Hitch -was followed by the  
Alaska Supreme Court in Lauderdale v. S ta te ,  548 P.2d 376 (Alaska -
1976). In Garcia v. District Court,  21st Judicial District,  --- Colo. ---, 
589 P.2d 924 (1979) the court held that a driver is entitled to a sample 
of his breath whenever a breath t es t  is administered, so tha t  he can 
a r r a n g e  for an independent test .  The scientif ic  basis for the Hitch 
holding-that there exists a scientifically valid method of retest ing breath 
t es t  ampoules--has been disputed in the scientific community, and most 
courts therefore have refused t o  follow Hitch. Cases a r e  collected and 
summarized in Reeder, R.H. 1977. The Hitch case--saving ampoules for 
a defendant from a chemical t e s t  for chemical intoxication. National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration report DOT-HS-803-593; in this 
regard see also, - State v. Canaday, - Wash.2d -, 585 P.2d U85 (1978). 
In Scarborough v. S ta te ,  261 So.2d 475 ( ~ i s s .  1972), cert. denied, 410 
U.S. 946 (19731, it was held that refusing a driver's request t ha t  a blood 
tes t  for BAC be taken, combined with police officer's refusal to permit 
him to use a telephone after his arrest and confinement to jail, amounted 
to  a suppression of evidence and a deprivation of due process. Whether a 
driver charged ~ ~ i t h  an alcohol-related offense has a due process riqht t o  
obtain an exculpatory chemical test is disputed by courts. In this regard 
compare, Smith v. Ganske, 114 Ariz. ,4pp. 515, 5 6 2  P.2d 395 (1977) and 
Smith v. Cada, - 114 Ariz. App. 510, 562 P,2d 390 (1977) [interference with 
driver's efforts to obtain test is deprivation of right to  fair t r ial]  , with 
S t a t e  v.  Reyna ,  9 2  Idaho 6 6 9 ,  448 P.2d 762 (1968) [driver has no 
constitutional fight to obtain exculpatory chelnical test]. 
The leading cases dealing with revocation of probation are Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778  (1973), and Mempa v. Rhay, 359 U.S. 128 (1967). 
One should see  generally, Killinger, G.G.; Kerper, H.B.; and Cromwell, 
P.F., Jr .  1976. Probation and parole in the criminal justice system. St. 
Paul: West Publishing Company; Kerper, H.R., and Kerper, J. 1974. 
Legal rights of the convicted. St. Paul: West Publishing Company; and 
the materials in Section 11.0 of this volume. 
Adjudication and Sanctioning by the Administrative System 
The application of procedural due process to driver licensing was 
discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell -v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 
(19711, which characterized a driver's license as an "important interest1 '  
tha t  cannot be taken without due process of law. This topic again was 
dealt with by the Court in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (19771, which 
permitted license suspension prior to hearing in an "emergency situationll 
justifying swift action. A driver's license is now described by many s t a t e  
courts as a llqualifiedTT or lllimitedll right; in this regard - see: People -v. 
Brown, 174 Colo. 513, 485 P.2d 500 (1971), cer t .  denied, 404 U.S. 1007 
(1972); Johnston v. -9 State 236 Ga. 370, 223 S.E.2d 808 (1976); and Nicholas 
v. Secretary of State, 74 Mich. App. 64, 253 N.W.2d 662 (1977). 
Where suspension is flautornaticll upon recording of a fixed number of 
traffic convictions or violation points, prior notice is not necessary; -9 see  
e.g., Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Argeros, 313 
So.2d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). In the Dixon case the U.S. Supreme 
Court dealt with the necessity for and timing of hearings. A hearing 
may be unnecessary where it is based on accumulated traff ic convictions, 
because an opportunity to contest the facts had been offered at  the trials 
of the offenses themselves. That result was r eached  in People  v .  
Anderson, 50  Ill. App.3d 516, 365 N.E.2d 729 (1977) [driving with license 
suspended], and Stauffer v. Weedlun, 188 Neb. 105, 195 N.W.2d 218 (1972) 
[point  s y s t e m ] .  However ,  i t  has been held that  a driver must be 
informed, before paying a fine for a traffic offense, that  payment of the 
f i ne  will be t r e a t e d  as a guilty plea for which the driver licensing 
authority may eventually penalize him; - see  i n  th i s  r ega rd ,  Cave v .  
Colorado Department of Revenue, 31 Colo. App. 185, 501 P.2d 479 (1972). 
But a suspension for refusing an implied-consent tes t ,  while i t  is termed 
llautomatic,ll  requires several findings of fact  to be made at  a hearing. 
This is discussed in People v. Keen -9 396 Mich. 573, 242 N.W.2d 405 (1976). 
But where those facts had already been determined, such a s  a t  a court  
t r ial ,  a new fact-finding process may be unnecessary; - see in this regard, 
People v. Farr, 63 I11.2d 209, 347 N.E.2d 146 (1976). Cases holding that  a 
hearing need not be held prior to a mandatory suspension based on points 
include Horodner v. Fisher, 38 N.Y. 2d 680, 345 N.E.2d 571, 382 N.Y.S.2d 
28 (1976), and the Weedlun case ci ted above. Prehearing suspension for 
refusal to take an implied-consent test was upheld in the following cases: 
Popp v, Motor Vehicle Department,  211 Kan. 763, 508 P.2d 991 (1973); 
Craig v. Commonwealth Department of Public Safety,  471 S.W.2d 11 ( K Y .  
1971); and Daneault v. Clarke, U3 N.H. 481, 309 A.2d 884 (1973). On the 
other hand, presuspension hearings for refusal t o  t ake  the  t es t  we re  
r equ i r ed  in t h e  fol lowing cases: Slone v. Kentucky Department of 
Transportation, 379 F, Supp, 652 (E.D. Ky. 1974), aff irmed,  513 F.2d 1189 
(6th Cir. 1975); and Holland v. Parker, 354 F. Supp. 196 (D.s.D. 1973). 
In Montrym v. Pano ra ,  4 2 9  F .  Supp. 393 (D. Mass. 19771, t h e  
Vassachusetts prehearing suspension procedure in implied-consent cases 
was declared unconstitutional as a violaton of due process. Following the 
Dixon decision by the  U.S. Supreme Court, the District Court reaffirmed 
i t s  earlier conclusion t h s t  the s t a t e  procedure was unconst i tu t ional .  
Montrym v. Panora, 438 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Mass. 1977). The U.S. Supreme 
Court has noted probable jurisdiction over this case, 435 U.S. 967 (1978). 
Even i f  the Supreme Court upholds prehearing suspension procedures, some 
states will-either by statute or state constitutional provision--continue t o  
require prior hearings as a matter of their own state law. 
In general, a statute that on its face violates procedural due process 
can be "curedff where due process is granted in its application. In this 
regard - see, Jennings v. Mahoney, 404 U.S. 25 (1971). Lack of standards 
govern ing  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a c t i o n  may make a suspension or other 
administrative sanctioning scheme unconstitutional; however, standards or 
procedures developed by the licensing authority i tself  may "curefT the 
vagueness of the s ta tu te .  Issues  o f  s t a n d a r d s  and t h e  e x e r c i s e  of 
discretion are discussed in: Calabi v. Malloy, 438 F.Supp. 1165 ( D . V ~ .  1977); 
Brockway v. Tofany, 319 F. Supp. 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Elizondo v. S t a t e ,  
Department of Revenue, Division of Motor Vehicles, - Colo. -, 570 
P.2d 518 (1977); and Cameron v. Secretary of Sta te ,  63 Mich. App. 753, 
235 N.W.2d 38, leave denied, 395 Mich. 774 (1975). 
The license-revocation or license-suspension procedure is defined as 
"civil" in nature; for that reason the full range of protections afforded a 
criminal defendant will not apply. In this regard one should - see, Ferguson 
v. Gathright, 485 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1973), cer t .  denied, 415 U.S. 933 
(1974); Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971); 
Anderson v. Cozens, 60 Cal. App. 3d 130, 131 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1976); and 
McDonnell v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 45 Cal. App. 3d 653, 119 Cal. 
Rptr. 804 (1975). Rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses depend 
on the  nature of the issues raised a t  a hearing; where a s t a t u t e  is 
au tomat ic  in i ts  operation these rights may be unnecessary. I n  this 
regard - see: In re Sweeney, 257 A.2d 764  el. Super. Ct. 1969); English 
v.  Tofany,  32 A.D.2d 878,  302 N.Y.S. 2d  221 (1969); and Flory v. 
Department of Motor Vehicles, 84 Wash. 2d 568, 527 P.2d. 1318 (1974); - but 
s e e  Campbel l  v. S t a t e ,  Department of Revenue, Division of Motor -9 
Vehicles, 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971). Even where  r i gh t s  t o  
confront or cross-examine are available they may be waived; - see, August 
v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal. App. 2d 52, 7 0  Cal, Rptr. 172 
(1969). The burden of proof in such a hearing is a preponderance of the 
evidence; in this regard - see, Application of Baggett, 531 P.2d 1011 (0kla.  
1974). The requirement that  a decision maker be f ree  from bias :vas 
treated in Crampton v. Michigan Department of State, 395 Mich. 347, 235 
N.W.2d 352 (19751, and Wolney v. Secretary of State, 77 Mich. App. 61, 
257 N.W.2d 754 (1977). 
The gene ra l  r equ i r emen t  of wr i t t en  f indings a t  administrative 
proceedings is discussed in Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1977). 
Revoca t ion  proceedings  may be governed by s t a t e  rules of civil 
procedure, in this regard - see, Matter of Darvis, 588 S.W.2d 413 ( ~ o .  Ct. 
App. 1978). 
The rights to speedy administrative proceedings and to be free from 
ffunconscionable delayf7 are dealt with in the following; cases: In re  Arndt, 
6 7  N.J. 432, 341 -4.2d 596 (1975); In re  Garber, 141 N.ST. Super. 87, 357 
A.2d 297 (App. Div. 1976); and In r e  Emberton, 109 N.J.  Super. 211, 262 
A.2d 899 (App. Div. 1970). 
Revocation of a restricted license is apparently governed by the same 
procedural requirements as is revocation of an unrestricted one; in this 
regard - 9  see  Nicholas v. Secretary of State, 74 Mich. App. 64, 253 N.W.2d 
662 (1977). 
Revocation of Probation 
Revocation of probation issues are discussed in more detail in Section 
11.0 of this volume as well as in the Mempa and Gagnon cases cited above. 
7.0 THE GUARANTEE OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 
The gua ran t ee  of equal  p ro t ec t i on  of t h e  laws prohibi ts  t h e  
government from treating classes of persons differently from one another, 
unless the differential t rea tment  is necessa ry  t o  accomplish  some 
reasonable governmental purpose. 
7.1 Introduction 
The equal protection guarantee is specifically mentioned in the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
It forbids a s t a t e  to  "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.u The Equal Protection Clause does not apply to 
the federal government; however, discriminatory classifications by the 
federal government have been held to violate the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. 
7.1.1 The Role of Classifications in the Law. Classifications are  
found in nearly every area of the law. They perform functions essential 
to the operation of the legal system, such as defining what conduct is 
required and forbidden, setting out individual rights and duties, and, for 
example ,  identifying who must pay taxes or who may receive public 
benefi ts .  
The equal protection guarantee does not prohibit government from 
using classifications, nor does it require that individuals be t rea ted alike 
in every instance. What equal protection does require is that  those 
classifications the government does make are  necessary to accomplish 
some reasonable government purpose. 
Where classifications are  based on race,  religion, or citizenship, or 
other suspect classifications, or where they exist with respect to voting, 
marriage, or other fundamental rights, the government is required to 
justify its classification scheme: not only must such a classification 
scheme be necessary to further some compelling state interest; but other, 
less restr ict ive al ternatives to  the classification must be unavailable. 
Where neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification exists,  the 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  s c h e m e  is presumed to  be reasonable; thus, one who 
challenges such a scheme must demonstrate, that  is, have no rational 
relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. 
The law of equal p ro tec t ion  has  developed t o  t h e  point  where  
well-defined standards govern what kinds of classification schemes will be 
strictly examined, and what rights will be most vigorously protected,  by 
the courts. 
7 . 1 . 2  R e l a t i o n s h i p  of Equal  P r o t e c t i o n  t o  O t h e r  Law-Based 
Constraints. Analysis of equal p r o t e c t i o n  issues  pa r a l l e l s  t h a t  of 
substantive due process (discussed in Section 6 . 2 )  and of constitutional 
privacy (to be discussed in Section 11.0) in one important respect. S ta te  
a c t i ons  t h a t  in f r inge  fundamental  personal rights will be carefully 
s c ru t i n i zed  by t h e  c o u r t s ;  on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  a c t i o n s  a f f e c t i n g  
nonfundamental rights will be reviewed with deference to the government, 
with the result that only arbitrary or unreasonable s t a t e  action affecting 
those rights will be constrained. 
Classifications, especially those made on the basis of race or sex, may 
be  c o n s t r a i n e d  by  s t a t e  o r  f e d e r a l  s t a t u t e s  f o r b i d d i n g  
discrimination--especially in education and employment-as well as by the 
U.S. and state constitutions. 
7.2 The Nature of Eaual Protection Issues 
Challenges to classification schemes based on the  equal protection 
guarantee will be treated by courts as equal protection issues only if the 
three elements discussed in this section a r e  found to  exist. I f  all of the 
e l emen t s  a r e  p r e sen t ,  the issue will be resolved by considering the 
specific classifications and rights involved, and the governrn entfs  interest  
in classifying persons. 
7 . 2 . 1  Elements of an Equal Protection Issue. Three elements must be 
shown to exist before a challenge to a classification scheme is t r ea ted  as 
an equal protection issue. They are: 
state action; 
existence of a classification; and 
e unequal treatment of persons, based on membership 
in a class, that has a harmful effect. 
If all three elements exist, then a court will determine, using those 
tes ts  described la ter  in this section, whether a classification scheme is 
justified. 
7.2.1.1 S ta te  Action. Only "state actionf1 is constrained by the equal 
protection guarantee. State action is present where the government itself 
imp lemen t s  a c l a s s i f i c a t i on  s cheme ;  i t  also exists where there is 
significant state involvement in a classification scheme by private parties, 
such as where a municipality rents property to a business that refuses to 
serve black customers. 
7.2.1.2 Existence of Classifications. Once state action is established, 
it must next be shown that governmental action has led to  creation of 
some form of  classification. The most obvious classification is the 
specif ic ident i f ica t ion of groups in t h e  l anguage  of a s t a t u t e  or 
regulation, for example: making mixed marriages illegal (classification 
based on race); applying statutes only to urban areas (classification based 
on geography); or suspending drivers1 licenses of those found guilty of 
driving while intoxicated (DWI) ,  but not those found quilty of reckless 
driving (classification based on offense). 
Classifications rnay arise in the application of a s t a tu te  which does 
not itself identify specific groups. The classic case of discriminatory 
application involved a business licensing statute which gave governmental 
officials authority to  grant or deny licenses. Even though the statute 
itself made no racial classification concerning eligibility, those  who 
carried i t  out systematically discriminated against members of minority 
groups who applied for licenses. Thus, a classification s cheme  was 
implemented in the enforcement of the statute. 
Even where a statute is neutral on its face and is being enforced in a 
neutral fashion, unequal treatment may result. One example is the use of 
standardized tests to determine eligibility for employment; there  i t  has 
been alleged that  such tes ts  a re  biased against minority applicants and 
would therefore result in unequal treatment of them. The discriminatory 
impact of neutral policies is discussed later in this section. 
Not all classifications will be viewed by courts in the  same manner. 
A small group of classifications are  considered lfsuspectlf because they 
have historically been used to discriminate against minorities; these will 
be s t r i c t l y  s c ru t i n i zed  by courts and will be permitted only where 
absolutely necessary. Race,  religion, and alienage (noncitizenship) a r e  
recognized as suspect classifications; legitimacy of birth may also be 
suspect, although this has not been set t led.  Sex has been t rea ted  as a 
ffsemisuspectn classification, in that  classifications based on gender have 
been strictly scrutinized in many--but not all--cases. Poverty has not 
been recognized  as  a s u s p e c t  c lass i f ica t ion per se; however, poor 
defendants in criminal tr ials  may not  be denied a c c e s s  t o  c e r t a i n  
p rocedura l  s a f egua rds ,  such as  cour t -appoin ted  at torneys or tr ial  
transcripts to be used in appeals. The determinat ion of whe ther  a 
classification is flsuspect" is important because this determines how closely 
a court will examine it; this, in turn,  normally determines whether the  
classification scheme will be upheld. 
7.2.1.3 Unequal Treatment.  Once it is determined that state action 
exists and that it has led to creation of a classification, i t  must then be 
established that  unequal treatment, having a harmful effect, has resulted 
from tha t  classification scheme. Unequal t rea tment  may e x i s t ,  f o r  
example, with respect  to  the granting of government benefits, imposition 
of criminal sanctions or civil penalties, or the exercise of individual rights. 
As in the case of classifications, not all forms of unequal treatment 
will be examined by courts in the same manner. There exists a group of 
rights considered so important that  they may not be unequally granted 
unless the inequality is absolutely necessary. Such rights as voting, t ravel ,  
or procreation a re  expressly or impliedly granted by the U.S. Constitution 
and are therefore considered llfundamental. 'f The characterizat ion of a 
right as fundamental or nonfundamental is important because this, too, 
will determine how closely a court will examine a classification scheme 
and, in turn, whether it will be upheld. 
7.2.2 Resolution of Equal Protection Issues: Tests Employed - X  bv 
Courts. Once all three elements of an equal protection issue are shown 
to  exist, and the specific classifications and i n t e r e s t s  involved a r e  
identified, the issue will be resolved by a court by using one of three 
tests. These tests are: 
0 the traditional or f7rational relationshiptf test, 
0 the flstrict scrutiny1I test, and 
the intermediate test. 
These are discussed in order. 
7.2.2.1 The Traditional or "Rational Relationshipu Test. Classification 
schemes that involve neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental 
r igh t  a r e  eva lua t ed  by c o u r t s  under t he  t r ad i t i ona l  or lfrational 
relationshiptf test. Under this test, courts will defer to  judgments made 
by legislatures and presume legislation to be constitutional. In reviewing 
a classification scheme, a court will usually r equ i r e  only t h a t  t h e  
classification scheme have a rational relationship to some legitimate state 
purpose. Where the s t a t e  purpose is not evident, a court often will 
supply one. Under this standard, laws that are imprecise or that do not 
employ the fairest  possible classification system will nonetheless be 
upheld. It is only when a person challenging the classification scheme 
can demonstrate the lack of any reasonable connection between t ha t  
scheme and a valid state purpose that a court will f ind it unconstitutional. 
7.2.2.2 The "Strict Scrutiny71 Test. Classification schemes that  ei ther 
c rea te  a suspect classification or involve a fundamental right are much 
more strictly scrutinized by courts than those that do not. In these cases 
more than  a mere  r a t i ona l  relationship to  a valid s t a t e  purpose is 
required. Instead, the s t a t e  is required to  justify the existence of i ts  
classification scheme by proving that it meets two criteria: first, that it 
furthers some "compelling interest;" and second, that the classification 
scheme is the least drastic means of carrying out the s ta te ' s  compelling 
interest .  S ta tes  a re  rarely able to  demonstrate such a high degree of 
necessity for their actions; as a result, most state actions reviewed under 
this test in the past have been found unconstitutional. 
7.2.2 .3  The Intermediate Test. In some recent  cases s third t e s t  
appa ren t l y  has  been employed by courts, especially with regard to 
differential treatment based on sex. Under this test a court will defer to  
legislative judgments, but not to the point of hypothesizing justifications 
tha t  a re  not obvious from the  legislation i tself .  In addition, c o u r t s  
applying this tes t  apparently demand a closer connection between the 
challenged classification scheme and the  s t a t e  purpose than they would 
under the rational-relationship test. 
I t  is not known whether this middle-level tes t  will be applied more 
regularly in future equal protection cases, or whether this tes t  has been 
used as a device for resolving sex discrimination cases without making sex 
a suspect classification. 
7 . 3  Application of the  Equal Protection Guarantee to Highway Safety 
Issues 
There a re  several ways in which the implementation of highway crash 
countermeasures might be constrained by the equal protection guarantee. 
F i r s t ,  many s ta tu tes  affecting drivers or vehicles classify them and 
provide for differential t rea tment  based on class membership. Second, 
virtually all highway safe ty  legislation is capable of being enforced in a 
differential manner against certain groups of drivers or types of vehicles. 
Third, entry cr i ter ia  into countermeasure programs could result in classes 
of t raf f ic  violators being singled out for entry into rehabilitative or 
burdensome programs i n  lieu of traditional sanc tions. 
This section first discusses the  standards tha t  likely will be used by 
courts in reviewing countermeasure programs, then reviews the application 
of these standards to particular classifications of drivers and vehicles. 
The issues  of d i f f e r e n t i a l  enforcem e n t  of s a f e t y  legis la t ion and 
differential treatment of offenders are next treated. 
It should be noted that the Equal Protection Clause governs all "s ta te  
actionff: therefore, i t  constraints not only the enactment of statutes and 
their enforcement by courts, prosecuting attorneys, and the police, but 
also the promulgation and enforcement of administrative (driver-licensing) 
agenciesf regulations. 
7.3.1 Tes t s  Employed by Cour t s  in Reviewing Highway Crash 
Countermeasure Programs. Suspect classifications and fundamental rights 
a r e  unlikely t o  be involved in the implementation of highway crash 
countermeasure programs. It is inconceivable that a governmental agency 
would classify drivers for any reason on the basis of race or religion, and 
i t  is also highly unlikely that  classifications based on gender will be 
employed. If suspect classifications are created at all, they will result 
from differential application of the laws, 
Nor are  countermeasure programs likely to affect fundamental rights. 
The privilege or "qualified rightf1 to  operate a motor vehicle has been 
distinguished from the fundamental right to travel, since driving is only 
one means of travel, and an individual who loses his driving privilege may 
use alternate forms of transportation. 
Even if an a spec t  of some countermeasure program is found to  
infringe a fundamental right, such as the right to travel,  i t  is possible a 
court might find the state's interest in safety ftcompellingff and uphold the 
program anyway. It is doubtful, however, that racial,  religious, or other 
suspect classifications will in any event be upheld. 
7 . 3 . 2  Validity of Classifications C r e a t e d  by Sa fe ty  Legis la t ion 
Severa l  classification schemes regularly occur in the generation and 
enforcement of traff ic laws. These include differential t rea tment  of 
drivers by age or traffic records; differential treatment of vehicle classes; 
and the implementation of countermeasure programs on a p iecemea l  
geograph ica l  basis .  Following the discussion of classifications, an 
illustrative invalid classification-the automobile quest statute is discussed. 
7.3.2.1 Legis la t ion Classifying Drivers. 'Much of the legislation 
singling out classes of drivers for differential t rea tment  recognizes that  
certain drivers pose special safety risks. These classifications are based on 
age, past traffic record, and similar cr i ter ia ,  and these have generally 
been upheld by courts applying the rational-relationship test. 
Classifications based on age have included: longer license suspensions 
for  youthful drivers convicted of driving while intoxicated; prohibition of 
nighttime driving by minors; and minimum age requirements for learnerst  
permits. These have been upheld by courts, which have held them to be 
rational means of dealing with the greater risks created by younger, less 
experienced drivers. 
Legislation providing special t rea tment  for drivers convicted of DWI 
has likewise been upheld under the  rational-relationship test .  Programs 
providing rehabilitation in lieu of license suspensions on one hand, and 
legislation imposing harsher licensing sanctions for DWI offenders as  
compared with other traffic offenders on the other, have been recognized 
as rational means of dealing with the safety risks and health needs of the  
drinking driver. 
One fami l i a r  classification of drivers which occurs in traffic-law 
enforcement involves the application of implied-consent s ta tu tes .  These 
s ta tu tes  typically impose mandatory license suspensions upon drivers who 
refuse to submit to tests-whether or not they are  intoxicated--even i n  
those s ta tes  whose DWI statutes do not impose mandatory suspension upon 
drivers convicted of that offense. This scheme, however, has been upheld 
by courts as a rational means of dealing with the distinct problems of 
obtaining consent to tests and rehabilitating convicted drunk drivers. 
7.3.2.2 Legislation Classifying Vehicles. - Legislation recognizing the 
different physical characteristics of vehicles and singling out classes of 
t raf f ic  for special regulation have generally been upheld. These laws 
include size and weight limits for trucks, exclusion of certain vehicle 
classes from "no-f aultn insurance laws, and equipment regulations for 
motorcycle operators. Recent court decisions reject ing equal protection 
challenges to mandatory motorcycle helmet-use statutes are typical. One 
ground fo r  a t t a c k i n g  he lmet  laws was they  unfai r ly  singled out 
motorcycles for restrictive safety legislation; the courts responded that  
owing to the size, visibility, and exposure of motorcycles, legislatures 
could rationally legislate differential treatment for that class of vehicles. 
Even under a rational-relationship test, classifications of vehicles must 
be reasonably related to the state's objective of achieving highway safety. 
For example,  a municipal ordinance imposing weight limits on truck 
traffic but exempting trucks based in the city was held to violate the 
equal protection guarantee; there was found to be no difference in the 
safety hazards posed by resident and nonresident truck t raf f ic  that  could 
rationally justify such a distinction. 
7 . 3 . 2 . 3  Classifications Based on Geography. Legislation applying only 
to  certain geographical areas, such as  selected count ies  or judic ia l  
distr icts ,  has been upheld on the grounds that  s t a tes  may implement 
experimental programs on a piecemeal basis. Geographical and similar 
underinclusive classifications may also be upheld where a state lacks the 
resources t o  implement a s ta tewide program.  One example  of an 
u n d e r i n c l u s i v e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  scheme is New Yorkys  l eg i s la t ion  
fydecriminalizingyy traff ic offenses, which currently applies only to the 
state 's  largest cities and not state-wide. Another example occurred in 
California, which initially implemented rehabilitation programs for D WI 
offenders i n  a small number of 'ydemonstrationTy counties, but not others. 
In both of t he se  cases ,  cou r t s  found t h e  "p iecemea lyy  a p p r o a c h  
constitutionally permissable. 
7 . 3 . 2 . 4  Invalid Class i f i ca t ions :  Automobile yyGuest  statute^.^^ 
Characterizing legislation as Iysafety-relatedyf does not guarantee that  i t  
will be upheld, even under a rational-relationship test. Courts have held 
some forms of legislation affecting motor vehicles to violate the equal 
p ro t ec t i on  gua ran t ee ,  most notably, the so-called automobile guest 
s tatutes.  These s ta tu tes  distinguish between paying and nonpaying 
passengers  with r e s p e c t  t o  their right to sue negligent drivers for 
damages. Under guest s t a tu tes ,  paying passengers may sue their drivers 
for ordinary negligence, but nonpaying passengers may sue only in the  
event of gross negligence by their drivers. This distinction has been 
declared unconstitutional by many state courts  on the grounds tha t  i t  is 
not rationally related to the state's policy of promoting reasonable care in 
the operation of vehicles. 
7 . 3 . 3  Differential Enforcement of Safety Legislation. Laws may be 
fair on their face yet be enforced in such a manner t ha t  discriminates 
against certain classes of individuals. Differential enforcement conducted 
in a deliberate fashion and accompanied by a discriminatory intent  may 
provide a means of at tacking a criminal prosecution as a violation of 
equal protection. However, the  equal protection guarantee does no t  
require the s t a t e  to prosecute every traffic offender. Enforcement may 
be unequal, or even selective (directed,  for example, a t  only the  most 
flagrant offenders), and still be upheld against an equal protection attack. 
Sanctioning of offenders, including the revocation of probat ion s t a t  us, 
is because of i ts  nature conducted on a case-by-case basis; as a result, 
offenders will be t rea ted differently from one ano the r .  Sanc t ion ing  
pract ices  that  result in unequal punishment do not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause unless it can be shown that  deliberate discrimination 
was practiced. 
7 . 3 . 4  Entry Into Countermeasure Programs. Countermeasure programs 
may be implemented which single out d r i ve r s  and p lace  them i n t o  
experimental programs. Unequal assignment of drivers may trigger equal 
protection challenges from drivers who were sanctioned instead of placed 
into a rehabilitation progam, or from drivers who were placed into an 
experimental program in lieu of traditional sanctions. '4s mentioned 
already, geographical criteria and similar forms of underinclusiveness will 
be upheld against equal protection challenges. In addition, classifications 
based on such relevant cri teria as age, employment s ta tus ,  and past 
traffic record also are likely to be upheld. Classifications based on types 
of offenders will probably also be upheld, although blanket exclusions of 
certain offenders from rehabilitative programs might, in light of the 
rehabilitative purpose, be regarded as arbitrary and irrational. 
Some countermeasure programs may, despite entry criteria that are 
neutral on their face, result in the assignment of differential sanctions 
based on religion, race, or sex. Recent court decisions indicate that 
differential effects of neutral criteria do not by themselves violate the 
equal protection guarantee, and that it is only where criteria are applied 
with a discriminatory intent that an equal protection challenge would be 
upheld. 
7.4 Consequences of Equal Protection Challenges 
S ta te  action found by a cou r t  t o  v io la te  t h e  equal  p ro t ec t i on  
guarantee will be declared unconstitutional and therefore void by the 
courts. Such a declaration, because i t  involves the way i n  which a 
program is designed and implemented, will affect the entire program, not 
merely isolated instances of i ts  application or enforcement. Care must 
therefore be taken that  a proposed countermeasure program respect the 
equal protection guarantee, since the consequence of a successful a t tack 
is the future unavailability of that program. 
7.5 Resolving Equal Protection Constraints 
A planner intending to implement a countermeasure program may take 
several steps to resolve potential equal protection challenges. First of all ,  
no reference to race,  religion, or sex should be made i n  any highway 
safety legislation. In addition, specific and objective cri teria should be 
developed, whenever possible, to  guide those who implement proposed 
programs; this is because objective standards will control the exercise of 
d i sc re t ion  and reduce the possibility that  neutral legislation will be 
applied in a discriminatory manner. Finally, whenever classifications of 
any kind  are made, specific language explaining their relationship to 
public safety and welfare should accompany them. 
7.6 Summary and Conclusions 
The equal  p ro t ec t i on  g u a r a n t e e  prohibi ts  the government from 
classifying individuals and treat ing classes differently from one another, 
except when necessary to  accomplish some reasonable gove rnmen ta l  
purpose. Classification schemes, to be valid, must at  least be rationally 
related to the furtherance of some valid state objective. However, where 
a classification scheme creates  a suspect classification or affects the 
exercise of fundamental rights, the state must establish tha t  the scheme 
is necessary to further some compelling state interest. 
Most highway safety legislation involves neither suspect classifications 
nor fundamental rights; therefore it is required only to be rationally 
related to the state's interest  in promoting highway safety.  Statutory 
classifications of drivers based on age, geography, and type of offense 
have generally been upheld; classifications of vehicles have likewise been 
upheld, Some classifications, such as a distinction between paying and 
nonpaying passengers, have been dec l a r ed  i r r a t i o n a l  and t h e r e f o r e  
unconstitutional by a number of courts. 
Selectivity is pe rmi t t ed  in t h e  e n f o r c e m e n t  of n e u t r a l  t r a f f i c  
legislation, provided no deliberate discrimination is practiced. A similar 
standard applies to the sanctioning of t r a f f i c  o f f ende r s  and t o  t h e  
a s s i g n m e n t  of o f f e n d e r s  t o  c o u n t e r m e a s u r e  p rograms .  Some 
countermeasure programs, especially rehabilitative or experimental ones, 
may constitutionally be implemented on a piecemeal basis, such as in  
selected counties. 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY FOR THE GUARANTEE OF EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF THE LAW 
Introduction 
Introductory material on the equal protection guarantee may be found 
in the following: 16 AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law S S  485-541 (1964); 
Gunther.  The S u ~ r e m e  Court. 1971 Term. Foreword: In Search of an 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal 
Protection, 86 HARV. L. R E V .  528 (1972); United States Department of 
Agriculture v. Moreno -3 413 U.S. 528 (1973); San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Reed -v. Reed, - 404 U.S. 71 (1971), 
and Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). Discussion 
of t h e  c o n f l i c t  be tween  t h e  i nhe ren t  inequa l i ty  of l eg i s l a t i ve  
classifications and the demands of equal protection may be found in 
Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. 
REV. 341 (1949). 
The app l ica t ion  of the equal protection guarantee to  the federal 
government through the Due Process Clause may be found in Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The relationship between equal protection 
and substantive due process is discussed in Angel, Substantive Due Process 
and the Criminal Law, 9 LOY. CHI. L.J. 61 (1977). Numerous civil rights 
statutes have been enacted, and the best-known of them is The Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42  U.S.C.A. §S 2000a et seq. (West 1974). 
The Nature of Equal Protection Issues 
Elements of an Equal Protection Issue 
The requirement that  s t a t e  action exist for an equal protection claim 
to be valid is discussed in the following cases: Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 
U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 
(1961); and Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
The leading case involving classifications resulting from differential 
enforcement of an otherwise valid statute is Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 
356 (1886) [application of licensing s t a t u t e  so as to  deny licenses to  
minority applicants]. Differential enforcement of the  law is discussed in 
16 AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law 5 5  540-41 (1964); Oyler v. Boles -7 368 
U.S. 448 (1962) [upholding application of habitual offender s t a t u t e  even 
though i t s  enforcement was not uniform among such offenders];  and 
United Sta tes  v .  S t e e l e ,  461 F.2d 1148 (9 th .  C i r .  1972) [ s e l e c t i v e  
prosecution] . '  The concept of a 77suspect'1 classification is discussed in 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 6 7 7  (1973) (plurality opinion). The  
requirement that  a discriminatory intent  or motive must be shown in 
addition to disproportionate impact is discussed in tvashington v.  Davis -7 
426 U.S. 229 (1976); in this regard see also, Perry, The Disproportionate 
Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977). 
Discussion of underinclusive and overinclusive classifications may be 
found in Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 
CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949). Underinclusive classifications have been more 
readily accepted by courts  on the theory that  government should be 
allowed to proceed on a piecemeal basis in attacking problems. In this 
regard - see, McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802 
(1969) [affording absentee voting rights to some but not all prisoners]. 
The concept of "fundamental" rights is discussed in San Antonio  
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (19731, and also in  the 
Shapiro, Loving, and Harper cases cited below. 
Resolution of Equal Protection Issues: Tests Employed by Courts 
Discussion of the standards used by courts in resolvinq equal protection 
cases may be found in Gunther, The Su~reme  Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: 
In Search of an Evolving Doctrine on a Chanqing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). 
Use of the rational relationship t es t  is i l lustrated in the  following 
cases,  all of them upholding classification schemes: New Orleans v ,  
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) [banning pushcarts from cer ta in  downtown 
a r ea s ] ;  McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) [Sunday closing laws 
permitting some types of stores to  do business]; Williamson v. Lee  -
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) [law specifying who may sell eyeglasses] ; 
Railway Express Aqency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) [law forbidding 
certain classes of vehicles from carrying advertising] ; and Goesaert v. 
C lea ry ,  335 U.S. 464 (1948) [rules forbidding women to hold certain 
bartending jobs]. The statement that a classification will be upheld even 
if i t  is not made with mathematical nicety or results in some inequality 
may be found in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220  U.S. 61 (19~).  
A discussion of the "str ict  scrutiny" standard may be found in Note, 
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969). 
Leading cases applying the strict scrutiny test include Trimble v. Gordon -9 
430 U.S. 762 (1977) [legitimacy]; Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) 
[same] ; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) [right to travel] ; Loving 
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) [race] ; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663 (1966) [voting] ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) [criminal 
procedure]; and Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 
(1948) [al ienage].  Classifications a r e  rarely upheld under the s t r ic t  
scrutiny test. One case in which racial classifications were upheld was 
Korematsu v. United States,  323 U.S. 214 (1944) [exclusion of persons of 
Japanese ancestry from designated zones; justified in light of wartime 
emergency]. 
Although wealth has not been recognized as a suspect classification, 
courts have required that  certain aspects of the criminal process be 
afforded to all criminal defendants, regardless of ability to pay for them. 
In this regard see: Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 55 (1972) [appointed 
counsel in all nonpetty criminal cases] ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 
353 (1963) [appointed counsel for appeals guaranteed by l aw] ;  Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) [appointed counsel in all felony cases]; 
and Griffin -v. -9 Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956) [transcripts necessary for appeals]. 
Application of the middle standard of review may be found in the 
following cases :  Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) [ r e s i d e n c y  
requirement, divorce] ; Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa Countv, 415 U.S. 
250 (1974) [residency requirement, eligibility for medical t reatment]  ; 
United Sta tes  Department of Agriculture v. %furry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) 
[social welfare legislation]; San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) [wealth, education]; and Reed -v. Reed, - 404 
U.S. 71 (1971) [sex] . 
Application of the Equal Protection Guarantee to Highway Safety Issues 
A special s tate interest  in promoting highway safe ty  has long been 
recognized by courts; - 9  see  e.g., Hess -v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
The importance of this interest  was recognized in a decision upholding 
more severe punishments in cases of negligent homicide by means of a 
vehicle, than the  same offense committed by other means, People v.  
Sexton, --- Colo. ---, 571 P.2d 1098 (1977). One case which described the 
s t a t e ' s  i n t e r e s t  in removing  dr inking d r i ve r s  f rom t h e  roads  a s  
"compellingn was Anderson v. Cozens, 60  Cal. App. 3d 130, 131 Cal. Rptr. 
256 (1976). The  qua l i f i ed  r i gh t  t o  d r i ve  was d e s c r i b e d  a s  n o t  
ltfundamental'T in: Wells -v. Malloy, 402 F. Supp. 856 (D.Vt. 1975); Love v. -
Bell, 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d ll8 (1970); S t a t e  v. McCourt, 131 N . J .  Super. 
283, 329 A.2d 577 (App. Div. 1974); and Berberian v. Petit, - R.I. -, 
374 A.2d 791 (1977). In addition, these cases distinguish the  qualified 
right to  drive from the fundamental "right to travelT1: one who loses his 
driving privilege is not denied access to vehicles owned by others; nor is 
he deprived of access to other forms of transportation. 
Validitv of Classifications Created bv Saf etv Legislation 
Differences in treatment on the basis of age were upheld in Lopez v. 
Motor Vehicle Division, Department of Revenue, --- Colo, ---, 538 P.2d 
446 (1975) [d r ive rs  aged  21 and over suffer license suspension upon 
accumulation of 12 points, younger  d r i ve r s  s u f f e r  suspension upon 
accumulation of eight]; State in the Interest of Bogan, 250 So.2d 191 (La. 
Ct.  App. 1971) [minors prohibited f rom dr iving a t  n igh t ]  ; S t a t e  v.  
Damiano, 142 N.J .  Super. 457, 351 A.2d 631 (Morris County Ct .  1976) 
[minors convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI) subject to  longer 
license suspension than adults convicted of same] ; and Hayes v. Texas 
Department of Publc Safety, 498 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) [minor's 
l i c e n s e  r e v o c a b l e  a f t e r  f ewe r  v io la t ions  than  adu l t ' s ] .  S t a t e  
implied-consent s t a tu tes  typically impose mandatory license suspension 
upon drivers--whether legally intoxicated or not--who refuse a valid 
r eques t  t o  submit to  a t e s t ;  - see,  en%., MICH. COMP. LAWS A N N .  S 
257.625f (3) (1977). However, a driver who does submit and who is  
convicted of DWI might not receive a mandatory license suspension. This 
scheme has been held not to violate equal protection; - see, Augustino v. 
Colorado Department of Revenue, - Colo. -, 565 P.2d 933 (1977). 
Equal protection challenges to mandatory motorcycle helmet-use laws 
may be found in Everhardt v. City of New Orleans, 253 La. 285, 217 
So.2d 400 (1968); State v. Albertson, 93 Idaho 640, 470 P.2d 300 (1970); 
and - State v. Anderson, 275 N.C. 168, 166 S.E.2d 49 (1969). 
Differential t reatment of motorcycles in a s t a t e  no-fault insurance 
program was upheld in Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 522  P.2d 1291 
(1974). Statutory distinctions based on vehicle size and weight were  
upheld in Alexander v. -9 State 228 Ga. 179, 184 S.E.2d 450 (1971), and - State 
v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 72 Wis.2d 727, 242 N.W.2d 192 (1976). 
Differ en t ial license suspension procedures were upheld in Calabi v. Malloy, 
438 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Vt. 1977). 
Typical s t a t e  cases holding guest s t a tu tes  unconstitutional include: 
Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973); 
Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 91, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); and Manistee Bank 
& Trust Co. v. McGowan, 394 Mich. 655, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975). In this 
r ega rd  s e e  a l so ,  Note ,  Equal  Protection--An Evolving Intermediate 
Standard of Equal Protection Analysis--Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 
195, 31 N.E.2d 723 (1975), 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 185 (1976). Legislation 
establishing an "incentive fund" for good drivers and financially penalizing 
unsafe ones was found t o  violate the equal protection guarantee in State -
v. - Lee, 252 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1978). 
Differential Enforcement of Safety Legislation 
The concept of differential enforcement of otherwise valid t raf f ic  
s t a tu tes  is similar t o  the differential enforcement of other statutes, and 
is discussed in the Yick Wo, Oyler, and Steele cases cited above. 
Entry into Countermeasure Programs 
Geographic uniformity of sanctioning or t rea tment  program is not 
required. In this regard -7 see  Department of nilotor Vehicles v. Superior 
Court, San Mateo County, 58 Cal. App. 3d 936, 130 Cal. Rptr.  311 (1976); 
and People v. McNaught, 31 Cal. App. 3d, 107 Cal. Rptr. 566 (1973); - see 
also, Rosenthal v. Hartnett, 36 N.Y.2d 269, 326 N.E.2d 811, 367 N.Y.S.2d -
247 (1975) [administrative adjudication scheme for t raf f ic  offenses not 
required t o  be implemented uniformly through s ta te ;  legislature may 
imp lemen t  on piecemeal basis] . Piecemeal extension of sanctioning 
reforms is discussed in McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 392 
U.S. 802 (1969). The leading case  on the use of previous convictions as 
eligibility criteria for admission to  sanctioning proarams is Marshall v ,  
United Sta tes ,  414 U.S. 417 (1974). Discriminatory sanctioning practices 
are discussed in Ogler v. Boles -7 368 U.S. 448 (1962) and Moss -v. Hornig, 
314 F.2d 89 (2nd Cir. 1963); but see ,  United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 
443 (1972). One should see  also, S t a t e  v. Bradley, 360 So.2d 858 (La. 
19781, holding that exclusion of persons arrested but not convicted of DWI 
from the s t a t e r s  expungement s t a t u t e  is a denial of equal protection. 
Constraints on the assignment of sanctions for DWI offenders reviewed in 
Little, 5.W.; Young, G.; and Selk, S. 1974. Constitutional protections of 
convicted DWI offenders se lected to  receive special sanctions-alcohol 
countermeasures literature review. Final report. National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration report DOT-HS-371-3-786, 
Innovative sanctioning and t rea tment  programs were upheld against 
equal protection attacks in - Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964), 
and In re Spadafora, 54 ?disc.Zd 123, 281 N.Y,S,Zd 923 (Sup. Ct. 1967). 
Differential  t r ea tment  of alcohol offenders was held not to violate 
equal protection in Miller v. Tofany, 88 Misc.2d 247, 387 N.Y.S.2d 342 
(Sup. Ct. 1975) [conditional licenses to those in rehabilitation program], 
and - State v. Kent, 87 Wash.2d 103, 549 P.2d 721 (1976) [possible s tay  of 
automatic license revocation]; see also, - Jones v. Penny, 387 I?. Supp. 383 
(M.D.N.C. 1971). Special t r ea tment  of youthful t r a f f i c  o f f e n d e r s  by 
licensing agencies is discussed in the Damiano and Hayes cases mentioned 
above. 
Cri teria for admission into a program extending benefits are reviewed 
in 8ie1, M.R. 1974. Lega l  i s sues  and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of p r e t r i a l  
intervention programs. Washington D.C.: American Bar Association. ,4n 
especially important case in this regard is Marshall v. United States,  414 
U.S. 417 (1974) which involves use of previous convictions as eligibility 
criteria for admission into a narcotics treatment program. In Johnson v. 
Municipal Court, 70 Cal. App. 3d 761, 139 Cal. Rptr. 152 (19771, the 
defendant was prosecuted rather than placed into a rehabilitative program 
because of a lack of facilities; this was upheld by the court against an 
equal protection claim. 

8.0 THE PROHIBITION AGAINST UNREASONABLE 
ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is aimed at  
curbing general and arbitrary searches of citizens and seizures of their 
personal belongings, as well as lfdragnetff arrests and detentions. Under 
the U.S. Constitution, searches and arrests  must be justified by specific 
reasons and must be limited in scope. 
8.1 Introduction 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: "The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects ,  
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath  or 
aff irmation,  and particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized." This provision applies to both the federal 
and state governments. 
Fourth Amendment law is commonly referred to as the law of lrsearch 
and seizure." While searches and seizures are commonly thought of as 
actions that can be taken against a person's property, they also apply to 
persons. A n  arrest  or detention is a "seizurefT of the person and is 
therefore governed by the Fourth Amendment. This section therefore 
discusses both searches and seizures of property and seizures of persons. 
8.1.1 The Requirement of tfReasonableness.tf The Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit all arrests, searches or seizures, nor does it require that  
a search or arrest  warrant be obtained beforehand i n  every instance. 
What i t  does requ i re  is t h a t  a r r e s t s ,  s e a r ches  and s e i z u r e s  be  
ffreasonable,lf that is, supported by adequate cause and limited in scope to 
the extent  of the i r  necess i ty .  Because encounte r s  be tween  law 
en fo rcemen t  officers and citizens can take a variety of forms, and 
because the law of search and se izure  has l a rge ly  developed on a 
case-by-case basis, a detailed treatment of the Fourth Amemdment is apt 
to  become confusing. Therefore, these materials do not analyze the 
legality of every form of arrest, search or seizure, but  instead set forth 
the general constitutional principles governing these activities. 
8.1.2 Relationship of the Prohibition Against Unreasonable Searches 
and Seizures to Other Law-Based Constraints. The law of searches and 
seizure is closely related to  constitutional privacy protection, which is 
discussed further in  Section 11.0. Constitutional privacy protects individuals 
from official intrusion into their int imate activities. Thus the law of 
privacy is related to that of search and seizure in two ways: f i rs t ,  the 
issue of whether a ffsearchff  has taken place revolves around the concept 
of "reasonable expectation of privacy;lf and second, surveillance and other 
law enforcement techniques that raise issues of privacy often are resolved 
using Fourth Amendment principles. 
With respect  to arrested person, Fourth Amendment protection is 
related to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination (PASI): 
not only is the transaction characterized as a f7seizureft o which the law 
of search and seizure applies, but it also may give rise to  an in-custody 
situation to which the PAS1 applies. 
F ina l ly ,  law-enforcement  techniques such as warrantless ar res ts ,  
obtaining search warrants, and wiretapping a re  not only governed by the 
Fourth Amendment, but they also may be regulated by federal and state 
s ta tu tes ;  these s ta tu tes  may impose constraints in addition t o  those  
contained in the Constitution. 
8.2 The Nature of Arrest, Search, and Seizure Issues 
Challenges to official actions are governed by the Fourth Amendment 
only if they are regarded as intrusions on individual liberty (in the case 
of ar res ts  or seizures) or on privacy (in the case of searches). Once 
official action is determined to be governed by the Fourth Amendment i t  
must be reasonable in order for it to be upheld as constitutional. These 
concepts are discussed below. 
8.2.1 Applicability of the Fourth Amendment. This section f i r s t  
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discusses  those elements that  are  necessary for an incident to be a 
"search7' or a seizurew t h a t  t h e  Four th  Amendment  governs .  The 
prerequisites for a valid search are discussed first, following which those 
for valid seizures of the person (including arrests) are treated. 
8.2.1.1 Exis tence  of a "Search."  The Four th  Amendment  is  
inapplicable to law enforcement act ivi ty unless that  act ivi ty can be  
categorized as a ffsearchff  or "seizure," that  is, an intrusion into some 
place or m a t t e r  r egarded  as  p r i va t e .  Two concep ts - - reasonab le  
e x p e c t a t i o n  of p r ivacy  and t he  ' 'plain v iewu doctrine--have great  
significance in the law of search and seizure, and are discussed in order. 
8.2.1.1.1 77Reasonable Expectation of Privacy." When interpreting the 
Fourth Amendment, courts have decided that  a search takes place only 
when a "reasonable expectation of privacy" has been invaded. Thus, what 
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home, will not 
be protected by the Fourth Amendment. Conversely, a person in a public 
place, such as a telephone booth, might expect that his conversation will 
be private; in such a case, it is protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
The test used by courts to determine whether a reasonable expectation 
of privacy exists consists or two requirements: 
r the person who is searched must have a subjective expectation 
of privacy in the area or object searched; and 
e tha t  expectation must also be one that  society objectively 
accepts. 
Both of these factors must be met before a search is determined to 
exist. Using this test, courts have held that a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists when a t tempts  a re  made to ensure that conversations are 
not overheard, even when they take place in public, or when objects are  
placed out of view. Of most importance to the field of highway safety, 
a reasonable expectation of privacy is said to exist in a person's blood or 
breath; thus the Fourth Amendment governs tes ts  to  determine blood 
alcohol content (BAC). 
On the other hand, courts have applied the test and determined that 
t h e r e  is  no r ea sonab l e  e x p e c t a t i o n  of privacy in a person's voice, 
involuntary conversations with third parties, or objects left in public view. 
The last of these is dealt with in more detail in the following section. 
8.2.1.1.2 The "Plain Viewn Doctrine. Not every intrusion by law 
enforcement officers is considered a "search." One class of intrusions not 
governed by the  Fourth Amendment consists of so-called "plain-view" 
observations. The "plain view!' doctrine holds that no search may be said 
to exist where a police officer, who is in a position where he has a right 
to be, inadvertantly observes i tems or activities, Courts have held, for 
example, that observations made by a police officer  of objects  l e f t  in 
open windows or on car  seats  are  not searches when the officer  was 
lawfully in a position to make the observation. 
Reasonable expectations of privacy limit the degree to which the plain 
view doctrine can be used t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  po l ice  obse rva t i ons  as  
nonsearches. I f  a person a t t empts  to  conceal an object and the police 
officer attempts to observe the object despite its concealment, such as by 
peering through a curtained window, then the observation is no longer 
inadvertent and the  plain view doctrine will not apply. Similarly, an 
observation made a f t e r  an illegal entry will not be justified by the plain 
view doctrine because the police officer was not in a lawful position to 
make the observation. 
Plain view observations may be made by means of the five senses: 
smell,  touch, hearing, tas te ,  and sight. Detection of a lcoho l  on an 
individual's breath (in the course of lawful questioning) or the presence of 
contraband by touch (in the case of lawful fffrisk") are not searches under 
t h e  pla in  view doctrine, By the same token, observations involving 
certain devices used to enhance an officer's senses have been held not to 
be searches. These plain view observations include the use of flashlights 
and binoculars to view objects that could not be seen without such devices. 
8.2.1.1.3 Electronic Devices: Applications of the Expectation of 
Privacv and Plain View Concepts. Recently police agencies have begun to  
install signal-em i t t ing devices, commonly known as  beeper^,^' on moving 
vehicles to transmit to police officers their location. Courts are divided 
as to whether the use of a "beeperu is a search governed by the Fourth 
Amendment. Those courts holding it not to be a search have pointed out 
that a driver has no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the 
location of his vehicle, and that beepers are similar to other devices that 
enhance the five senses, such as binoculars or flashlights. Another group 
of cases have dealt with whether the use of dogs to detect marijuana and 
other drugs is a search;  t h e  major i ty  of c a se s ,  s t r e s s i ng  t h a t  no 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists with respect to the odor of 
drugs, have concluded that the use of dogs is not a search. 
In sum, there is not yet universal agreement concerning the application 
of the Fourth Amendment to the use of electronic devices. Analogies to 
binoculars and flashlights on one hand, and to  wiretaps or electronic 
"bugsu on the other, are certain to be urged on courts deciding whether 
the use of novel electronic devices will be treated as a search. 
8.2.1.2 Exis tence  of a l fSe izure l f  of t he  Person.  The Four th  
Amendment prohibits unreasonable useizuresM as well as unreasonable 
searches, and for that  reason i t  governs ar res ts  and other encounters 
between police and citizens, The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that not 
only are arrests governed by the Fourth Amendment, but encounters short 
of a full-fledged arrest-such as temporary detentions-are also  seizure^;'^ 
the test is whether a police officer, by means of physical force or show 
of authority, has i n  some way restrained the liberty of a citizen. Thus, 
the character of an encounter, rather than the label at tached to it ,  will 
determine whether it is a "seizurev governed by the Fourth Amendment. 
8.2.1.3 Summary. Encounters between police officers and citizens a re  
considered searches governed by the Fourth Amendment only where the 
officer had intruded into a place or activity regarded as private; that  is, 
one not only surrounded by a reasonable expectation of privacy, but also 
outside the officer's plain view. Encounters are considered seizures of the 
person governed by t he  Four th  Amendment where a police officer 
restrains in  some way a citizen's liberty. 
8.2.2 Reasonableness of the Arrest,  Search or Seizure. Once it is 
determined that  a s e a r c h  or s e i z u r e  has  t aken  p l ace ,  t h e  Fou r th  
Amendment requires that  i t  be reasonable. Reasonableness requires that 
probable cause exist for the arrest, search or seizure, and that  the scope 
of the search not be excessive. 
8.2.2.1 The Requirement of Reasonableness. The Fourth Amendment 
imposes a reasonableness requirement upon all encounters between police 
and citizens that  are  considered "searchesft or "seizures.ft Unless this 
standard of reasonableness is met,  the encounter is in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. "Probable causeff is the chief legal standard used to 
determine whether a search or seizure is reasonable. 
Tradit ionally,  probable cause for a search is present if f ac t s  and 
circumstances exist which lead a reasonable person to believe that  i t  is 
more likely than not that  the items sought are connected with criminal 
act ivi ty,  and that  they will be found in t h e  p l ace  t o  be  s e a r c h e d .  
Probable cause for ar res t  requires a similar belief that an offense has 
been committed and that  the person to be arrested has committed i t .  
Any reliable information may be used to  determine the existence of 
probable cause. 
As noted earl ier ,  there exist a wide variety of encounters governed by 
the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness. Where an encounter is 
a full-fledged arrest or search, with or without a warrant, the standard is 
one of probable cause, However, where it is a lesser intrusion--such as a 
f r i sk  i n s t ead  of a s e a r c h  or a detention instead of an arrest--the 
determination of reasonableness often reduces to a balancing t es t ,  which 
takes three considerations into account: 
e the severity of the intrusion, 
t h e  s o c i e t a l  need for  t he  in format ion  or evidence 
obtained, and 
t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  t o  t h e  individual ,  inc luding t h e  
possibility of criminal sanctions. 
Using this balancing process, courts require that searches involving greater 
intrusions into individual interests must meet more stringent standards of 
cause. Thus, a search of a person's blood or breath for BAC would 
require a greater  degree of probable cause than a neighborhood housing 
inspection for building-code violations. 
The balancing concept with respect to reasonableness is important 
because it has been the basis for the development of warrantless search 
exceptions discussed la ter  in this section. Further, it is very important 
to the field of highway safety, because intrusions of vehicles and drivers 
by police o f f i c e r s  o f t en  involve a balancing process to satisfy the 
reasonableness requirement. 
The following sections discuss the reasonableness requirements as they 
relate to searches and to seizures of the person, respectively. 
8.2.2.2 Reasonableness  Requi rements  Governing Searches. As 
mentioned earlier,  a search governed by the  Four th  Amendment is 
reasonable if it is justified by sufficient cause-usually traditional probable 
cause-and is properly limited in scope. 
8.2.2.2.1 Probable Cause: The Warrant Requirement. It has been 
held by the U.S. Supreme Court that for a search to be reasonable, either 
a warrant based on probable cause must be obtained beforehand, or the 
circumstances surrounding the search must place i t  i n t o  one of t h e  
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
A warrant is a written order issued by a court authorizing a police 
officer to conduct a search. An officer seeking a warrant must apply to 
a neutral magistrate (court official), he must present reliable information, 
and the magistrate must believe that it is more likely than not that the 
officer's assertions are correct, before a warrant will be issued. For a 
search warrant the information offered must tend to show that the items 
sought are connected with criminal activity and that  they may be found 
in the places to be searched. 
Searches occurring in the course of traffic-law enforcement are almost 
universally conducted without warrants. For that  reason the various 
excep t ions  to the warrant requirement, discussed here, are  of great  
significance to highway crash countermeasure development. 
8.2.2.2.2 Probable Cause: Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement. A 
number of exceptions to the warrant requirement have been recognized. 
Searches conducted under these exceptions st i l l  require some degree of 
justification; i n  f ac t ,  searches conducted under several of the exceptions 
require the same level of probable cause as does a search conducted 
under a warrant. The requirement of a warrant is dispensed with in 
these situations because i t  is impossible or unnecessary to  obtain one 
beforehand. The following section describes the principal exceptions and 
indicates the cause requirements governing each exception. 
8.2.2.2.2.1 Exigent Circumstances. In some situations a police officer 
may find it necessary to conduct a search without a warrant because in 
the time necessary to obtain the warrant, evidence of a crime to be 
concea l ed  or des t royed .  This s e a r c h ,  o f t e n  ca l l ed  an ! !ex igen t  
 circumstance^!^ search,  requires that a police officer have probable cause 
to believe that evidence of a crime may be found; i t  also requires that  
circumstances exist making it impractical to secure a warrant. 
Using the doctrine of exigent circumstances, courts have upheld the 
warrantless search of an entire automobile because it might be moved out 
of the jurisdiction resulting in a loss of evidence. The same reasoning 
has been applied in  upholding warrantless evidential testing of the BAC of 
a suspected impaired driver: The U.S. Supreme Court s t a ted  that  since 
blood alcohol disappears rapidly over t ime,  this creates  the necessary 
exigent circumstances for a search without a warrant. 
8.2.2.2.2.2. Search Incident to  Arrest.  A major exception to the 
requirement of a search warrant is a search conducted a t  the t ime of a 
lawful ar res t .  Its purpose is to intercept  weapons that  could be used 
against the officer and evidence of crime that  could be concealed or 
destroyed by the suspect. For these reasons the search is limited to the 
arrested suspect's person and to the area  within his immediate control. 
Since probable cause was necessary for the arrest in the first place, this 
type of search cannot validly take place without probable cause. In 
practice, a search incident to arrest will occur after every lawful ar res t ,  
even for minor offenses where there was no evidence to search for and a 
relatively small probability that the arrestee would be armed. Thus, this 
exception becomes important to the field of highway safety. 
There are two essential differences between an exigent circumstances 
search and a search incident to arrest. The first concerns the scope of 
the search: while the search incident to arrest is limited to  the arrested 
suspect's person and the area within his immediate control, an exigent 
circumstances search may be directed a t  any evidence that  could be 
concealed or destroyed. The second difference relates to probable cause 
for the search. Probable cause, that evidence or weapons will be found, 
is required for an exigent cricumstances search; on the other hand, a 
search incident to arrest may be conducted without any prior suspicion 
that the suspect may be armed or in possession of evidence. 
8.2.2.2.2.3 "Stop and Frisk" Detentions. In the course of a criminal 
investigation a police officer will often need or want to stop an individual 
as part of the investigation. This investigatory stop, which falls short of 
being an arrest ,  was held by the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio to -
justify a limited warrantless search i n  conjunction with it. Such an 
encounter, commonly referred to as a flstop and frisk," requires first that 
the police officer have an "articulable suspicion of criminal activity," that  
is, some specific reason to suspect that the person has committed, or is 
about to commit, a crime. That justifies the initial stop. Then, i f  the 
officer has a reasonable fear that the suspect he has stopped is armed 
and dangerous, he may-to protect  himself--conduct a brief ?'pat downw 
search, or frisk, for weapons. Unlike the search incident to arrest, he 
may not look for evidence.  The Cour t  jus t i f ied  "s top and f r isk"  
detentions using the test  of reasonableness; by balancing the need to 
search for weapons to protect the officer against the degree of intrusion 
involved, i t  found that  such a limited search was reasonable without 
traditional probable cause. 
Terry is significant in traffic-law enforcement in t l ~ o  respects: not 
only does i t  provide justification for frisking and disarming drivers who 
may be carrying weapons, but Terry -is also cited in support of conducting 
encounters, less intrusive than arres ts  or searches, on grounds less than 
traditional probable cause. However, Terry -has erroneously been ci ted to  
justify searching for evidence-not merely weapons-on less than probable 
cause, 
8.2.2.2.2.4 Inventory Searches. Automobiles may be impounded by 
police f o r  a v a r i e t y  of reasons ,  such as  abandonmen t ,  t h e f t ,  or 
nonpayment of parking fines. Following impoundment, a routine police 
practice is to secure and inventory the vehicle's contents. This is done 
for several reasons: protecting the vehicle owner's property while the 
vehicle remains in  police custody; avoiding claims of stolen or misplaced 
p rope r ty ;  p r o t e c t i n g  po l ice  o f f i c e r s  f rom p o t e n t i a l  dangers;  and 
determining whether the impounded vehicle had been stolen. The U.S. 
Supreme Cour t  has  held t h a t  a rou t ine  inventory search,  properly 
conducted and not used as a pretext  to  investigate possible criminal  
a c t i v i t y ,  is "reasonablef1 under the Fourth Amendment, and evidence 
obtained in the course of such a search may be used as the basis for a 
criminal prosecution. This is so even where no reason existed beforehand 
to suspect that evidence of crime would be found by the inventory search. 
8 .2 .2 .2 .2 .5  C o n s e n t  S e a r c h e s .  Any s e a r c h  w i l l  be  held  
valid-regardless of whether sufficient cause exists to conduct it--if the 
consent of the proper party is obtained beforehand. The major questions 
concerning consent searches have been: 
e what is proper consent; and 
e who may properly consent. 
In dealing with the question of proper consent, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has stated that a person has consented to  a search when he voluntarily 
submi t s  t o  i t .  Voluntar iness  is not  determined by an individual's 
subjective s t a t e  of mind, but by whether a reasonable person would 
believe that  the individual consented. Factors that would be considered 
in a determination of voluntariness of consent would include: whether he 
was threatened or coerced into giving his consent; and whether he had 
shown hesitation in giving his consent. However, i t  is not necessary, 
unless i t  is specifically required by statute, that a person be informed of 
his right not to consent. 
In address ing t he  issue of who may consent to a search, courts 
recognize that  in most instances only the person to be searched may 
consent. However, in searches of a person's property, someone other than 
the owner may consent. There, the key issue becomes one of control 
rather than ownership, and any person who has an individual or shared 
right to control of the property may consent to its search. Thus a lawful 
user of an automobile or other property may consent to its search even 
though it contains property owned by others. 
8 . 2 . 2 . 2 . 2 . 6  Regula to ry  Searches .  Searches for the purpose of 
enforcing regulatory schemes include building inspections for health or 
safety code violations and automobile inspections for equipment violations. 
These encounters are also governed by the Fourth Amendment and a r e  
therefore required to be Mreasonable.lf 
One important aspect of regulatory searches is that "individualized" 
probable cause is not required. As in the case of inventory searches and 
searches incident to arrest, it is not necessary that a police officer have 
a suspicion, prior to searching, that evidence of violations will be found 
in a particular searched person's control. IEather, the belief that a given 
population or area will contain some violations is sufficient to justify a 
regulatory search. 
Another significant  characterist ic  of the regulatory search is i ts  
purpose, namely, to detect narrow classes of regulatory violations, such as 
health and safety hazards. The narrow scope of the regulatory search 
and the absence of an individualized probable cause requirement a r e  
interrelated: owing to its limited scope and intrusiveness, a regulatory 
search is made reasonable by a lesser showing of cause than that  required 
for full-scale search. The rationale for these searches has been that the 
public need for enforcement of health and safe ty  regulations outweighs 
the invasion of privacy caused by the intrusion. 
The regulatory search rationale, together with consent, has been used 
to justify searches of airline passengers for concealed weapons. It has 
been reasoned that  such searches, being part of a regulatory scheme and 
not part of a criminal investigation, d id  not have to be directed a t  any 
particular person or place, The rationale was that the minimal intrusion 
was outweighed by the need for the search. In addition, passengers were 
warned in advance  of the preboarding search; thus they could have 
avoided the search by taking another mode of transportation. 
8 . 2 . 2 . 2 . 3  Summary: Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements. A 
full-scale search governed by the  Fourth Amendment normally must be 
justified by a warrant, issued by a judicial officer and based on probable 
cause. There are ,  however, cases where a police officer  is unable t o  
obtain a warrant, or where surrounding circumstances make a warrant 
necessary. In addition, there are so me lesser intrusions--such as frisks, 
inven tory  sea rches ,  and regulatory searches--which because of their 
limited character require less justification than traditional probable cause. 
Case s  in which the  warrant and/or probable-cause requirements a re  
relaxed occur frequently in  traffic-law enforcement. 
8 . 2 . 2 . 2 . 4  The Lawful  Scope of a Search .  Once i t  has been 
determined that  sufficient justification exists for a sea rch- -wi th  or 
without a warrant--the other major factor that  determines whether a 
search is reasonable is its scope. A search is reasonable i f  i t  is limited 
to the boundaries se t  by the warrant or by the justifying exception. For 
example, if a warrant is obtained and i t  describes an object to  be in a 
large box, looking under a rug for that box would not be within the scope 
of search. Similarly, if a search incident to  ar res t  is made of a person 
arrested in his living room, the scope of this exception would not justifv 
a search of the arresteeis bedroom as well, since art icles in the bedroom 
are not within his immediate control. 
Warrantless searches based on consent often involve a question of 
proper scope of the search. When a person consents to a search he may 
limit the places to be searched and the time allowed for the search. For 
example, without any other reason justifying the search, an officer may 
not search the bedroom of a person who had consented to a search of his 
living room only. Likewise, a t  any time during the search, the consent 
may be retracted by the person giving the it. 
Closely associated with the scope of a lawful search is a concept 
termed "escalating probable cause." This concept is best explained by 
example. An officer makes a valid stop of a driver for speeding. Upon 
approaching the driver's vehicle he notices the odor of intoxicants inside. 
He then  lawful ly  r eques t s  the  driver to get  out of his vehicle for 
observation and performance of several coordination tests.  As a result,  
the officer observes slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and a lack of physical 
coordination, and validly arrests the driver for DWI. 
At the beginning of the stop the officer only had sufficient cause to 
arrest for speeding, He did not have probable cause to  ar res t  the driver 
for DWI. It was only a f te r  his contact  with the driver that probable 
cause for arrest for drunk driving developed. It is this development of 
probable cause by steps that  is referred to as escalating probable cause. 
It has a great deal of importance to the field of highway safe ty  because 
many t raf f ic  stops begin as stops for relatively minor violations and later 
develop into arrests or searches involving more serious offenses. 
I t  should be emphas ized  t h a t  both  a va l id  initial stop and the 
requisite level of cause are necessary for each of a series of increasingly 
in t rus ive  actions to be justified under the escalating probable cause 
theory. An illegal initial stop will invalidate police actions subsequent to  
the stop, whether or not probable cause existed for the subsequent actions. 
8.2.2.3 Reasonableness Requirements Governing Arrests and Other 
Seizures of the Person. An arres t  is a seizure of the person that is 
governed by the Fourth Amendment; deprivations of liberty falling short 
of a formal ar res t  likewise a re  f7seizuresff of the person to which the 
reasonableness requirement applies. Seizures of the person are  reasonable 
i f  they are  justified by sufficient cause--normally traditional probable 
cause. 
8.2.2.3.1 Probable Cause: The Warrant Requirement, As is the case 
of searches, arrest warrants a r e  preferred by the U.S. Supreme Court.  
The Court,  however, has recognized significant exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, and in pract ice  relatively few a r r e s t s  a r e  c a r r i e d  ou t  
pursuant to warrants. 
An arres t  warrant, like a search warrant, is issued by a magistrate or 
other judicial officer. A police officer  seeking a warrant must present 
reliable information indicating it is more likely than not that an offense 
has been committed and the person to be arrested has committed it. 
8.2.2.3.2 Probable Cause: Warrantless Arrests. Although courts have 
expressed a preference for ar res t  warrants, war ran t less  a r r e s t s  a r e  
permitted.  These, in fact, are far more common than arrests carried out 
under warrants. 
A police officer  may arres t  a suspect without a warrant if he has 
probable cause to believe that the suspect is committing a felony, or has 
committed one. This is so whether the suspected felony occurred in the 
police officer's presence or outside of it, 
A rule of common law requires a police officer to obtain a warrant to 
make a misdemeanor arrest, unless the suspected misdemeanor occurred i n  
his p r e sence .  This rule, which is not a constitutional requirement,  
survives in many states. However, a number of states have abolished this 
rule, and only require that  an officer  have reasonable cause to believe 
that a misdemeanor is being or has been committed. Other s t a t e s  have 
abolished the in-presence requirement for the specific offense of DWI. 
Abolition of the in-presence rule, which has been urged by t h e  U.S. 
Department of Transportation as well as by some legal commentators, 
could have great impact on traffic law enforcement. 
Because the Fourth Amendment requires that warrantless arrests, as 
well as warrantless searches,  be based on probable  c a u s e ,  t h e  U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that  persons arres ted and detained without a 
warrant must be brought before a magistrate as soon as poss ible  t o  
determine whether probable cause had existed a t  the time of his arrest. 
8 . 2 . 2 . 3 . 3  "Stop and Frisku Encounters. Earlier in this section the 
limited "friskf1 for weapons was discussed as an exception to the search 
warrant requirement. Not only the frisk, but also the initial stop leading 
to  the frisk, is governed by the Fourth Amendment. As ment ioned 
before, a police officer must have an "ar ticulable suspicion of criminal 
activity" before he may initially stop an individual. Owing to the public 
interest in stopping criminal activity before i t  occurs, and also to the 
limited nature of this encounter, a standard less than traditional probable 
cause will justify an officer in acting under this rationale. 
8.2.2.3.4 Investigatory Detentions. Even though one objective of the 
Fourth Amendment is to guard against "dragnetf1 searches and seizures, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that  situations might exist i n  which 
police officers conducting a criminal investigation may subject persons to 
so-called 'Iinvestigatory detentionsu without probable  cause .  These  
encounters are permissible i f  a criminal investigation is underway, the 
detention is limited to obtaining fingerprints, and what the Court termed 
"narrowly circumscribed procedures" are followed by the police agency, 
8 . 2 . 3  Summary. There are  two major e l emen t s  which must be 
considered i n  determining whether a search or an arrest is valid: first, 
whether the incident is a search or ar res t  governed by the  Four th  
Amendment; and second, whether the search or arrest is reasonable. A 
search exists only when a reasonable expectation or privacy has been 
invaded. The courts require that for there to be such an expectation, a 
person must show a subjective expectation of privacy and society must 
objectively be prepared to  accept that expectation. A seizure of the 
person exists whenever a police officer interferes with a ci tizenls liberty. 
This is so whether or not the interference is labelled a formal "arrest.f1 
Reasonableness  is de te rmined  by the  ex i s t ence  of s u f f i c i e n t  
justification for the search or arrest and, in the case of a search, proper 
limitation of its scope. Normally, probable cause is required to  justify a 
search. The probable cause requirement is satisfied either by obtaining a 
warrant, or by meeting the requirements for a warrantless search or 
arrest .  Warrantless searches a re  permitted where probable cause exists 
and where it would be either unsafe to society or too time-consuming to 
delay action while a warrant is obtained. Encounters less intrusive than a 
full-fledged arrest  or search may be justified by a standard less than 
traditional probable cause. In the case of a search, the scope is limited 
by either the warrant or the circumstances required for a warrantless 
search; intrusion beyond those limits will make the search unreasonable. 
8.3 Application of the Prohibition Against Unreasonable Searches and 
Seizures to Highwav Safetv Issues 
The Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and 
seizures has significant impact on t raf f ic  law enforcement procedures. 
Search and seizure issues are  raised when police officers stop drivers, 
arrest them for traffic violations, or collect evidence of t raf f ic  offenses, 
specifically samples of body fluids to be examined for BAC. Owing to 
the concept of escalating probable cause, enforcement of t raf f ic  laws 
often leads to the gathering of evidence and arrest for other nontraffic 
offenses. 
In  this section the major Fourth Amendment issues associated with 
highway safety and traffic-law enforcement are  discussed. These issues 
include: 
e the authority of police officers to stop vehicles; 
investigation of a driver bv  an officer who has validly 
stopped his vehicle; 
requirements for a valid arrest of citation of a driver; 
the authority to search a vehicle and i ts  driver following 
a valid arrest; and 
e prearrest or "preliminary" testing of drivers for BAC. 
8.3.1 The Authority to Stop Vehicles. When a police officer stops a 
vehicle for any sort of investigation, that stop is considered a seizure and 
is therefore subject to the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Police stops of drivers may be classified into 
three broad groups: 
stops based on probable cause; 
e checkpoint stops; and 
arbitrary stops. 
These are discussed in order. 
8.3.1.1 Stops Based on Probable Cause. A police officer may stop and 
invest igate  any d r i v e r  who he h a s  p r o b a b l e  c a u s e  t o  b e l i e v e  has  
commit ted  a traffic violation in his presence. A warrant is not necessary 
for the stop to be reasonable.  The probable cause necessary t o  make 
such a s top  reasonable may be supplied f i r s t  of all, by specific moving 
violations, such as illegal turns, disobeying s top  signs, or crossing cen te r  
lines. I t  may also be supplied by generally irregular driving behavior such 
as abnormally low speeds, 'ljackrabbit'l starts, or overcorrection of driving 
errors .  In addition, violations of noise, equipment, or registration laws 
would justify probable cause stops. 
Once the driver has lawfully been stopped, the officer who stopped 
him may conduct an observation of t he  driver and his  v e h i c l e ;  t h i s  
observation may, in turn,  provide cause to  a r r e s t  for other  offenses,  
conduct further investigations, or both. As mentioned ear l ie r ,  a r t i f ic ia l  
aids such a s  flashlights may be used to enhance the officer's five senses 
in his investigation of the scene. 
8.3.1.2 Checkpoint Stops. Checkpoint stops are stops of all drivers 
along a single section of roadway by police off icers  a t  e i ther  temporary 
roadblocks or fixed checkpoints.  They have been used to detect illegal 
aliens, investigate criminal ac t iv i ty ,  and to  verify drivers1 licenses and 
vehicle registrations. 
Checkpoint s tops a r e  seizures  and therefore  subject  to  the  Fourth 
Amendment. The reasonableness requirements  governing w a r r a n t l e s s  
checkpoint s tops has been the subject of several Supreme Court decisions 
but remain unclear. 
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the use of warrantless, permanently 
fixed checkpoints where the i r  purpose was t o  de t ec t  illegal aliens.  The 
Cour t ,  using a balancing test with respect to sufficient cause, found that 
such checkpoints were reasonable if they were: permanently located with 
adequate warning; operated routinely and unoffensively; located on a 
highway having a relationship to  the purpose of the checkpoint; and 
positioned by a nonfield officer, meaning that decisions concerning whom 
t o  s t o p  and i n v e s t i q a t e  a r e  not made by the investigating officers 
themselves. 
The South Dakota Supreme Court relied on this reasoning in assessing 
the reasonableness of a warrantless roadblock for the detection of drunk 
drivers. The court found the particular roadblock in question violated the 
Fourth Amendment; it held, however, that i f  a  warrantless checkpoint for 
drunk drivers were permanently located with advance notice, and if the 
decision on where to locate  the checkpoint were made by a nonfield 
o f f i ce r  i t  would be reasonable. The court reached its decision by weighing 
the severity of the intrusion to the driver against the need to keep drunk 
drivers off the highways. 
The law governing checkpoint stops is not fully settled. It appears, 
from the language of the cases, that permanently fixed checkpoints with 
advance notice to  the driver of their location are favored over temporary 
checkpoints. The scope of any search after a  checkpoint s top is limited 
t o  t h e  reason  fo r  t h e  stop. I f ,  however, a f t e r  the stop the police 
officers observes any behavior tha t  gives h i m  probable cause to  believe 
that a  violation has been committed, he may lawfully investigate further. 
8.3.1.3 Arbitrarv Stops. Arbitrary stops a re  stops made by a police 
o f f i ce r  without probable cause to believe that  a  driver committed any 
traffic violation, and without any restr ict ions on the officer 's choice of 
whom t o  s top .  Arb i t r a ry  s t o p s  have commonly occu r r ed  i n  the 
enforcement of so-called "display laws," s t a tu tes  authorizing officers to 
stop a driver for the purpose of verifying his driver's license and vehicle 
registration. 
In practice,  however, police agencies appear to have used display laws 
for purposes other than verifying licenses and detecting stolen vehicles. 
Commonly, ar res ts  for narcotics laws violations and other crimes have 
resulted from these stops. The Delaware Supreme Court, recognizing the 
inherent unfairness of arbitrary stops, held that they violated the Fourth 
Amendment, and the U.S. Supreme Cour t  has r e c e n t l y  upheld t h e  
Delaware court's decision. As a result, future police checkpoints must be 
truly tfrandomlf and directed a t  all t raf f ic  using a particular highway. 
Thus, e r e c t i n g  roadblocks stopping every tenth vehicle would be an 
acceptable procedure to  ensure randomness; stopping a single vehicle 
would not be. 
8.3.2 Investigation Following the Initial Stop. Once an officer has 
made a valid stop of a driver, he is a t  least  initially limited i n  his 
investigation, or search, of that driver. This is true whether the stop is 
based on probable  c ause ,  or is  a checkpoin t  s t op .  Any i n i t i a l  
investigation must re la te  to the reason for the stop in the first place. 
For example, if a police officer stops a driver to check his license and 
registrat ion,  in the absence of any reason to believe a violation has 
occurred, he is not entitled to search the vehicle for items such as drugs 
or open containers of liquor. 
The scope of the search is greatly increased, however, by the plain 
view doctrine. Once the police officer has made a valid stop and is 
lawfully i n  position a t  or near a driver's vehicle, activity that reasonably 
suggests to him that  a violation of the law has occurred provides h i m  
with sufficient cause to investigate with respect to that offense. This is 
best explained by an example. If a police officer, a f t e r  making a valid 
checkpoin t  stop for a routine vehicle inspection, smells the odor of 
intoxicants and notices that the driver appears to be impaired, then he 
would have probable cause to  arrest him for DWI, The discovery of the 
driver's impairment would not be considered a search; this is because the 
police officer was lawfully a t  the side of the vehicle, and the driver's 
condition therefore was in ''plain view" of the officer. Chemical tes ts  for 
alcohol content are discussed in greater detail later in this section. 
8.3.3 The Arrest. In the field of highway safety there is only one 
major issue associated with the arrest  of drivers for a traffic violation, 
namely whether a warrantless arrest may be made by a police officer for 
a misdemeanor committed outside his presence. This requirement is a 
surviving common-law rule, one not required by the U.S. Constitution. In 
s t a t e s  that  s t i l l  adhere to the in-presence requirement, a police officer 
who wishes to make a t raf f ic  ar res t  ei ther must view the  violation or 
find a witness of the violation willing to appear before a magistrate and 
execute a warrant. As mentioned earl ier ,  this constraint  on the arres t  
power is eroding in many states. 
In traffic-law enforcement,  police officers commonly issue drivers 
ci tat ions in lieu of a custodial ar res t  for such minor v io la t ions  a s  
speeding,  illegal turns, and disobeying t raf f ic  signals. A driver who 
receives a ci tat ion is not required to  be brought i n t o  cus todv  ( t h e  
stationhouse); frequently he is not required to appear in court unless he 
chooses to contest the charges against him; rather, he may pay a fine by 
mail or to  the court clerk. The ci ted driver is, however, required to 
either pay the fine or appear in court. Should he ignore the  c i ta t ion,  a 
warrant for his arrest is issued by the court. 
8.3.4 Postarrest Activity. A search conducted a f t e r  an arres t  for a 
t raf f ic  violation, like all other searches, must be based on probable cause. 
This can be provided by a warrant, or by circumstances qualifying i t  as  a 
valid warrantless search. There will almost never be a search based on a 
warrant conducted after a traffic-law arrest.  Rather ,  i n  virtually every 
i n s t a n c e ,  any such search will acquire i ts  validity from one of the 
warrantless search requirements. The two justifications for warrantless 
searches occurring a f te r  an arres t  for a t raf f ic  violation are searches 
incident to arrest, and exigent circumstances searches. 
Of most significance to the field of highway safety is the taking of 
blood or breath samples from drivers arrested for DWI. A11 s t a t e s  have 
implied-consent laws, authorizing the taking of blood, breath, or other 
bodily substances from drivers ar res ted for DWI for ana lys i s  o f  t h e  
a lcohol  con t en t ,  It is clear  that  such takings of blood samples are  
searches, and the same reasoning applies to the taking of breath samples; 
thus chemical tes ts  are considered searches and to be valid they must be 
reasonable. 
Courts  have upheld the reasonableness of an evidential postarrest 
chemical test without either a warrant or the tested person's consent. 
They have based their approval of this process on two warrantless-search 
exceptions. First, since the driver is under arrest  for DWI and certain 
fac ts  indicate that the testing will produce evidence of the offense, the 
procedure is a valid search incident to arrest. Second, courts have found 
that  i n  the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant, the blood or 
breath alcohol content in the driver's body will dissipate, providing the 
exigent circumstances necessarty to conduct a warrantless search. The 
exigent-circumstances rationale has been extended, in a number of s ta tes ,  
to evidential testing conducted prior to a formal arrest. It appears that 
such testing without a formal arrest  is reasonable under t he  Four th  
Amendment, provided probable cause to arrest in fact existed at  the time 
of the search. The relationship between arrest and chemical testing also 
will be discussed in the next section. 
There are  several limitations that the courts have set out for blood or 
breath testing procedures. In addition to a valid ar res t ,  there must be 
clear indication that incriminating evidence will be found by using the 
procedure; the test must be conducted by medically approved methods, 
and i t  must be conducted in a manner that will produce reliable, relevant 
evidence. All testing schemes must meet these requirements to be valid. 
8 . 3 . 5  "Preliminary Breath Testff Statutes. In recent years a number 
of states have enacted s ta tu tes  authorizing police officers to conduct 
so-called preliminary breath tests (PBTs). These tests are not designed to 
produce evidence that would be used to prove intoxication a t  a DWI trial;  
rather,  these are  screening mechanisms which would be used to guide 
police officers in deciding whether to make a formal DWI arrest. 
PBT s ta tutes  differ in their scope, that is, under what circumstances 
police officers may test drivers; s ta tu tes  commonly authorize tests  for 
drivers involved i n  t raff ic crashes, as well as for drivers believed to be 
impaired by alcohol. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that  
breath tests  are  searches, and also has indicated that probable cause to 
arrest--or its equivalent--is required before a driver may be t e s t ed .  
Therefore, i t  is likely that  some PBT statutes authorize testing in cases 
where justification under the Fourth Amendment is lacking. There is 
presently l i t t le  case law dealing with prearrest testing; thus the question 
of what constitutes sufficient cause to conduct a PBT awaits resolution 
by courts. 
8.4 Consequences of Search and Seizure Challenges 
The normal result of an illegal search or seizure is that  evidence of 
an offense resulting from that  search or seizure will be excluded from 
the trial of that  offense. For example, if a court were to  hold that  
r equ i r ing  a d r ive r  t o  t a k e  an evidential breath test  before he was 
arrested for DWI would be prohibited. This principle is known as the 
exlusionary rule. It applies only in criminal proceedings and is available 
only to the person subjected to the illegal search or seizure. 
There is a corollary to the exclusionary rule which states that any 
further evidence obtained as a consequence of an illegal ar res t ,  search or 
seizure--even though i t  was obtained legally--is also inadmissible in a 
later criminal prosecution. This is known as the "fruit of the poisonous 
tree1! doctrine. There is one major qualification to this doctrine, namely 
tha t  i t  will not be applied i f  subsequent ev idence  could have been 
obtained independently of the illegal search or seizure. 
Normally, when law-enforcement activity is held to be an unreasonalbe 
search or seizure i t  will nullify only the single incident of enforcement 
that produced the violation. A program planner could therefore take 
steps to reduce such violations without invalidating an entire program, 
such as by issuing guidelines to law enforcement officers. 
In  a limited se t  of circumstances it is conceivable that the unlawful 
procedure would be the central  feature of an entire countermeasure  
program, such as one involving stopping vehicles in nonrandom fashion or 
testing drivers for alcohol content without sufficient cause. I f  this is the 
c a s e ,  i t  is possible that  the entire program might be enjoined from 
further operation. 
8.5 Resolving Search and Seizure Constraints 
Where governmental (police) officers are involved in arrests, searches, 
and seizures of drivers and their vehicles, several means of resolving 
p o t e n t i a l  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  c o n s t r a i n t s  a r e  possible.  When 
countermeasure activity invades driversf reasonable expectations of privacy 
and therefore involves lTsearches,fT possible constraints could be resolved by 
ensuring that the activity is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
Reasonableness  will be enhanced by developing specific guidelines 
governing the circumstances under which a search or seizure could take 
place (such as procedures to ensure randomness of vehicle stops) and the 
scope of these searches or seizures. Whenever possible, the justifications 
of plain view, exigent circumstances, or searches incident to arrest could 
be raised in behalf  of p rocedures  c a r r i e d  out  wi thout  war ran t s .  
Addit ionally,  where drivers suffer only minor infringements of their 
privacy, this also should be argued in favor of the government act ivi ty 
being Tfreasonable." 
Searches not justified by probable cause may nevertheless be permitted 
where they are consented to, or where the driver had waived his Fourth 
Amendment protection as part of a probation or other sanctioning scheme. 
The latter concept-the limited rights of probationers and others available 
f o r  s a n c t i o n i n g - - i s  of pa r t i cu l a r  impor t ance  t o  highway c r a sh  
countermeasure programs because  many sub j ec t s  of programs a r e  
probationers and other persons having limited rights. Countermeasure 
programs involving searches of convicted offenders must, however, be 
reasonably  r e l a t e d  to  the  goals  of the sanctioning scheme; this is 
discussed further in  Section 11.0 of this volume. 
8.6 Summary and Conclusions 
The Fourth Amendment neither prohibits all searches and seizures, nor 
requires a warrant before an arrest ,  search, or seizure may take place. 
It lays down a general requirement that any arrest, search or seizure be 
lfreasonable,IT that is, based on sufficient cause and no broader i n  scope 
than is necessary under the circumstances. 
The standard normally required to justify a s ea r ch  or s e i zu r e  is 
probable cause; however, encounters falling short of a full-scale arrest or 
search may be justified by a lesser degree of cause. 
4 search warrant is normally required beforehand; however, there  exist 
a number of exceptions permitting warrantless searches where appropriate 
justification exists, circumstances make it impractical to obtain a warrant 
o r  both. The warrant requirement is dispensed with i n  a number of 
situations, including: searches incident to ar res t ;  "frisks" for weapons; 
searches of automobiles on the highway; consent searches; and regulatory 
searches. The scope of these searches may be limited, such as when they 
take place in connection with the arrest or detention of a person. 
-- Arrest warrants, like search warrants, a re  also normally r equ i r ed  
beforehand. However, warrantless arrests are permitted where a police 
officer  observes an offense, where an officer  has probable c ause  t o  
believe that  the suspect committed a felony outside his presence, and-in 
a number of states-where an officer has probable cause to  believe that  
the suspect committed a misdemeanor outside his presence. In practice, 
the great majority of traffic arrests are made without warrants. 
Police stops of drivers and searches of automobiles are governed by 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirements. A driver may be stopped 
for investigation by an officer upon a reasonable suspicion that the driver 
had committed a t raf f ic  violation i n  his presence. Checkpoint stops of 
drivers without individualized suspicion are allowable, provided they are 
placed a t  fixed locations, by persons other than field o f f i c e r s ,  wi th  
advance warning, and are directed a t  the entire driving public. Arbitrary 
or nonrandom stops, without individualized suspicion, have been declared 
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Following a valid stop,  the driver's conduct or other circumstances 
may give the investigating officer  probable cause to  ar res t  h i m  for a 
t raf f ic  violation or some other offense, or to  search his vehicle f o r  
alcohol, drugs, or evidence of crime. 
Chemical tes ts  for BAC are  one type of search,  and these may be 
conducted following arres t  on a DWI charge. Postarrest  alcohol tes ts  
have been upheld against Fourth Amendment challenges. In some states, 
tests may validly be conducted prior to  formal ar res t ;  however, these 
tes ts  must be justified by the equivalent of probable cause to arrest. In 
addition to constitutional provisions, statutes governing all administration 
of alcohol tests in many states impose additional law-based constraints on 
the implementation of highway crash countermeasures that involve testing. 
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(1967); Boyd v .  United States,  116 U.S. 616 (1886); and the so-called 
flbeeperff cases cited below. The occurrence of an arres t  triggers the 
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436 (1966), as well as the Fourth Amendment issues of probable cause. 
The Nature of Search and Seizure Issues 
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The Nature of Arrest. Search, and Seizure Issues 
Existence of a "Searchff or ffSeizurefl of the Person 
The concept of "reasonable expectation of privacy" is treated in Katz -
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),, The twofold t es t  for determining 
whether such an expectation exists is stated in Justice Harlan's concurring 
opinion in Katz, - 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (concurring opinion). In this 
respect  one should see also, United States v. -7 Solis 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 
1976). The concept of "reasonable expectat ion of privacyff is also dealt  
with in the  following cases: Car ter  v. State, 255 Ark. 225,  500 S.W.2d 
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1976); and United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Mass. 1975). 
The reasonable-expectation-of-privacy t es t  was applied t o  the filming 
of a r r e s t e d  DWI s u s p e c t s ,  and courts  considering these cases have 
concluded that a person has no such expectation with respect  t o  filming 
of his words and actions, all of which were observed by arresting officers. 
The following cases are illustrative: Thompson v. People, --- Colo. --- Y 
510 P.2d 311 (1973); People v. Ardella, 49 Ill. 2d 517, 276 N.E.2d 302 (1971); 
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of binoculars and other artificial aids to  a police officer's five senses] ; 
and Wright v.  United States,  4 4 9  F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1971) [use of 
f lash1 ightl . 
I t  should be noted that  the Fourth Amendment governs only the 
actions of governmental officers, not those of private individuals. In this 
regard -- see, S ta te  v. Enoch, 21 Or. App. 652, 536 P.2d 460 (1975); and 
State v. Jenkins, 80 Wis. 2d 426, 259 N.W.2d 109 (19771, both of which 
deal with searches and seizures conducted by private citizens. 
Arrests a re  dealt with in F i sher ,  E.C. 1967. Laws of a r r e s t .  
Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University, Traffic Institute. Seizures 
short of formal arrest are discussed in Delaware v. Prouse, --- U.S. ---, 
47 U.S.L.W. 4323 (1979), and in the cases cited in Prouse. 
A warrant is strongly preferred by the U.S. Supreme Cour t  a s  a 
precondi t ion to  a valid arrest .  In this regard see,  United Sta tes  v. 
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) [search],  and Beck v. Ohio, - 379 U.S. 89 
(1964) [arrest] . What constitutes "probable causeff is generally discussed in 
the following: Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the 
Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664 (1961); and Stacey v. Emery, 
97 U.S. 642 (1878). 
Reasonableness of the Search or Seizure 
The required standard of cause for a full-scale ar res t  is probable 
cause, whether the arrest  is carried out under a warrant or without one. 
In this regard - see, Wong Sun v. United States,  371 U.S. 471 (1963); and 
Draper v. United States,  358 U.S. 307 (1959). Warrantless arrests  are 
especially likely to be carried out in cases of suspected felonies. Two 
recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 
38 (19761, and United S ta tes  v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (19761, hold that a 
warrant is not required for a felony a r res t ,  when the arres t  is based on 
probable cause and made in a public place. 
Reasonableness of the Arrest. Search or Seizure 
The  relat ionship between llreasonablenessfl and probable cause has 
sometimes been referred to as Var iab le  probable cause." Materials on 
t h e  deg ree  of p robab le  c ause  nece s sa ry  f o r  e n c o u n t e r s  sho r t  of 
full-fledged searches or a r res t s  include the following: LaFave, S t ree t  -_ 
Encounters and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 
MICH. L. REV. 40 (1968); and Comment, Search and S e i z u r e  in t h e  
Supreme court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 
664 (1961). One should s e e  a l so  t h e  fol lowing:  Uni ted  S t a t e s  v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 442 
U.S. 873 (1975); Adams v.  Will iams,  407 U.S. 143 (1972); Davis v. 
~ i s s i s s i p ~ i ,  394 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, - 392 U.S. 1 (1968); and 
United States v. Davis -7 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). 
The r equ i r emen t s  for  a valid warrant include probable cause and 
issuance by a neutral  magistrate,  both of which a r e  discussed above. 
Case s  dealing with the types of evidence that  may be considered i n  
making a probable cause de t e rmina t i on  inc lude :  Uni ted  S t a t e s  v. 
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); 
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); and Rrinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). 
Although Beck -v. Ohio -7 379 U.S. 89 (19641, s t a tes  a preference for 
ar res t  warrants,  w a r r a n t l e s s  a r r e s t s  a r e  p e r m i t t e d  under  c e r t a i n  
circumstances. In this regard -9 see Prosser, W.L. 1 9  Handbook of the 
law of torts. 4th ed. pp. 131-36. St. Paul: West Publishing Cornpany; 
and Fisher, E.C. 1967. Laws of arrest. pp. 124-228. Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University, Traffic Inst i tute.  One should see  also, t h e  
following federal  s t a tu tes  permitting warrantless arrests: 18 U.S.C.A. S 
3053 (West 1969) [ U S .  marshals]; 18 U.S.C.A. S 3653 (West 1969) [ar res t  
of probationer] ; 2 6  U.S.C.A. S 7607 (West 1967) [Bureau of Narcotics and 
Bureau of Customs] ; and 2 6  U.S.C.A. 5 7608 (West  1967) [ I n t e r n a l  
Revenue Service]. Sta te  statutes dealing with warrantless arrest are set 
out below. 
The rationale of "exigent circumstancesTt is discussed generally in 68 
AM. JUR. 2d Search and Seizure S 5 6  (1973). Cases  applying th i s  
doctrine include: Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) [evidence capable 
of being easily destroyed]; Chambers v.  Maroney, 399 U.S. 4 2  (1970) 
[search of automobile on highway]; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) 
["hot pursuitH] ; Schmerber v, California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) [evidence that  
disappears with the passage of time] ; and Carroll v. United 267 
U,S. 132 (1925) [search of automobile on highway] . 
Search incident to arrest is discussed in United States v. Robinson, 414 
U.S. 218 (1973); Chime1 v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United Sta tes  v. 
Wysocki, 457 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1972); and In re Kiser, 419 F.2d ll34 (8th 
Cir. 1969). 
The police practice of "stop and friskT1 was dealt with by the Court in 
Terry v. Ohio -9 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The flfrisktT may be conducted only for 
the officer's own protection and therefore is limited to weaDons; in this 
regard -- see, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 41 (1968). Terry did not deal 
explicitly with the officer's authority to stop persons for investigation; 
this was addressed in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). In Davis -v. 
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 7 2 1  (19691, i t  was held that  an investigatory 
detention, conducted as part of a criminal investigation and for a limited 
purpose--such as fingerprinting--may be conducted on suspicion less than 
the level of probable cause required to arrest. 
Inventory searches and the rationale for conducting them are discussed 
generally in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
The leading case dealing with consent searches is Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). One should s e e  a lso ,  t h e  a i r po r t  
preboarding search case, United Sta tes  v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 
1973). Third party consent issues and the "controlfT test  are  discussed in 
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) and Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 
483 (1964); see also, - State v. Hahn, - 38 Ohio App. 461, 176 N.E. 164 (1930). 
The relationship between the concept of "implied consentu and the law of 
search and seizure is t reated in Reeder R.H. 1972. Interpretation of 
implied consent laws by the  courts. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern 
University, Traffic Institute; People v. Superior Court of Kern County, 6 
Cal. 3d 7 5 7 ,  493 P.2d 1145, 100 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1972); Rossell v. City and 
County of Honolulu, - Haw. -, 579 P.2d 663 (1978); and Comment, The -
Theory and Pract ice  of Implied Consent in Colorado, 47 COLO. L. REV. 
Cases dealing with so-called "regulatory searches" include: Marshall v. 
Barlowfs Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); - See v. City of Seat t le ,  387 U.S. 541 
(1967); and C a m a r a  v. Municipal Court,  387 U.S. 523 (1967). These 
searches do not require individualized probable cause; however, neutral  
c r i t e r i a  must  be observed .  Thus, health and safe ty  inspections of 
premises cannot be carried out unless ei ther the owner consents, or a 
wa r r an t  is  ob t a ined ,  The re  ex i s t  a sma l l  number  of regula tory  
schemes-such as liquor and f irearms regulations--in which consent to  
s e a r c h  is an e s s e n t i a l  cond i t ion  of pa r t i c ipa t ing  in the regulated 
enterprise. In this regard -9 see  United Sta tes  v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 
(1972), and Colonade Catering v. United States,  397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
Airport preboarding searches are dealt with in United States v. Davis, 482 
F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). 
Reasonab leness  i ssues  concerning arres t  include the  warrant and 
p robab le  c ause  r equ i r emen t s ,  d iscussed above.  R e a s o n a b l e n e s s  
requirements governing seizures short of arrest are discussed in Delaware 
v. Prouse, ---U.S. ---, 47 U . S . L . W .  4323 (1979); Uni ted  S t a t e s  v .  
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, - 392 U S .  1 (1968); and 
State v. Olgaard, - S.D. -, 248 N.W.2d 392 (1976). 
Ao~l ica t ion  of the Prohibition Against Searches and Seizures to Hiehwav 
Safety Issues 
The Authoritv to S t o ~  Vehicles 
Police stops of automobiles, however limited, are seizures governed by 
t h e  Fou r th  Amendment .  In t h i s  r ega rd  - 9  s e e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); and United States v. Briqnoni-Ponce, 
422 U.S. 873 (1973). Thus ei ther individualized suspicion or n e u t r a l  
cri teria are  required before a police officer may validly stop a vehicle. 
Whether a police o f f i c e r  has sufficient cause to stop a vehicle is 
determined from all surrounding facts  and c i r cums t ances ;  th i s  was 
expressed in - State v. Landry, 116 N.H. 288, 258 A.2d 661 (1976). 
Checkpoint stops--which dispense with the need for individualized 
probable cause but which are  governed by neutral criteria--have been 
authorized for a number of limited purposes. The leading case dealing 
with checkpoint stops is United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 
(1976), which se t  out standards fo r  pe rmanent ly  f ixed checkpoin t s  
established to detect  illegal aliens. The Martinez-Fuerte standards were 
\ 
applied to checkpoints established to detect  drinking drivers in S ta te  v. 
Olgaard,  --- S.D. ---, 248 N.W.2d 392 (1976). Olgaard held that  the 
particular checkpoint program before i t  was unconstitutional, but upheld 
the constitutionality of checkpoint-type stops in general. Other cases 
upholding fixed checkpoints include: United Sta tes  v. Bonanno, 180 F. 
Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) [investigation of suspected criminal activity]; 
People v. De la Torre, 257 Cal. App. 2d 162, 64 Cal. Rptr. 8 0 5  (1967) 
[vehicle safety inspection] ; City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So.2d 784 
(Fla, 1959) [license and registration check] ; and S ta te  v. Kabayama, 9 4  
N.J. Super. 78, 2 2 6  A.2d 760 (Morris County Court 1967), affirmed, 98 
N.J. Super. 85, 236 A.2d 164 (App. Div.), affirmed mem., 52 N , J ,  507, 246 
A.2d 714 (1968). 
"Roving checkpoin tsfl or "arbitrary stopsf1 give police officers unlimited 
discretion over what drivers they may stop and ask to produce licenses 
and registrations. This practice was conducted in many states; in this 
regard -- see, S ta te  v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 6 7 2  (1975). 
However, in Delaware v. -7 Prouse - U.S. -, 47 U.S.L.W. 4323 (1979), the 
Supreme Court declared arbitrary stops unconstitutional. Under Prouse, 
police officers must have either an articulable and reasonable suspicion 
that a law violation has occurred, or follow neutral standards for stopping 
vehicles (such as stopping every tenth vehicle). General discussion of 
arbitrary stops may be found in: Comment, Elimination of Arbitrary 
Automobile Stops: Theory and Practice, 4 FORDHAM URB.  L.J. 327 
(1976); Note, Random Spot Checks and the Fourth Amendment, 5 5  NEB. L. 
REV. 316 (1976); and Note, Nonarrest Automobile Stops: Unconstitutional 
Seizures of the Person, 25 STAN. L. REV. 865 (1973). 
Investigation Following the Initial Stop 
Once a police officer has legitimately stopped an automobile he may, 
for his own protection, require the driver to get out of his vehicle. This 
practice was upheld in Pennsylvania v. Mimms -9 434 U.S. 106 (1977). The 
Mimms holding is an example of the  U.S. Supreme Court's balancing 
approach in determining the reasonableness of intrusions on a driver's 
privacy. 
Arrest 
Under the  common law, a police officer could make a warrantless 
misdemeanor arrest only where the alleged offense was committed in his 
presence. - See, 5 AM. JUR. 2d Arrest S 26 (1962). The in-presence rule, 
which is not required by the U.S. Constitution, has  been  wholly or 
partially eliminated in a growing number of states.  In this regard -9 see 
e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 S 107-2 (Smith-Hurd 1970); K A N .  STAT. 
A N N .  S 22-2401(c)(2) (1974); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW S 140.10 (McKinney 
1971); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. A N N .  a r t .  14.03 (Vernon 1977); and WIS. 
STAT. A N N .  S 968.07 (West 19711, all of which authorize warrantless 
misdemeanor arrests where the officer has reasonable grounds to  believe 
the suspect has committed an offense. Some statutes have not abolished 
the in-presence requirement generally, but have done so with respect to  
suspected DWI offenses; - 9  see  e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 764.15 
(Supp. 1978-79). On the other hand, many s ta tes  retain the  common-law 
ru l e  and a u t h o r i z e  warrantless misdemeanor ar res ts  only where the 
suspected misdemeanor occurs in the arresting officer's presence; typical 
of these s ta tu tes  a r e  FLA. STAT. ANN. S 901.15 (West 1974); and VINN. 
STAT. ANN. S 629.34 (West 1947). 
Postarrest Activity 
The testing of drivers for blood alcohol content is discussed in: Ervin, 
R.E. 1976. Defense of drunk driving cases. 3d ed. 2 vols. New York: 
Matthew Bender and Company, Inc.; Reeder, R.H. 1972. Interpretation of 
implied consent laws by the courts. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern 
University, Traffic Institute; and the text and accompanying bibliographic 
materials in Sections 9.2 and 9.3 of this volume. 
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) the U.S. Supreme Court 
indicated that  compulsory chemical testing for BAC was a search. State 
decisions holding chemical tests to be searches include: - Sta te  v. Howard, 
193 Neb. 45, 225 N.W.2d 391 (1975); - Sta te  v. McCarthy, 123 N.J. Super. 
513, 303 A.2d 626 (Essex County Ct. 1973); S ta te  v. Osburn, 13 Or. App. 
9 2 ,  508 P.2d 837 (1973); Commonwealth v. Quarles, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 
363, 324 A.2d 452 (1974) (plurality opinion); and S ta te  v. Driver -7 59 Wis. 
On the other hand, physical coordination tests to determine impairment 
are not searches; in this regard - see, e.g., - Sta te  v. Handfield, 115 N.H. 
628, 348 A.2d 352, cert. denied, 427 U.S. 909 (1975). 
The Fourth Amendment requires only that  compulsory chemical tes ts  
for  BAC be flreasonable.ll Thus chemical tests could constitutionally be 
carried out over the tested driver's objection, provided no brutality or 
violence is involved. Implied-consent legislation, however, substitutes 
license suspension for physical coercion as the means of compel l ing 
submission to  tests. In this regard -9 see - People v. Superior Court of Kern 
County, 6 Ca1. 3d 757, 493 P.2d 1145, 100 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1972); and 
Comment, The Theory and Practice of Implied Consent in Colorado, 47 
COLO. L. REV. 723 (1976). Obtaining BAC evidence through physical 
compulsion therefore may violate implied-consent legislation and lead to 
suppression of the evidence at  trial; in this regard see, S ta te  v. Riggins, --
348 So.2d 1209 ( ~ l a .  Dist. Ct. App. 1977); and Rossell v. City and County 
of Honolulu, - Haw. -, 579 P.2d 663 (1978). 
In Schmerber, the Court appeared to require both a valid arrest for 
some alcohol-related offenses, and a clear indication that  evidence would 
be found before a driver could be tested for BAC. Most states have by 
s ta tu te ,  required an arres t  before a d r ive r  may be t e s t e d ;  t yp i ca l  
provisions include CAL. VEH. CODE 5 13353(a) (west  1971); ILL. ANN. 
STAT. ch. 95 1/2, 4 11-501.l(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); and MICH. COMP. 
LAWS A N N .  5 257.625c(l)(a) (1977). Failure to arrest prior to testing may 
r e s u l t  in suppress ion of BAC ev idence  a t  trial; typical decisions include: 
S t a t e  v. Richerson, 87 N.M, 437, 535 P.2d 644 (Ct. App.), cert .  den ied ,  87 -
N.M. 450, 535 P.2d 657 (1975); and S t a t e  v. Byers, 224 S.E.2d 726 (W.Va. 
1976).  
Not a l l  s t a t e s ,  however, require a formal arres t  prior t o  administration 
of chemical tests. Several  c o u r t s  h a v e  i n t e r p r e t e d  S c h m e r b e r  t o g e t h e r  
w i t h  a m o r e  r e c e n t  d e c i s i o n ,  C u p p  v .  Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) 
[permitting a search for "highly e v a n e s c e n t v  e v i d e n c e  w i t h o u t  a f o r m a l  
a r r e s t ,  provided requ i s i t e  probable cause exists] , and have concluded tha t  
\ 
an arres t  is not a consti tutional p r e r e q u i s i t e  t o  t e s t i n g .  In t h i s  r e g a r d  
s e e ,  S t a t e  v. O e v e r i n g ,  --- Minn. ---, 268 N.W.2d 68 (1978). O t h e r  --
decisions tha t  h a v e  p e r m i t t e d  t e s t i n g  w i t h o u t  a f o r m a l  a r r e s t  include:  
Peop le  v. F i d l e r ,  175 Colo. 90, 485 P.2d 725 (1971); - S t a t e  v. Mitchell, 245 
So.2d 618 ( F l a .  1971); DeVaney v. S t a t e ,  259 Ind. 483, 288 N.E.2d 732 
(1972); and People v. Graser, 393 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (Amherst Town Court 1977). 
A recent development in alcohol test ing is  the  so-called p r e l i m i n a r y  o r  
p r e a r r e s t  b r e a t h  t e s t  (PBT).  As of D e c e m b e r  1978 t h e  following PBT 
s ta tutes  had been enacted: FLA. STAT. 5 322.261(1)(b) (1978); IND. CODE 
ANN. S 9-4-4.5-3 (Burns  Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. t i t .  29, S 
1312.llC (West Supp. 1978-79); MINN. STAT. ANY. S 169.121(6) (West  Supp. 
1979); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-U-5 (1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08(3) 
(1974); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW S U93a (McKinney Supp. 1978-79); N.C. 
GEN. ST.4T. ANN. 5 20-16.3 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-20-14 (Supp. 
1977); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 32-23-1.2 (1976); VA. CODE S 18.2-267 
(1975); and  D.C. CODE ANN. S 40-1002(b) (1973) [apparently authorizing 
PBTs]. The purpose of a PBT i s  t o  gu ide  a po l ice  o f f i c e r  in dec id ing  
w h e t h e r  t o  m a k e  a DWI a r r e s t ;  and  s o m e  PBT s t a t u t e s  a p p a r e n t l y  
authorize test ing d r ive rs  w i t h o u t  p r o b a b l e  cause .  Thus  t h e  PBT r a i s e s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i ssues  which have yet  to  be resolved by the  courts. PBTs 
a r e  discussed further in Brandt, G.D., and Dozier, P.C. 1976. R e p o r t  on 
t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  of p r e l i m i n a r y  b r e a t h  l a w s  in t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s .  
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration report  DOT-HS-801-934. 
Consequences of Search and Seizure Challenges 
The 17exclusionary rulef1 was originally applied in federal courts in 
Weeks v. U J  232 2,s. 383 (1914) and was subsequently applied 
t o  t he  s t a t e s  through t h e  Due Process  Clause  of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, - 367 U.S. 643 (1961). This rule applied to  the 
actions of government officers and not private individuals; in this regard 
see, Barnes v. United States, 373 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1967). Nor does i t  -- 
apply to  noncriminal proceedings; in this regard see, United States v. 
Janis 428 U.S. 433 (1967) [enforcement of income tax delinquency], Lat ta  
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v. Fitzharris, 521 P.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975) [revocation of probation]; and 
Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Probation and Parole Revocation: A 
Policy Appraisal, 54 TEX L. REV. U15 (1976). Finally, the exclusionary rule 
is not an absolute bar to the introduction of illegally obtained evidence a t  
t r ial  to impeach a defendant's credibility; in this regard - see, Comment, 
The Im~eachment Exceotion to the Constitutional Exclusionarv Rules. 73 
COLUM. L. REV. 1476 (1973). Exclusionary rules may be created by 
s ta tu te  as well as by court rule. - See, in this regard, 18 U.S.C.A. 5 
2518(lO)(a>(i) (west  1970), dealing with communications intercepted in 
violation of federal wiretap laws, Implied-consent s ta tu tes  in ef fect  
c r e a t e  exclusionary rules in two ways. First,  because they mandate 
testing certain procedures, mentioned earlier,  on the  p a r t  of pol ice  
officers, the failure to observe those procedures may be grounds for 
excluding the test results a t  trial. Second, some implied-consen t s t  a t  ut es 
limit the introduction of test results to DWI prosecutions only and forbid 
their use in other criminal actions; in this regard - see, e.g., ILL. A N N .  
ST-4T. ch. 95 112, S 11-501.l(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); see generally, 
Annot., 16 A.L.R. 3d 748 (1967). 

9.0 THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (PASI) 
The privilege against self-incrimination (PAS11 is aimed a t  protecting 
individuals from being compelled by the government to give testimony 
that could be used against them in a later criminal prosecution. 
9.1 Introduction 
T h e  Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in part: 
"No person . . . shall be compelled in  any criminal case to be a witness 
aga ins t  himself." This is commonly referred to as the PASI. This 
privilege applies to actions of both the federal and state governments. 
9.1.1 The Scope of the PASI. The PASI prohibits the government 
from compelling individuals to give testimony that  could be used against 
them i n  a  criminal prosecution. It first of all prohibits the prosecution 
at  a  criminal trial from compelling a criminal defendant to take the 
witness stand. The PASI also forbids a governmental body to compel an 
individual to appear and testify in any o the r  proceeding--cr iminal ,  
legislative, or administrative-where that testimony could be used against 
him in a subsequent criminal action. In addition, the PASI applies to 
s i t ua t i ons  where a person is "in custody,11 that is, under arrest  or 
otherwise deprived of liberty and interrogated by police officers, 
9.1.2 relations hi^ of the PASI to Other Law-Based Constraints, The 
PASI is closely r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  Four th  Amendment prohibi t ion of 
unreasonable searches and seizures, in that the same transaction may be 
characterized as both an "arrestT1 or ttdetentionll to which the law of 
search and seizure applies, and an in-custody situation to which the Fifth 
Amendment PASI applies. 
Ce r t a in  evidence-gather ing techniques may also be governed by 
s ta tu tes  which may afford individuals the right to refuse to provide 
evidence; although these are  not based on the U.S. Constitution, they 
have a constraining e f fec t  similar to that  of the constitutional PASI. 
Specifically, implied-consent s t a tu tes  regulating the administration of 
blood or breath tes ts ,  which may grant drivers limited rights concerning 
the collection and use of evidence, a re  of particular importance in the 
imp lemen ta t i on  of highway crash countermeasures. TheseBs ta tu tes ,  
because of their importance, are discussed in this section. 
9.2 The Nature of PASI Issues 
Challenges to investigatory or law enforcement techniques will not 
violate the PASI unless each of five elements a re  shown to  exist. I f  all 
five elements are present, and if the individual who asserted his PASI had 
not waived or otherwise lost i t ,  a violation has occurred, and evidence 
obtained as a consequence of the violation may not be used against him. 
9.2.1 Elements of a PASI Violation. The five elements that  must be 
established for a PASI violation to exist are the following: 
0 there must be compulsion; 
compulsion must be exerted by the government, not 
a private party; 
the evidence obtained through compulsion must be 
utestimonial'T; 
0 that evidence must be "incriminating"; and 
the person asserting the PASI must be asserting i t  
on his own behalf and not in behalf of another. 
These elements are discussed in order. 
9.2.1.1 Compulsion. The PASI is directed onlv at compelled testimony; 
incriminating evidence volunteered by an individual is outside the scope of 
t h e  privilege. The most direct  form of compulsion occurs where an 
individual is forced to choose between appearing and testifying a t  some 
official proceeding or suffering punishment. Penalties that constitute 
compulsion include not  only c r im ina l  s anc t i ons  such as  f i ne s  or  
incarceration, but also the loss of employment or a professional license, 
resulting from failure to testify. 
Compulsion also exists whenever a person is placed i n  custody and 
questioned by police officers. In Viranda v, Arizona the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that being placed in custody is, by its very nature, coercive, 
and that the PASI therefore requires specific protections of persons who 
are  interrogated while i n  custody. The Miranda rules, to be discussed 
la ter ,  a re  intended to ensure that  a suspect is not coerced  by t he  
circumstances of his arrest or detention into furnishing testimony against 
himself. 
Where a person chooses  to exercise his PASI and remain silent,  
mentioning the fact of his silence is itself incriminating inasmuch as i t  
reflects  a lfconsciousness of guilt1'. For that reason the prosecution at a 
criminal trial may not make the exercise of the PASI more costly by 
comment ing  on the accused's silence, thus bringing the issue to the 
attention of the jury. 
9.2.1.2 Government  Involvement. The PASI constrains only the 
government and its officers. Compulsion st em ming from private par ties, 
such as one's employer or family, is not governed by the PASI. 
9.2.1.3 The Requirement That Evidence Be lfTestimonial." The PASI 
does not apply to all evidence that might lead to a criminal conviction. 
Only evidence that  is deemed l f tes t imonial l l  or f l communica t ive f f  is 
protected from compelled disclosure. Evidence termed "physicalf1 or "realf' 
is not protected because no communication of thoughts  or ideas  is 
involved. 
A n  important case distinguishing testimonial from physical evidence 
involved the taking of a blood sample from a driver suspected of driving 
while intoxicated (DWI). Even though the taking of blood from the driver 
was compelled and resulted in his conviction of the offense, no PASI 
violation occurred; this was because no communication or testimony was 
involved. Other evidence-gathering techniques that are  outside the scope 
of t h e  P AS1 b e c a u s e  t h e y  involve "physical" evidence include 
fingerprinting, photographing, measurement, appearance i n  police lineups, 
and providing voice or handwriting specimens. 
The ga the r i ng  of physical  ev idence  may g e n e r a t e  "testimonial 
byproducts,!' that is, communications of thoughts or ideas triggered by 
administration of phvsical tests. The admission of testimonial byproducts 
a t  a criminal trial would violate the PASI, even though admitting the t es t  
results themselves would not. 
There a re  also tests  that  themselves compel disclosure of thoughts or 
ideas. For example, even if results of polygraph tes ts  were considered 
r e l i ab l e  by c o u r t s ,  persons could not be forced to submit to them. 
Although the polygraph measures changes in body functions accompanying 
a pe-rsonls responses  t o  questions, this !'physicalu evidence actually 
indicates the tested individual's thoughts and ideas and therefore involves 
disclosures which cannot be compelled without violating the P ASI. 
9.2.1.4 The Requ i r emen t  Tha t  Evidence Be " I n ~ r i m i n a t i n g . ~ ~  
Incr imina t ion  ex i s t s  whenever  t h e  r e a l i s t i c  t h r e a t  of a criminal 
prosecution exists. Where the danger of prosecution no longer exists,  
such as when a person has been granted immunity from prosecution, has 
already been convicted or acquitted of that offense, or where the s t a t u t e  
of limitations has run out, the PASI does not offer any protection. 
Some noncriminal penalties are so serious that they have been included 
in t he  def in i t ion  of " inc r imina t ion . "  These include, for example, 
adjudication as a juvenile delinquent, which is labeled a llcivilll mat ter .  
On the other hand, purely civil penalties, such as the payment of damages 
or the loss of driving privileges, a r e  not  within t h e  de f i n i t i on  of 
llincriminationll; nor a re  social punishments such as embarrassment, scorn, 
or disgrace, 
9.2.1.5 Exerc i se  of t h e  PASI Must Be " P e r ~ o n a l . ~ ~  The PASI is 
'lpersonalll to the one asserting it. An individual cannot use the PASI to 
r e fu se  t o  testify on the grounds that  his testimony will lead to the 
prosecution of a third party. In addition, one may not invoke his own 
PASI to  prevent some third party from offering incriminating testimony 
about him. 
Because the PASI is personal, i t  can also be waived by the person 
entitled to assert i t ,  However, waiver of a fundamental constitutional 
right such as the PASI must be done voluntarily, that  is, without threats  
or coercion, and knowingly, that is, with an awareness of what will be 
the effects of the waiver. 
9.2.2 Specific PASI Issues. Three major areas in which PASI issues 
recently have been raised are the following: whether a person can be 
required by  law to submit to physical tests for incriminating evidence; 
whether a person can be required to report his act ivi t ies-- including 
violations of the law--to the government; and what protection the PASI 
affords to a person being questioned while i n  police custody. These are  
treated in order. 
9.2.2.1 Administration of Physical Tests. Physical tests intended to 
identify a person, for example, by  requiring h i m  to appear in pol ice  
l ineups ,  provide voice or handwriting samples, or submit to tests to 
determine blood type, blood alcohol content (BAC), or the presence of 
narcotic drugs, a re  not constrained by the PASI. This is because the 
evidence obtained as the result of these tests  is considered wphysical" 
rather than f'testirnonial.u The application of this issue to physical tests 
for alcohol impairment is discussed later in  this section. 
9 . 2 . 2 . 2  ffSelf-Report" Statutes. A number of regulatory schemes 
require persons engaged in certain activities, such as pharmacy, gun and 
am munition s a l e s ,  or moneylending, to maintain records subject to 
inspection by appropriate governmental authorities. Such schemes, when 
specifically directed at professional gamblers, narcotics dealers, or others 
engaged in illegal occupations, confront those persons with the choice of 
either complying with the reporting scheme and supplying evidence of 
their own lawbreaking, or risking the penalties for noncompliance. This 
class of self-report requirements was, in a series of decisions by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, found to violate the PASI. On the other hand, self-report 
schemes of a more general regulatory nature have been upheld. The 
application of this issue to statutes requiring drivers involved i n  t raff ic 
crashes to stop and identify themselves is discussed below. 
9.2 .2 .3  The hliranda Decision: Application of the PASI to  In-Custody 
Questioning. Violation of the PASI occurs where police officers engage in 
abusive practices to coerce an accused into confessing his guilt of a 
crime. The U.S. Supreme Court took notice of those abuses and, in  the 
Miranda decision, took steps to protect the PASI of suspects accused of 
crimes. The Court required police officers, after they place a person in 
custody and before they begin to question him, to advise the accused of 
the following: 
e he has the right to remain silent; 
any statements he offers may and will be used in a 
criminal prosecution against him;  and 
e he has the right to have an at torney present during 
interrogation. 
Unless the suspect has waived these rights, any incriminatory statements 
obtained in violation of the requirements se t  out above may not be used 
at trial to prove his guilt. 
The Miranda requirements  do not govern general, lfon-the-sceneH 
questioning, or situations where an individual volunteers certain s ta tements  
to police. However, once a person is formally placed under arrest, or his 
liberty is restricted to the point that he is in ef fect  "under arrest ,"  the 
Miranda requirements then apply. 
The app l ica t ion  of Miranda t o  t r a f f i c  stops and to testing; and 
questioning in connection with traffic stops, is discussed below. 
9 . 2 . 3  S t a t u t o r v  Rights to Refuse to Provide Evidence. Certain 
physical testing procedures to which the PASI does not apply are governed 
by s ta tu tes  that  give individuals the option of refusing to take the test. 
Because the PASI does not apply, a s t a t e  may enforce its public policy 
favoring these tests and may impose penalties on those who exercise their 
option to refuse. Sanctions for refusal may include civil penalties, such 
as the loss of driving privileges, and may include comment at  trial on the 
refusal to be tested. These issues are discussed below in the materials 
dealing with implied-consent legislation. 
9.3 Application of the PASI to Highway Safety Issues 
This section will treat three classes of PASI issues that might arise in 
connection with the implementation of highway crash countermeasures. 
They are: 
physical tests to determine a driver's impairment; 
"hit-and-run" s ta tu tes  requiring drivers involved i n  
s e r i o u s  t r a f f i c  c r a s h e s  t o  s t o p  and iden t i fy  - themselves; and 
e applicability of Miranda rights, including the right to 
counsel, to the arrest or detention of a driver for a 
traffic offense. 
9.3.1 Physical and Chemical Tests to Determine Impairment. Blood 
and breath (chemical) tests, and physical coordination tests ("field testsr ') ,  
a re  the principal means of determining whether one's driving ability has 
been affected by alcohol or drugs. Field tests normally a re  administered 
af ter  a driver is stopped for some traff ic offense and is suspected of 
DWI, but before the driver is arrested. Chemical tests, on the other hand, 
a r e  normally administered af ter  arrest  on a DWI charge. These are 
discussed in order. 
9.3.1.1 Physical Tests: Field Tests Prior to Arrest. Field tests are 
used to determine the extent to which a driver's coordination has been 
impaired by alcohol or drugs; tests  include walking in a straight line or 
reciting the alphabet. Because the purpose of these tests is to determine 
the driver's coordination and not his thoughts or ideas, field tests have 
been defined as "nontestimonial" and therefore outside the scope of the 
PASI. 
Because field tests  are nontestimonial, it has also been held that  
police officers are not required to advise the driver of his Miranda rights 
in  connection with the testing. 
9.3.1.2 Chemical Tests: Blood or Breath Tests Following Arrest. 
Blood or breath tests to determine alcohol content ,  like field tests ,  a re  
nontestirnonial and, therefore,  not within the scope of the PASI. A 
driver, t he r e fo r e ,  may not  r e fu se  to  submi t  on t h e  bas i s  o f  t h e  
constitutional privilege. 
However, the implied-consent laws of many s ta tes  in e f fec t  grant 
statutory rights to refuse a chemical test .  Drivers in these s ta tes  a re  
typ ica l ly  given an option of submitting to the tes t  and risking the 
consequences of a high BAC result, or refusing the test  and suffering a 
mandatory license suspension. This "right to refuse" actually gives the 
driver only a choice between penalties. In a number of s t a tes ,  there is 
no right to choose and the refusing driver faces a double penalty: the 
prosecution is permitted to comment on his refusal (which increases the 
likelihood of a DWI conviction); and the driver also faces a mandatory 
license suspension for refusal. Because t h e  PASI does not  prohibi t  
comment on a driver's refusal to  submit to a nontestimonial procedure, 
the issue of whether refusal may be commented upon is a s t a t u t o r y  
matter, and thus varies from state to state, 
Even though 3liranda does not apply to the administration of tes ts ,  
many s t a t u t e s  r equ i r e  t h a t  a d r ive r  be given a s e p a r a t e  s e t  of 
"implied-consent warnings" set t ing out his rights with respect to  t h e  
chemica l  t e s t .  The app l i c a t i on  of Miranda to DFYI ar res ts  and to 
chemical tests is discussed later in this section. 
Other protections that  a driver, faced with compelled chemical tests, 
might be provided by statute include: 
t h e  right to have an independent test  performed by a 
qualified person of the driver's choosing; 
a choice among several types of chemical tests, such as 
blood, breath, or urine; 
advance  n o t i c e ,  oral or written, of the penalties for 
refusing to submit to a test; 
access to, and the right to make an independent test of, 
bodily fluid samples. 
9.3.2 llHit-and-Runll Statutes. Statutes in every state require a driver 
involved in a serious traffic crash to stop a t  the crash scene and identify 
himself, or be subject to criminal penalties. These statutes have been held 
by the U.S. Supreme Court and by state courts not to violate the PASI. 
Hit-and-run s ta tu tes  have been distinguished from the unconstitutional 
self-report schemes discussed earlier,  for several reasons, including the 
following: 
e their purpose is merely to identify drivers and not 
to incriminate them; 
e identifying oneself at a crash scene is not the same 
as "giving testimonyu; 
they are  directed a t  the entire driving population, not 
merely those who have violated traffic laws; and 
e self-reporting schemes are  often the only means of 
ensuring financial responsibility for traff ic crashes 
and deterring hazardous driving. 
Some courts have been careful to point out that self-reporting schemes 
t h a t  pose more se r ious  r isks  of self-incrimination or that require 
disclosures beyond mere identification may violate the PASI. 
9.3.3 Arrests and Detentions of Drivers: The ADDlication of Miranda. 
This section discusses three issues connected with the application of 
Miranda to traff ic stops: what categories of traffic stops are llcustodiallf 
and therefore governed by Miranda; the application of Miranda to physical 
and chemical tests; and whether the right to counsel applies to traffic 
stops. 
9.3.3.1 Traffic Stops and the Concept of "Custodial Interrogation." 
The Miranda decision does not apply to every encounter between law 
enforcement officers and citizens; it governs only those interrogations 
that are conducted while an accused is " in  c ~ s t o d y . ~  Therefore, only 
those traff ic stops that  meet the definition of "custodial interrogations" 
must be conducted in accordance with the Miranda rules. 
The i n i t i a l  s t op  of a driver by police officers is not considered 
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"custodia l1 ' ;  r e q u e s t s  f o r  one 's  license and registrat ion,  or general 
background questions, such as those regarding ownership of the vehicle, 
are  not considered "custodial interrogation." Issuance of a traffic citation 
for a minor infraction is not tlcustodial" because the driver is only briefly 
detained and he usually is not even required to leave his vehicle. Where, 
however, a driver is placed under formal ar res t  or brought into custody 
(namely, the stationhouse), the Miranda warnings must be given before any 
further interrogation may take place. Because DWI is cons idered  a 
serious t raf f ic  offense, and because drivers suspected of DWI are brought 
into custody, the Miranda warnings must be given t o  suspected drunk 
dr ivers .  
Incriminating s ta tements  made by the driver prior to formal arrest or 
transportation into custody may la te r  be introduced as evidence a t  a 
criminal prosecution without regard to Miranda. Such statements made by 
a driver after arrest or transportation into custody may be used only i f  
the Miranda requirements-giving the appropriate warnings and permitting 
counsel to be present-had been complied with. 
There exists one other significant limitation on the scope of Miranda, 
namelv that  voluntary s ta tements  by the accused--those not made in 
response to police questioning--may be used against h i m  in a criminal 
proceeding. This is so whether or not the arresting officers had properly 
given the Miranda warning. 
9 . 3 . 3 . 2  Application of Viranda to  Administration of Tests. The 
Miranda protections apply only to police questioning aimed a t  obtaining 
incriminatory statements by the accused, not to physical or chemical tests 
which are defined as "nontestimonial." Because of this, a driver arrested 
for DWI will be advised of his Miranda rights in connection with his being 
questioned but these rights do not apply to his being tested, 
Sta tutes  i n  most s t a tes  require that a driver be given a separate set 
of warnings advising him of his rights in connection with the testing 
itself.  The giving of two se ts  of warnings may cause confusion on the 
driver's part; he may mistakenly believe that he may refuse the chemical 
tes t  and suffer no penalty for doing so, or that he has the right to have 
an attorney present during the questioning process. 
9.3.3.3 The Right to Counsel. Miranda imposed the requirement that 
an accused have the right to have counsel present during in-custody 
interrogation. This was done to ensure protection of a suspectfs rights, 
especially his PASI, from police abuse. The right to counsel guaranteed 
under hl iranda,  however ,  should be dis t inguished from t h e  Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of counsel in criminal proceedings. The latter 
guarantee exists to protect an accused's rights during certain "criticaltf 
stages of a criminal proceeding. 
Critical stages are  those a t  which a person's rights with respect to a 
fair trial are at  stake; these include arraignment, preliminary examination, 
plea, the trial itself,  and sentencing. Because it has been held by the 
U.S. Supreme Court that  " c r i t i c a l  s t a g e s n  may a r i se  only a f t e r  a 
defendant is charged with a crime, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
does not govern custodial interrogation. Rather, the right to counsel 
during interrogation arises under Miranda. 
As pointed out earlier,  neither Miranda nor the Sixth Amendment 
demands that an accused DWI offender be guaranteed the right to counsel 
in connection with chemical testing. However, a number of s ta tes  have 
granted such a right either under their implied-consent statutes, by court 
interpretation of their statutes, or by court rules. These statutory rights 
are,  however, limited: s ta tu tes  typically grant an accused offender the 
right to consult with his attorney prior to deciding whether to submit to 
a tes t ,  not to have an attorney present; furthermore, this right applies 
only when the consultation would not unreasonably delay the t e s t i ng  
procedure. 
9.4 Consequences of PASI Challenges 
A violation of the PASI may occur i n  one of two ways: first, when 
incriminating testimony is illegally compelled from a person, used a t  a 
criminal prosecution against h im,  and leads to his conviction; and second, 
when a person properly invokes his PASI, r emains  s i l en t ,  and is 
consequently punished for his silence. If the person i n  the first case 
successfully challenges the violation of his PASI, a court may declare his 
conviction void and order a new trial on the basis of evidence other than 
the illegally corn pelled testimony. A successful challenge in the second 
case will result in a court lifting the punishment that  was imposed for 
remaining silent. 
9.5 Resolving PASI Constraints 
A planner intending to implement a countermeasure program may take 
several steps to resolve p o t e n t i a l  PASI cha l lenges .  F i r s t  of a l l ,  
coun t e rmeasu re  dev ices  could be developed that  would obtain only 
llphysical'l evidence from a driver, or would simply identify h i m ,  without 
gathering any testimonial s ta tements ,  Second, where testing procedures 
or a r r e s t  and de t en t i on  r o u t i n e s  p o s e  a h a z a r d  of c o m p e l l e d  
self-incrimination, specific guidelines should be developed to govern those 
programs, since compliance with standard procedures reduces the risk of a 
PASI challenge. These should cover informing subjects of their rights and 
duties, when and how access to counsel should be permitted,  and what 
s o r t  of r ecords  should be main ta ined  t o  prove compl iance  with 
constitutional and statutory requirments. .4 third method is t o  r e l y ,  
whenever  possible, on PASI waivers beforehand from subjects, as is 
currently done with respect to Miranda rights prior to custodial police 
interrogations. Fourth, schemes that  might violate the PASI could be 
limited in their scope to probationers and others having only limited 
rights. Care must be taken, however, to ensure that these schemes are 
reasonably related to the probationary scheme and that  they do no t  
compel blanket or uninformed waivers of the PASI which might not be 
permitted by courts. These issues are  discussed in greater  detai l  in 
Section 11.0 of these background materials. 
9.6 Summary and Conclusions 
The PASI is aimed a t  preventing governmental bodies or officers from 
compelling individuals  t o  give t es t imony  t h a t  may lead  t o  t he i r  
prosecution for a crime. Compulsion may consist of penalizing a person 
for refusing to testify, drawing inferences of guilt from one's remaining 
silent,  or the inherent compulsion that exists while a person is in police 
custody. 
The PASI consists of five elements, all of which must be present 
before the privilege will be recognized i n  a given case. There must be 
some form of compulsion.  The compulsion must be applied by the 
government. The ev idence  must pose t h e  poss ibi l i ty  of c r imina l  
p rosecu t ion ,  tha t  is, be fTincriminating.T' Finally, the PASI must be 
asserted by the person holding it, and not by or for anyone else. 
A c r u c i a l  e l e m e n t  of t h e  PASI in t e rms  of highway c r a sh  
countermea3rres is the distinction between testimonial evidence, which is 
within the scope of the PASI, and physical evidence, which is not. Tests 
for alcohol impairment are considered "physicalTT and lie beyond the scope 
of the privilege. Thus, a driver's "right to refusefT a chemical test is 
provided by s t a t u t e  and does not  a r i s e  under t he  U.S. or s t a t e  
consti tut ions.  
Sel f - repor t  requirements raise the possibility of PASI violations, 
especially where they are directed against classes of individuals suspected 
of a s p e c i f i c  form of c r imina l  a c t i v i t y .  However,  s e l f - r epo r t  
requirements directed a t  the general public--such as all drivers--and 
intended for a regulatory purpose are unlikely to trigger PASI violations. 
Another concept crucial to countermeasure implementation is t he  
requirement of ucustodial interrogation7' for the Miranda requirements to 
apply. Most rou t ine  s tops  for  t r a f f i c  v iola t ions  a r e  def ined as  
noncustodia l  and fo r  that reason are  outside the scope of Miranda; 
however, arrests  for more serious violations must conform to  those  
requirements. 
Situations that lie outside the constitutional protections of the PASI 
and Miranda may nevertheless be governed by s ta tu tes  that  guarantee 
drivers certain protections against the use of compelled, self-incriminatory 
evidence. Specifically, the implied-consent laws of many s ta tes  grant 
drivers rights, such as attorney consultation, that are not required by the 
U.S. Constitution. 
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Analyt ic  s tudy  111. Final  r epo r t .  National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration report DOT-HS-052-1-068. 
Implied-consent  laws a r e  discussed in t h e  following materials: 
Comment, The Theory and Practice of Implied Consent in Colorado, 47 
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1119 (1977). A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  p h y s i c a l  c o o r d i n a t i o n  t e s t s  a r e  n o t  t f c r i t i c a l  
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B A C  a r e  s e t  o u t  i n  s t a t e  i m p l i e d - c o n s e n t  l e g i s l a t i o n  a n d  t h e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r u l e s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  d e r i v e d  f r o m  t h e m .  P r o v i s i o n s  
specifying t h e  t e s t s  t h a t  may b e  administered and des igna t ing  t h e  p e r s o n s  
q u a l i f i e d  t o  a d m i n i s t e r  t h e m  inc lude :  MICH. COMP.  LAWS ANN. S S  
257.625a(l), 257.525a(2) (1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. S §  169.123(2), 169.123(3) 
(Supp.  1979); - a d  N.Y. VEH. & T R A F .  LAW S S  1194(1), ll94(7) ( ~ c K i n n e y  
Supp.  1979). T e s t i n g  m u s t ,  i n  m a n y  s t a t e s ,  b e  c o n d u c t e d  w i t h i n  a 
s p e c i f i e d  t i m e  a f t e r  a r r e s t ;  i n  t h i s  r ega rd  -7 see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 
112, S  ll-50l.l(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); and  N.Y. VEH.  & T R A F .  LAW § 
1194(1). A choice among chemica l  tests is given t h e  driver  in a number of 
states; t y p i c a l  p rov i s ions  i nc lude :  CAL.  VEH. C O D E  S 13353(a)  ( W e s t  
1971); a n d  ?hINN. STAT. ANN. S  169.123(2) (West Supp. 1979). Examples of 
t h e  regulat ions gove rn ing  a l c o h o l  t e s t i n g  i n c l u d e  CAL.  ADM. C O D E  S §  
1215-1222.2, c i t e d  in E rwin ,  R.E. 1976. Defense of drunk driving cases.  
3d  ed .  2 vol. pp. 28-20--28-38.5. New York:  M a t t h e w  B e n d e r  a n d  
Company Inc.; and MICH. ADM, CODE R.325.2561-R.325.2569 (Supp. 1974). 
Many implied-consent s t a t u t e s  i n  e f f e c t  g r a n t  a d r i v e r  a n  o p t i o n  of 
r e f u s i n g  c h e m i c a l  t e s t s  a n d  e l e c t i n g  a m a n d a t o r y  l i c e n s e  s u s p e n s i o n  
in s t ead ,  A f e w  s t a t e s  r e f e r  e x p l i c i t l y  t o  a " r i g h t  t o  r e fuse t1 ;  i n  t h i s  
r e g a r d  - s e e , MICH. COMP.  LAWS ANN.  257.625d (1977). O t h e r  s t a t e s  
reach  t h e  s a m e  resul t  by l imit ing t h e  p r o s e c u t i o n l s  r i g h t  t o  c o m m e n t  o n  
t h e  d r i v e r ' s  r e f u s a l ;  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d  - s e e ,  ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95-112, S  
11-501.l(c) (Smi th -Hurd  Supp.  1978); a n d  MASS. ANN. LAWS c h .  9 0 ,  S 
2 4 ( l ) ( e )  ( ~ i c h i e l ~ a w .  C o - o p  1975).  C a s e s  c o n s t r u i n g  i m p l i e d - c o n s e n t  
s t a t u t e s  s o  a s  t o  prohibit  commen t  on r e f u s a l  i n c l u d e  P e o p l e  v. H a y e s ,  
6 4  Mich .  App. 203 ,  235  N.W.2d 182 (19751, a n d  C i t y  of S t .  J o s e p h  v. 
Johnson, 539 S.W.2d 784 (340. C t .  App.  1976). E v e n  w h e r e  a n  o p t i o n  o f  
r e f u s a l  i s  o f f e r e d ,  a d r i v e r  who  r e f u s e s  t o  s u b m i t  s u f f e r s  m a n d a t o r y  
l i c e n s e  suspens ion ;  - s e e  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  MICH. C O M P .  L A W S  A N N .  S  
257.625f(3) (1977). 
O t h e r  s t a t e s  a f f o r d  a driver  no option of refusal ,  and comment  on t h e  
driver's re fusa l  a t  a subsequent  DWI t r i a l  i s  n o r m a l l y  p e r m i t t e d  i n  t h e s e  
s t a t e s .  S t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  p e r m i t t i n g  c o m m e n t  include: 
UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE S ll-902.l(c) (Supp. Il 1976) [optional  p rov i s ion ]  ; 
ALA. C O D E  t i t .  32,  S 5-193(h) (1975); DEL. CODE t i t .  21, S 2749 (1974); 
and IOWA CODE ANN. S 321B ( W e s t  Supp.  1978-79). C a s e s  p e r m i t t i n g  
c o m m e n t  on  t h e  b a s i s  of s t a tu to ry  in terpre ta t ion  include - S t a t e  v. Tabisz -7 
129 N.J. Super. 80, 322 A.2d 453 (App. Div. 19741, a n d  C o m m o n w e a l t h  v. 
R u t a n ,  2 2 9  P a .  S u p e r .  C t .  400 ,  3 2 3  ,4.2d 730 (1974). T h e  r i g h t  t o  
comment  a t  a DWI t r ia l  on a d r i v e r ' s  r e f u s a l  i s  d e a l t  w i t h  g e n e r a l l y  i n  
Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 370 (1963). 
I m p l i e d - c o n s e n t  s t a t u t e s  f r e q u e n t l y  contain provisions requir ing police 
of f icers  t o  inform a driver  t h a t  his re fusa l  t o  submit  t o  a t e s t  w i l l  r e s u l t  
i n  l i c e n s e  suspension.  In many s t a t e s  t h e  of f icer  also may be required t o  
inform t h e  driver  of h i s  r i g h t s  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  t e s t i n g  p r o c e s s .  
T y p i c a l  p r o v i s i o n s  include: CAL. VEH. CODE 9 13353(a) (west 1971); ILL. 
4 N N .  STAT.  ch .  95-1/2, S 11.501.l(a) (Smi th -Hurd  Supp .  1 9 7 8 ) ;  V I C H .  
C O M P .  L A W S  A N N .  5 2 5 7 . 6 2 5 d  ( 1 9 7 7 ) ;  a n d  N . J .  S T A T .  A N N .  S 
39:4-50.2(e) (\Vest Supp. 1978). 
T h e s e  i m p l i e d - c o n s e n t  w a r n i n g s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  from those  required by 
Miranda, and this  dist inct ion i s  m a d e  i n  - S t a t e  v. D a r n e l l ,  8 Wash. App.  
6 2 7 ,  508 P.2d 613, c e r t .  d e n i e d ,  414 U.S. 1112 (1973). The  implied-consent 
warnings a r e  made  mandatory by  s t a t u t e  a n d  n o t  t h e  U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n ;  
t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  w a s  m a d e  in  S t a t e  v. Myers, 58 N.M. 16, 536 P.2d 280 
(1975); and  Commonweal th  v ,  R u t a n ,  229 P a .  S u p e r .  C t .  400 ,  3 2 3  -4.2d 
730  (1974). W h e r e  b o t h  s e t s  of warnings a r e  given, confusion may resul t ;  
this  in turn  may inval idate a d r i v e r ' s  c o n s e n t  o r  r e f u s a l  t o  s u b m i t  t o  a 
t e s t .  In t h i s  r e g a r d  -- see, Rust  v. Depa r tmen t  of Motor Vehicles, 267 Cal. 
App. 2d 602, 73 Cal. Rpt r .  366 (1968); a n d  C a l v e r t  v. S t a t e ,  D e p a r t m e n t  
of R e v e n u e ,  M o t o r  V e h i c l e  D iv i s ion ,  184 Co lo .  214, 519 P.2d 341 (1974). 
Fa i lure  t o  give a driver  t h e  r e q u i r e d  i m p l i e d - c o n s e n t  w a r n i n g s  c o u l d  b e  
g r o u n d s  f o r  s e t t i n g  aside a l icense suspension imposed for  refusing a t e s t ;  
see, Purvis v. S t a t e ,  129 G a .  App.  208 ,  199 S.E.2d 366 (1973). W h e r e  a -- 
d r i v e r  c o n s e n t s  t o  a t e s t  w i t h o u t  being given t h e  required warnings, t h e  
tes t  results may be suppressed a t  trial; see, State v. Freymuller, 26 Or. --
App. 411, 552 P.2d 867 (1976). One specific example is the  rie;ht t o  
additional tes ts  that  is granted drivers in many states.  This right is 
statutory only, and is not constitutionally required; -7 see - Sta te  v. Nunez -7 
139 N.J. Super. 28, 351 A.2d 813 (Law Div. 1976). Falure to advise a driver 
of his right to such tests could in effect justify a driver's refusal to  take 
a BAC tes t  and se t  aside a suspension imposed for refusal; - see, Garrett 
v. Department of Public Safety, 237 Ga. 413, 228 S.E.2d 812 (1974); and 
Connollv v. State, 79 Wash. 2d 500, 487 P.2d 1050 (1971). 
Y -
Although the U.S. Constitution does not require  t h a t  counsel  be  
present a t  the administration of alcohol tests, a number of states have 
afforded dr ivers  a l imi ted  r i gh t  t o  consult w i t h  an a t t o r n e y  in 
connec t ion  with their decision whether to  submit or refuse. Typical 
provisions include:  I L L .  STAT. A N N .  ch.  95-1/2, S 11-501.l(a)(3) 
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 169.123(3) (west Supp. 1979); 
and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, S 1202(b) (1978). One should see also, Gooch 
v. Spradlinq, 523 S.W.2d 861 (MO. Ct. App. 1975) [applying state court rule 
granting arrested persons-including those arrested for DWI--the right to  
c o n t a c t  counse l l .  These s ta tu tory  rights a re  limited: they permit 
consultation, but do not require an attorney's presence; they a r e  further 
limited to  situations where the test would not be "unreasonably delayed.Tf 
A small number of states have, by court decision, granted drivers limited 
rights to contact  counsel; these include: Prideaux v. State, Department 
of Public Safety, - Minn. -, 247 N.W.2d 385 (1976); People v. Gursey, 
2 2  N.Y.2d 224, 239 N.E.2d 351, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1968); and S ta te  v. 
Welch -7 - Vt.  -, 376 A.2d 351 (1977) [BAC testing i n  connection with 
vehicular homicide prosecution] . 
The Welch, Prideaux, and Gursey decisions suggest that chemical 
testing is in some respects a critical stage of the criminal prosecution for 
alcohol-relating driving offenses. However, these courts were careful to 
point out that such testing was not in the same category as those cri t ical  
stages defined by the U.S. Constitution. Some courts have expressly 
stated that the decision whether to  submit to  a tes t  is not a fTcri t ical  
s tageff;  in this regard see,  S ta te  ex rel. Webb v. City Court of the City -
o f  T u c s o n ,  2 5  Ar iz .  L4pp. 214, 542 P.2d 407 (1975). O t h e r  d e c i s i o n s  
holding t h a t  a driver  has  n o  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t  t o  c o n s u l t  a n  a t t o r n e y  
inc lude :  G r e e n  v. D e p a r t m e n t  of P u b l i c  S a f e t y ,  308 So.2d 863 (La. Ct .  
App. 1975); Robertson v. S t a t e  ex. rel.  Les ter ,  501 P.2d 1099 ( O k l a .  1972);  
P e t e r s o n  v. -9 S t a t e  --- S.D. ---, 261 N.W.2d 405 (1977); and Coleman v. 
C o m m o n w e a l t h ,  212 Va. 6 8 4 ,  187 S.E.2d 172 (1972). O t h e r  c o u r t s  h a v e  
d e n i e d  t e s t e d  d r i v e r s  t h e  r i q h t  t o  c o u n s e l  on  t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  B A C  
tes t ing  is an  a spec t  of t h e  i m p l i e d - c o n s e n t  process- -a  c i v i l  m a t t e r  n o t  
g o v e r n e d  b y  t h e  r i g h t  t o  counse l .  T y p i c a l  d e c i s i o n s  i n c l u d e  S t a t e  v. 
Severino, 56 H a w . 4 7 8 ,  537 P.2d ll87 (19751, and L e w i s  v. N e b r a s k a  S t a t e  
D e p a r t m e n t  of M o t o r  V e h i c l e s ,  191 S e b .  704 ,  217 N.W.2d 177 (1974). A 
d r ive r  t e s t e d  f o r  BAC m a y  h a v e  t h e  r i g h t  t o  h a v e  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  t e s t  
p e r f o r m e d  by  a p e r s o n  of  h is  c h o i c e ;  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d  -7 s e e  CAL.  VEH. 
CODE S 13354(b) ('West Supp. 1978); MINN.  STAT. ANN. S 169.123(2) ( W e s t  
S u p p .  1979);  a n d  N.Y. VEH. & T R A F .  LAW S 1194(8) ( M c K i n n e y  Supp .  
1978-79).  
"Hit-and-Run1! S t a t u t e s  
S t a t u t e s  r e q u i r i n g  d r i v e r s  i n v o l v e d  in  t r a f f i c  c r a s h e s  t o  s t o p  a n d  
identify themselves a r e  discussed above in Section 9.2 of t h i s  v o l u m e  a n d  
accornpanying bibliographic materials .  
Arres ts  and Detentions of Drivers: The  Application of Miranda 
T h e  i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of  M i r a n d a  t o  t h e  ini t ial  s top  and t o  on-the-scene 
questioning is discussed in: S t a t e  v. S m i t h ,  174 Conn .  118, 384  A.2d 347 
(1978); - S t a t e  v. Dubany, 184 Neb. 337, 167 N.W.2d 5Z6 (1969); and S t a t e  v. 
Tavlor -9 249 Or. 268, 437 P.2d 853 (19681, a n d  T r a i l  v. S t a t e ,  552 S.W.2d 
7 5 7  ( T e n n .  C r i m .  A p p .  1 9 7 6 ) .  T r a f f i c  s t o p s  w e r e  f o u n d  n o t  t o  b e  
f f c u s t o d i a l , "  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  o u t s i d e  t h e  s c o p e  of Y i r a n d a ,  i n  S t a t e  v .  
Macuk ,  57 N.J. 1, 268 A.2d 1 (1970). One should s e e  a lso  in this  regard ,  
Note, Consti tut ional  Law-Privilege Against Se l f - Inc r imina t ion - -App l i ca t ion  
of  M i r a n d a  v. A r i z o n a  t o  M o t o r  Vehicle Violations, 38 MO. L. REV. 652 
( 1 9 7 3 ) .  
10.0 PRIVACY 
Privacy is not a single right but the combination of a number of 
related rights, each of them derived from a distinct source. These rights 
include: constitutional rights, which protect certain personal act ivi t ies 
from unwarranted governmental invasion; civil or com mon-law rights, 
which protect an individual's reputation or menta l  well-being f rom 
interference by others; and statutory rights, which protect individuals 
from unregulated collection, maintenance, and dissemination of personal 
data by governmental bodies. 
10.1 Introduction 
Pr ivacy is  nowhere  referred to  i n  the text  of the United States 
Constitution, and only a few state constitutions currently contain explicit 
p ro t ec t i ons  of individual  privacy. It is now accepted that various 
constitutional provisions, taken together, protect certain intimate places 
or activities from unwarranted governmental interference. 
Common-law privacy protection encompasses four separate privacy 
r igh t s  protecting interests in reputation and mental well-being from 
interference by others. Unlike const i tu t ional  or s t a t u t o r y  pr ivacy 
p ro t ec t i on ,  which are  directed a t  governmental action, common-law 
privacy protection is aimed at  actions of private parties. 
Statutory privacy protection includes federal and state privacy acts 
which regulate the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of personal 
data by governmental agencies. It also includes a variety of federal and 
state provisions prohibiting wiretapping, the dissemina tion of confidential 
data, and related invasions of privacy. 
10.1.1 The Development of Privacy Protection. Even though courts 
and legislatures have long protected privacy interests, explicit recognition 
of privacy d id  not occur until the late nineteenth century. Then, courts 
began to recognize common-law privacy rights protecting persons from 
commercial appropriation of their names and likenesses. Later court 
decisions extended privacy protection to cover intrusion into p r iva te  
m a t t e r s ,  publ ic i ty  placing others i n  a  false light, and disclosure of 
intimate information, all of which are discussed below, 
Unlike common-law privacy, which is directed chiefly against invasion 
by private parties, constitutional privacy p r o t e c t s  individuals  f rom 
invasions by government. The U.S. Supreme Court did not explicitly 
recognize privacy as a constitutional right until 1965, although i t  had in 
e f f e c t  protected individual privacy in a number of earlier decisions, 
especially those involving search and seizure and substantive due process. 
S t a t u t e s  making c e r t a i n  types of personal data confidential and 
legislation regulating electronic eavesdropping have long protected aspects 
of individual privacy. The f irst  a t t empt  a t  comprehensive s ta tu tory  
protection of personal data  occurred in 1974 when the Federal Privacy 
Act was enacted. Legislation similar to the federal act has since been 
passed in a growing number of s ta tes .  Additionally, there a re  numerous 
s ta tu tes  that  declare certain types of personal data to be confidential and 
thus closed to public inspection. 
In sum, privacy has long been the subject of protection by courts and 
legislatures; however, relatively little protection has been developed under 
the explicit label of This is especially true of constitutional 
privacy protection, which most directly constrains l aw-en fo rcemen t  
act ivi ty.  It follows that little law has been developed concerning privacy 
as a law-based constraint on countermeasure implementation. However, 
pr ivacy issues  could weigh heavi ly  i n  the  evaluat ion of proposed 
countermeasure programs. Privacy is a  developing l ega l  a r e a  and is 
becoming an increasingly important political considerations. 
10.1.2 Relationship of Privacy to Other Law-Based C o n s t r a i n t s .  
Cons t i tu t iona l  privacy protection is derived from a number of more 
specific guarantees found i n  the Bill of Rights, particularly the First 
Amendment freedoms of worship, speech, assembly, and association, and 
the guarantee of "liberty" found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process  Clauses. The language and concepts used by courts i n  
resolving privacy cases are  often similar to  those used in cases arising 
under one of the specific guarantees from which privacy is derived. 
Common-law privacy protection is related to  other protections of 
personal reputation and mental well-being. Those interests, when invaded 
by others, might be enforced through actions alleging libel, slander, or 
infliction of mental distress. Common-law privacy, as in the case of libel 
and slander, may be subject to overriding First Amendment rights of the 
press to disseminate information and the public to receive it. 
Pr ivacy s ta tu tes  a re  in large part a t tempts  to unify a number of 
existing protections gttaranteed by law or custom, including, for example, 
the sealing of adoption records and the nondisclosure of rape victims' 
identities. 
10.2 The Nature of Privacy Issues 
Privacy rights, arising from each of the three sources described above, 
are directed a t  different categories of conduct and protect  somewhat 
different interests. For that reason they require separate treatment. 
10.2.1 Common-Law Pr ivacy P ro t ec t i on .  Common-law pr ivacy 
protection safeguards individual reputation and mental well-being from 
invasion by others. Protection is chiefly directed a t  invasions by private 
persons, although i t  applies to invasions by government officers as well. 
The substantive law governing common-law privacy rights is developed and 
applied by s ta te  courts and is relatively uniform from s ta te  to state. 
Four specific invasions of privacy have been recognized. They are: 
e intrusion upon another's seclusion or solitude or into his 
private affairs (intrusion); 
public disclosure of embarrassing private fac ts  about 
another (disclosure); 
publ ic i ty  which places another in a false light i n  the 
public eye (false light publicity); and 
e appropr ia t ion ,  fo r  p r i va t e  commercial advantage, of 
another's name or likeness (appropriation). 
The last of these, appropriation, is not applicable to highway crash 
countermeasure implementation and will not be discussed. The remaining 
three invasions of privacy are discussed in order. 
10.2.1.1 Intrusion. Intrusion is the classic lfinvasion of privacy." It is 
a prying into the private mat ters  of a n o t h e r ,  and can  be done by 
searching him, entering upon his premises, placing him under surveillance, 
or reading his private papers. Two elements must exist for an intrusion 
to occur: 
0 a prying into a place or act ivi ty intended to be kept 
private; and 
0 t h a t  prying is considered offensive to one of ordinary 
sensibilities. 
10.2.1.2 Disclosure. Disclosure is the publication of true but damaging 
information about another, This differs  from libel and slander, which 
normal ly  r equ i r e  t ha t  the information disclosed be false as well as 
damaging. Three elements must exist for a disclosure to occur: 
0 the information disclosed is private and not something 
already known to the public; 
e the disclosure is a "public one,lf that  is, one made to a 
large number of people; and 
e tha t  disclosure is considered offensive to one of ordinary 
sensibilities. 
T h e  concep t  of "a l ready  known t o  the  public" r equ i r e s  some 
qualification. Not all information that is ffpublicff may be disclosed. For 
example, the court record of a criminal conviction from the distant past 
is, strictly speaking, a public record; however, i ts  disclosure might be 
regarded as an invasion of privacy i f  the convicted person had long since 
rehabilitated himself, and there is no socially recognized justification for 
making the disclosure. 
10.2.1.3 False Light Publicity. False light publicity is the publication 
of information that incorrectly places a person i n  a context  damaging to 
his reputation. Using one's name or picture to endorse ideas or products 
with which he has no reasonab le  connec t ion ,  f a l se ly  a t t r ibu t ing  
embarassing statements to him, or incorrectly identifying h i m  with some 
criminal or antisocial enterprise are all examples of false light publicity. 
Two elements must exist for false light publicity to occur: 
publicity that  gives the public a false impression of an 
individual; and 
that publicity is considered offensive to one of ordinary 
sensibilities. 
10.2.2 Constitutional Privacy Protection. Two forms of constitutional 
privacy exist. One consists of privacy rights arising under the U.S. 
Cons t i  tution; the second, which supplements the privacy protection of the 
federal constitution, consists of rights recognized by s t a t e  courts as a 
matter of state constitutional law. These are discussed in order. 
10.2.2.1 Privacy Rights Under the U.S. Cons t i tu t ion .  The U.S. 
Supre me Court f irst  gave explicit recognition to constitutional privacy in 
its 1965 decision of Griswold v. Connecticut. The case dealt with s t a t e  
laws prohibi t ing persons--whether marr ied  or single--from using 
contraceptives. The Court declared the law unconstitutional insofar as 
t h e  l aw  a p p l i e d  t o  m a r r i e d  c o u p l e s ,  on t h e  g rounds  t h a t  i t  
unconstitutionally invaded the rrzone of privacyrT surrounding the marital 
relationship. Zones of privacy, reasoned the Court, were created by 
so-called rlpenumbral rights," not specif ied i n  t h e  Cons t i  tu t ion  but  
nonetheless associated with specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. One 
example  of a penumbral  r i gh t  i s  t h e  u n s p e c i f i e d  " p r i v a c y  of 
associationu--the right to keep one's political associations secret-that was 
recognized as necessary to protect the exercise of one's specified First 
Amendment freedom of speech. Thus, a zone of privacy formed by 
several penumbral rights was found by the Court to surround the married 
couple's decision regarding the use of contraceptives. 
The Court's next landmark privacy cases, the 1973 abortion decisions, 
emphasized two major points concerning constitutional privacy, First of 
all, government is not absolutely prohibited from invading a zone o f  
privacy. A s ta te  may do so in furtherance of some "compelling interest," 
such as, in the abortion cases, safeguarding the health of pregnant women 
and the potential life of unborn children. The state is, however, limited 
to the least  drastic means of carrying out i t s  compel l ing i n t e r e s t .  
Second,  not  a l l  personal decisions are  safeguarded by constitutional 
privacy; only "fundamental" personal rights enjoy such protection. Rights 
not considered fundamental may be limited by state action intended to 
further the public health, safety, morals, or welfare. This distinction was 
made in a number of court decisions upholding, for example, school 
disciplinary rules, lawsprohibiting drug use, and state fornication s ta tu tes  
against privacy claims. 
A 1976 Supreme Cour t  decis ion appea red  t o  l im i t  the privacy 
protection g r an t ed  by t h e  U.S. Cons t i t u t i on  t o  a sma l l  group of 
fundamental activities. These include marriage, contraception, abortion, 
child rearing, and other mat ters  related to  the family. Protection of 
rights lying outide these areas was left to state courts and legislatures. 
However, privacy protection apparently has been ex tended  t o  c a se s  
involving the administration of involuntary and highly intrusive medical or 
psychiatric treatment. This is discussed in more detail below. 
10.2.2.2 Privacy Rights Under State Constitutions. Most state courts 
have followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court and limited privacv 
protection to a limited class of fundamental personal rights. A minority 
of state courts have, however, recognized broader privacy protections as a 
matter  of their own constitutional law. Areas in which constitutional 
privacy protection has been broadened include the following: 
e invalidating,  as violations of privacy, s ta tu tes  making 
certain flvictimless c r i r n e ~ , ' ~  especially consensual sexual 
conduct, unlawful; 
prohibit ing or restricting the administration of h igh ly  
intrusive medical or psychiatric treatment without the 
treated individual's informed consent: 
permitting terminally ill patients to refuse life-saving 
medical treatment; and 
e proh ib i t ing  i n s t i t u t i ona l  o f f i c i a l s  from conduct ing 
unnecessary and embarrassing searches or observations of 
inmates. 
The first of these developments primarily involves the privacy of the 
home and t h e r e f o r e  has l i t t l e  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  c o u n t e r m e a s u r e  
implementation. The second and third recognize an aspect of privacy 
somet imes  r e f e r r e d  t o  as  f lautonomy,l l  t h a t  is,  a r ight  t o  make  
fundamenta l  decisions concerning one's own welfare without official 
interference. The fourth development emphasizes human dignity as an 
aspect of privacy by recognizing a right to shield one's intimate actions 
from public exposure. The last  development raises the possibility that  
governmental intrusions into nonfundamental activities, such as using drugs 
or engaging in sexual activity, could violate s t a t e  constitutional privacy 
protection. The application of these developments to highway crash 
countermeasure implementation is discussed further later in this section. 
10.2.3 Statutory Privacy Protection. The first s ta tu tes  explicitlv 
protecting privacy were enacted in the early twentieth century i n  s t a tes  
whose courts refused to explicitly recognize common-law privacy rights. 
Those statutes were primarily directed a t  commerical appropriation, not 
harm to reputation or mental well-being. Electronic eavesdropping by 
both governmental officers and private persons also has been made subject 
to some statutory control. In addition, specific classes of information, 
including public records containing intimate personal data,  have been 
shielded from public disclosure by statutes in many states. 
Comprehensive protection against invasions of privacy resulting from 
the unwarranted collection, maintenance, and use of personal data by the 
government was afforded by the Federal Privacy Act of 1974 and by s ta te  
s ta tu tes  modeled after it. Criminal history data is regulated i n  somewhat 
similar fashion by federal and state statutes and regulations. 
10.2.3.1 Wiretap S t a t u t e s .  The first federal s t a tu te  regulating 
wiretapping was enacted i n  1934. In 1968, provisions governing a l l  
e l e c t ron i c  su rve i l l ance ,  including e l ec t ron i c  "bugging" as well as 
wiretapping, were enacted. The 1968 provisions require that  probable 
cause be shown and judicial permission be granted before e l e c t ron i c  
surveillance of an individual by governmental officers can take place; the 
Act also limits the duration of such surveillance. 
10.2.3.2 Privacv Provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FoI,~).  
The federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was passed i n  1966 and 
amended in 1974. The FOI.4, which governs all federal agencies, first of 
all requires agenc ies  t o  publish t h e i r  p rocedures ,  gene ra l  policy 
s ta tements ,  final decisions, and other materials whose contents affect 
members of the public. Second, the FOIA requires agencies to permit 
public inspection of other records in their possession, provided they are 
requested in accordance with established procedures and are not exempted 
by one or more provisions of the FOI.4. A number of s t a tes  have 
enacted FOI-4s or "public records ac tsn  that  a re  similar in intent  and 
language to the federal FOIA. 
Even though the FOIA encourages disclosure of information, it also in 
effect protects privacv by requiring government agencies i n  certain cases, 
t o  r evea l  t o  individuals the personal information that  was compiled 
concerning them. Data such as dossiers of alleged subversives were made 
subject to disclosure under the FOIA. Privacy is protected bv the FOIA 
in one other respect, in that several classes of information a re  exempted 
f rom disclosure. Three important exemptions are: f irst ,  personnel, 
medical, and other files the release of which would consti tute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of privacy; second, investigatory records compiled 
for law enforcement purposes; and third, material specifically exerllpted 
from disclosure by other statutes. 
10.2.3.3 The Federal Privacy Act of 1974. In  recent  years, the 
accumulation of large quantities of personal  d a t a  by gove rnmen ta l  
agencies, and the development of computer retrieval systems, have come 
to be regarded as threats  to personal privacy. Two specific concerns 
have been expressed. First, offical action concerning individuals might be 
taken on the basis of false or incomplete personal information. Second, 
true but embarrassing information could be disseminated to those who 
have no need to know it. These concerns caused Congress to enact the 
Privacy Act of 1974, which regulates the information practices of federal 
agencies. The Act applies not only to federal agencies themselves but 
also all nonf ederal enti ties that maintain record systems using federal 
funds. A growing number of s t a t e s  have passed pr ivacy or " f a i r  
information practices" ac ts  similar in intent and language to the federal 
ac t .  
The basic r equ i r emen t s  of the  Federal Privacy Act include the 
following: - 
agencies that  collect personal data concerning individuals 
(known as "data subjectst1) must inform them that  they 
are doing so, and why they are doing it; 
e data subjects asked to furnish personal information must 
be informed of any rights they may have to refuse to 
provide it; 
d a t a ,  o n c e  c o l l e c t e d ,  can be mainta ined only i f  
maintaining it is necessary for the agency's objectives; 
dissemination of data is limited: first, to specific persons 
and purposes defined in the Act; second, when authorized 
by the data subject; and third, when the FOIA requires it 
to be made available; and 
e violators of the Act are made subject to civil penalties, 
and wil lful  v io la to rs  a r e  also sub j ec t  t o  c r i m i n a l  
prosecut ion. 
10.2.3.4 The Crime Control Act Amendments of 1973 and the LEAA 
Regulations. The legislative history of the Privacy Act indicated that  
c r imina l  h is tory  d a t a  should be the  sub j ec t  of separate,  specific 
legislation. Such legislation was enacted by Congress i n  1973 as part of 
i ts  amendments to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets -4ct of 
1968. Acting under authority of that  s ta tu te ,  the Law Enforcement  
Assistance Administration (LEAA) of the U.S. Department of Justice 
issued regulations governing information practices concerning criminal 
history data. 
The LEAA regu l a t i ons  apply t o  s t a t e  or local law enforcement 
agencies receiving L E A A  funds, as well as agencies sharing data  with 
LEAA-funded agencies. Thus the regulations affect most criminal justice 
record systems. These provisions, where applicable, require agencies: to 
ensure the timeliness and accuracy of their records; to res t r ic t  their 
dissemination and use to law enforcement and research purposes, and to 
persons having a need to know their contents; to permit data subjects to 
inspect and challenge data concerning them; and, i n  general,  to take 
appropriate security precautions. The LEAA regulations are discussed in 
greater detail below. 
10.2.3.5 Other Statutory Privacy Protections. Certain classes of 
records, because of their personal nature, have been spec i f  ically excluded 
from disclosure by statutes. Examples of information kept confidential by 
statute include the following: 
records of adoption or legitimation proceedings; 
e records of juvenile court proceedings; 
e b i r t h  c e r t i f i c a t e s  t h a t  may con ta in  emba r r a s s ing  
information such as illegitimacy, and death cer t i f ica tes  
t h a t  may show such disreputable causes of death as 
suicide, venereal disease, or miscarriage; 
e health records maintained bv hospitals, clinics, or other 
state institutions; 
e case files of welfare recipients; 
e scholastic records containing medical, psychiatric, or other 
personal information: and 
e traffic crash reports submitted by drivers. 
The classes of information made confidential vary from state to state. 
Some statutes may conflict with First Amendment rights of the ned ia  to 
gather information. For example, a U.S. Supreme Court decision declared 
unconstitutional a state law prohibiting disclosure of rape victims' names 
where those names were carried in court files open to public inspection. 
10.2.3.6 Summary.  Statutory privacy rights may be created by 
legislatures in cases where courts are unwilling to recognize ce r ta in  
p r i v a c y  r i g h t s ,  o r  w h e r e  a c o m p r e h e n s i v e - - r a t h e r  t h a n  
case-by-case-approach to privacy is preferred. Most privacy s ta tu tes ,  
both comprehensive and specific, govern the recordkeeping practices of 
governmental agencies,  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  co l l ec t ion ,  main tenance ,  and 
dissemination of personal data. 
10.3 Application of Privacy Rights to Highway Safety Issues 
Very little law explicitly based on privacy has been developed with 
respect to highway crash countermeasures. This is so for two reasons. 
First, the U.S. Supreme Court has largely limited constitutional privacy to 
concerns connected with the home, and to conduct unrelated to driving. 
Second, privacy issues affecting highway safety generally have arisen i n  
connection with specific constitutional guarantees such as the prohibition 
of unreasonable searches and seizures or the substantive due process 
requirement. 
Three  gene ra l  c lasses  of countermeasure activity are subject to 
possible constraints arising from privacy rights. They are: surveillance of 
vehicles and their drivers; the administration of involuntary, intrusive 
treatments; and the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of personal 
data concerning drivers. These are discussed in order. 
10.3.1 Surveillance of Drivers. Challenges to surveillance programs 
usually involve Fourth Amendment search and seizure law. The concept of 
ffreasonable expectation of p r i~acy ,~?  discussed earlier,  is crucial i n  these 
cases because activities that invade no such reasonable expectation are 
not even governed by Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirements. 
Driving behavior generally is not surrounded by a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, because vehicles are operated on highways and i n  other areas 
open to the public, and also because a person's actions in connection with 
operating a vehicle usually can be observed by other members of the 
public. Therefore, surveillance of driving behavior usually would not be 
subject to Fourth Amendment constraints, and individuals challenging those 
surveillance programs must either base their attack on other provisions of 
the Constitution or rely on statutory protections. 
I t  has been suggested that  placing large numbers of surveillance 
devices i n  public areas would erode democratic values and "chill" the 
exercise of personal liberty. However, those courts that have dealt with 
challenges to  far-ranging surveillance programs, directed a t  poli t ical  
d i s s iden t s ,  have so far  refused to accept  such an argument. Their 
reasoning has been that no specific harm arising out of any surveillance 
program had been shown, and that a showing of speculative harm was not 
sufficient to challenge it. - 
Surveillance of individual drivers by placing a signal-emitting device or 
"beeperf' on their vehicles have been upheld by courts against Fourth 
Amendment challenges. As pointed out earlier in the search and seizure 
materials, most courts dealing with llbeeperll cases have held that  no 
reasonable expectation of privacy existed with respect to the whereabouts 
of onefs vehicle, and for that reason Fourth Amendment constraints did 
not apply. Privacy per se was not a basis for challenging the placement 
of a "beeper" in any of these cases; moreover, given current  case law, i t  
is also unlikely that a privacy attack would succeed. 
It is possible that new electronic devices, designed to pry more closely 
into individual's actions, would encounter privacy-based attacks. With 
respect to highway crash counte rmeasures ,  any dev ice  or program 
involving surveillance or monitoring of drivers could generate public 
resentment; that, in  turn, might trigger legislation restr ict ing the use of 
such countermeasures. 
10.3.2 Administration of Involun tarv Treatment. Privacy protection 
does not confer an absolute freedom to do as one pleases with his own 
body; converse ly ,  privacy does not afford absolute protection from 
intrusions upon one's body, Such intrusions as vacc ina t ion ,  eugen ic  
sterilization, fluoridation of the public water supply, and blood tests to 
determine paternity or blood alcohol content have been upheld against 
what amount to privacy challenges. 
A privacy right has, however, been recognized that protects against 
c e r t a i n  involuntary  and highly in t rus ive  medical  or psychological 
treatments. Such treatment as electroshock therapy or psychosurgery 
affect ing one's mental capacity has been found "highly intrusively and 
therefore an invasion of privacy by some courts. Such treatments,  as a 
consequence, cannot be administered without either consent or a showing 
of compelling necessity by the s ta te .  At least one court has applied a 
similar analysis to  the administration of life-sustaining medical treatment 
to a chronic vegetative patient, and another court similarly restricted a 
proposed behavior-modification regime directed at  school children deemed 
likely to become drug abusers. Forced ingestion of chemical agents also 
may invade individual privacy, especially i f  they induce pain or mental 
distress, or if there exists a danger of harmful side effects. 
Several courts have adopted a balancing test by which the legality of 
forced treatments is judged: the impact on individual privacy of the 
treatment is weighed against the state's interest i n  administering the 
treatment, and the relationship between the particular form of treatment 
and the state's interest. 
A number of countermeasure programs currently used to rehabilitate 
convicted DWI offenders, involve treatment or therapy designed to deal 
with the driversr alcohol involvement. However, few--if any--of the 
regimes involve the kind of treatments found to invade individual privacy. 
Likewise, none of the proposed countermeasure programs contemplate 
compulsory intrusive treatment or the forced ingestion of drugs. 
10.3.3 Collection, Maintenance, and Dissemination of Personal Data. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that consti tut ional  
privacy protection does not apply to the distribution of damaging personal 
data by state officials. Protection against such practices therefore must 
be based on p ro tec t ions  provided by s t a t e  court decisions and by 
legislat ion.  
The implementation of countermeasure programs likely will result in 
the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of personal data concerning 
countermeasure subjects. This data is likely to include arrest, conviction, 
and other criminal history data as well as medical and psychological 
information. 
10.3.3.1 Legislation Concerning Criminal History Data. Criminal history 
data includes the records of any formal encounters between individuals 
and the criminal justice system (CJS). These data include, for example, 
"rap sheets" (compilations of an individual's encounters with the criminal 
jus t i ce  s y s t e m ) ,  police blotters, fingerprint cards, t r ial  transcripts, 
presentence investigation reports, and abstracts  of convictions. The use 
of such information is governed by s ta tu tes  and regulations; misuse is 
subject to statutory penalties and, i n  some cases, civil suits. The most 
important provisions dealing with the collection, maintenance, and use of 
these data are discussed below. 
10.3.3.1.1 L E A A  Regulations. The L E A A  regulations, discussed earlier, 
apply to state and local agencies maintaining criminal history data. The 
gene ra l  r equ i r emen t s  of t imel iness  and a c c u r a c y ,  r e s t r i c t i o n  of 
dissemination, inspection by subjects, and security precautions apply to all 
criminal history data unless that  class of data is exempted. Exempted 
classes of information include the following: 
chronological records such as "police blotters"; 
court records of public judicial proceedings; and 
a t raf f ic  records maintained by administrative (licensing) 
agencies for the purposes related to driver licensing. 
Police blotters  and court records are exempt because they customarily 
have been public records, and also because i t  is extremely difficult to 
compile an individual's entire criminal history from them. Traffic records 
are exempt for a number of possible reasons: they carry abstracts  of 
conv ic t ions  only; they are  widely disseminated for such purposes as 
insurance; and thev already are subject to state regulation. 
On the other hand, entire criminal histories-which include arrests as 
well as formal adjudications of gui l t - -are  more  l ikely  t o  con t a in  
inaccuracies; dissemination of these records is also more likely to harm 
the subjects of those records. This is especially true where crirninal 
histories contain entr ies showing arres ts ,  which do not by themselves 
indicate guilt. As a result,  the L E A A  regulations: require agencies to 
determine the most recent disposition of those arrests; forbid agencies 
from disseminating the mere fact  of an arrest  without attempting to 
update it; and place strict limits on the dissemination of nonconviction 
data. The L E A A  rules are less stringent with respect to conviction data, 
which may be disseminated by the agency to anyone. 
LEAA regulations, while they restrict dissemination, do not require an 
agency to disseminate criminal history data to anyone; thus, state or local 
laws may impose greater restrictions on public access to the data. . 
10.3.3.1.2 State Statutes. As the result of the Privacy Act and the 
L E A A  regulations, a number of s ta tes  have enacted statutes restricting 
the use of criminal history data. Typical restrictions on the compilation, 
maintenance, and dissemination of these data might include: 
a e xpungement or "purging" ( remova l  from f i l e s  and 
records) of arrest  records after a given number of years 
or if the arrest was not followed by a conviction; 
9 seal ing (segregation from public records) of arrest  or 
conviction records after a given number of years; 
e prohibiting the use of conviction data as the basis for 
denying public emplovment or an occupational license, 
unless the crime related directly to the job or license 
sought; and 
9 es tabl ishing t ime  periods during which a r r e s t s  and 
dispositions must be r epo r t ed  t o  t he  s t a t e  agency 
maintaining the data. 
As stated earlier,  s ta tes  are  permitted under the L E A A  regulations to 
place greater restrictions on dissemination than those required by  L E A A  
regulations. 
Driving records, listing drivers' convictions of traffic-law offenses and 
involvement in traff ic crashes, normally are governed neither by the 
L E A A  regulations nor by s ta te  statutes regulating criminal history data: 
rather, these records usually are the subject of separate provisions found 
i n  s t a te  vehicle codes. Similarly, reports of traff ic crashes made by 
involved dr ivers  as well as by investigating police departments, are 
regulated by separate provisions. These s ta tu tes  typically allow public 
access to driving records and police officers1 crash reports, but not to 
drivers' crash reports. 
10.3.3.1.3 Summary.  Tra f f i c - l aw enforcement  generates large 
quantities of criminal history data, including public records of convictions, 
complete criminal histories of individuals, and official records that do not 
carry complete individual histories. Most privacy legislation is directed a t  
such individual histories as '?rap sheets," particularly arrest records, rather 
than public court records or such records as "police blotters.1f 
Privacy legislation limits both the authority of governmental bodies to 
disseminate criminal history data, and the rights of private individuals to 
gain access to such data. 
10.3.3.2 Legislative Restrictions Governing Other Personal Data. In 
the course of implementing countermeasure programs, records may be 
generated by s t a t e  driver-licensing authorities, rehabilitative agencies, 
hospitals and physicians. These records may con t a in  persona l  d a t a  
concerning drivers, and such data may be governed by general or specific 
privacy legislation of the type described earlier. 
10.3.3.3 P ro t ec t i ons  Against hlisuse of Personal Data. Privacy 
legislation usually contains two means of enforcing the rights of persons 
whose records a re  illegally collected, maintained, or disseminated. An 
individual who is injured by a violation frequently may bring a civil action 
against the offending agency or individual. Willful violators typically are 
subject to criminal penalties. In addition, most privacy s ta tu tes  establish 
p rocedures  by which individuals may review files concerning them, 
challenge alleged errors, and ensure t h a t  c o r r e c t e d  in format ion  is 
distributed to recipients of earlier, incorrect reports. 
10.4 Consequences of Privacy Challenges 
The consequences of successful privacy challenges to countermeasure 
programs depend on what aspect of the program is being attacked, and on 
what basis. 
If a countermeasure program itself is found unnecessarily to invade 
privacy, or to involve devices whose very functioning invades privacy, the 
e n t i r e  program could be dec la red  invalid by a court,  and criminal 
convictions obtained from such a program may likewise be invalidated. 
P r o g r a m s  employing devices  t h a t  do not  invade pr ivacy may 
nonetheless generate personal data that could be used in violation of the 
law. Criminal penalties provided by privacy s ta tu tes ,  and judgments 
resu l t ing  from civi l  pr ivacy su i t s ,  could i n c r e a s e  t h e  c o s t  of 
countermeasure implementation. Moreover, governmental agencies outside 
the criminal-justice svstem, as well as private parties participating in 
countermeasure programs, could face restricted access to personal records 
concerning drivers as the result of LEAA regulations and state statutes. 
Finally, programs involving the administration of medical or other 
treatment might be improperly conducted. Intrusive t r e a t m e n t  not  
consented to by subjects could provide the basis for especiallv damaging 
civil actions which, i f  successful, could greatly increase the cost  of 
implementing the treatment program. 
10.5 Resolving Privacy Constraints 
Most constraints based on privacy involve the implementation, rather 
than the design, of countermeasure programs. Therefore, a p lanner  
intending to implement such a program should take steps to ensure that 
procedures consistent with the law are  both known and ca r r i ed  ou t .  
Specific guidelines should be developed for all aspects of implementation, 
especially where the collection, dissemination, and use of personal data 
are likely to occur. 
Where a program itself is attacked on privacy grounds, the relationship 
of that  program to public interests in heal th  and s a f e t y  should be 
demonstrated. The appropriateness of particular practices to ensuring 
public health and safety also should be demonstrated. 
Programs that  are  likely to invade protected privacy interests i f  
imposed on the general driving public might successfully be implemented 
if they a re  limited i n  scope to  probationers and other persons possessing 
limited rights. In any event,  the subject 's proper consent should be 
ob t a ined  p r io r  t o  admin i s t e r i ng  any form of intrusive medical or 
psychiatric treatment. 
10.6 Summary and Conclusions 
Privacy protections are derived from three separate sources: the U.S. 
and s t a t e  constitutions; common law developed by s t a t e  c o u r t s ;  and 
s ta tu tes .  Constitutional protection of privacy, as it is now defined, is 
virtually inapplicable to highway-safety, except insofar as i t  prohibits the  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of involuntary and intrusive medical or psychological 
treatment. Common-law privacy protects against injuries to reputation or 
m e n t a l  well-being inflicted by other individuals or by governmental 
officials.  S t a tu to ry  p r o t e c t i o n  app l i e s  mainly  t o  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n ,  
maintenance, and dissemination of personal data by governmental agencies. 
The last of these is most relevant to countermeasure implementation. 
Highway crash countermeasures have so far encountered few challenges 
based solely on privacy. However, the administration of medical  or  
psychological t rea tment  and particularly the use of personal data in  the 
implementation of countermeasure programs, may generate privacy issues. 
C a r e f u l  a d h e r e n c e  t o  p r ivacy  l eg i s l a t i on  and the  development of 
appropriate guidelines for program implementation will reduce the impact 
of challenges based on privacy. 
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between s ta tu tory  privacy protection and the First Amendment is the 
subject of Cox Broadcas t ing  Corp.  v .  Cohn,  420 U.S. 469 (1975) 
[identifyins rape victim in newspaper story]. 
The Nature of Privacy Issues 
Common-Law Privacy Protection 
The four  categories of common-law protection were developed in 
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). Cases involving intrusion 
include: McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 
S.E.2d 810 (1939) [eavesdropping] ; Brex - v. Smith, 104 N . J .  Eq. 386, 146 
A.2d 34 ( ~ h .  1929) [prying into records and papers]; and Sutherland v. 
Kroger Co. ,  144 W.Va. 673,  110 S.E.2d 716 (1959) [ s e a r c h ] .  The  
requirement that  conduct be offensive to one of ordinary sensibilities is 
discussed in Horstman v. Newman, 291 S.FV.2d 567 (Ky .  19561, and the 
requirement that a place or activity be private is applied in Gill - v. 
Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal.2d 224,  253 P.2d 441 (1953) [appearance in 
public place]. Cases involving disclosure of private fac ts  include the 
following: Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 82, 127 P.2d 5 7 7  
(1942) [what constitutes a public disclosure] ; Melvin v. Reid, - U2 Cal. App. 
285, 2 9 7  P.2d 91 (1931) [publication of criminal conduct from person's 
distant past held to be "offensive to person of ordinary ~ensibilities~~l ; and 
Trammel1 v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941) [what 
constitutes a ''public disclosurelTl . Examples of false light publicity used 
in this section are taken from the-Prosser article cited above. 
Constitutional Privacy Protection 
The Griswold case is discussed in a number of commentaries, including: 
Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 6 4  MICH. L. REV. 219 
(1965); and Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter For An 
Expanded Law of Privacy, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197 (1965). 
The l im i t a t i on  of pr ivacy protect ion to  llfundamental rights" is 
illustrated by the following federal court decisions: United States v. 
Horslev, 519 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1975) [upholding statutes making possession 
or use of marijuana illegal] ; Prostrollo v. University of South Dakota, 507 
F.2d 7 7 5  (8th Cir. 19741, cert .  denied sub nom. Prostrollo v. Brown, 421 
U.S. 952 (1975) [upholding co l lege  dormi to ry  regula t ions]  ; Doe - v .  
Commonwealthls Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affirmed 
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976) [upholding s ta tu tes  prohibiting sodomy] ; and 
Morgan v.  City of Detroit, 389 F. Supp. 9 2 2  (E.D. Mich. 1975) [upholding 
statutes making prostitution unlawful] . 
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (19761, appears to have limited the privacy - -
protection of the U.S. Constitution to matters  relating to marr iage ,  
p rocrea t ion ,  con t r acep t i on ,  family relationships, child rearing, and 
educa t i on. 
Sta te  courts may, as a matter of their own law, enlarge protections of 
individual privacy rights beyond the minimum guarantees of the U.S. 
Cons t i tu t ion .  For example ,  s t a t e  cases  declaring prohibitions of 
'lvictimless crime" to be unconstitutional include the following: Ravin v. 
S t a t e ,  537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) [striking down s ta tu tes  prohibiting 
possession or use of marijuana, insofar as they apply to private use in the  
home] ; S t a t e  v. Pilcher, --- Iowa ---, 2 4 2  N.W.2d 348 (1976) [same, 
sodomy statutes]; and State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200,  381 A.2d 333 (1977) 
[same, fornication statutes]. 
Cases restricting, on privacy grounds, the administration of highly 
intrusive medical or psychological t rea tment  include t h e  following: 
Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733 (9 th  Cir. 1974); Aden v. Younger, 57 -
Cal. App. 3d 662,  129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1976); Superintendent of Belchertown 
S ta te  School v. Saikewicz, - Mass. -, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); and Price -
v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976). The "right to  dieu 
case, Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), upheld a chronic 
vegetative patient's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.  One should 
see also, People v. Privitera, 74 Cal. App. 3d 936, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764 
(1977), holding that because a patient's right to receive medical t rea tment  
and a physician's right to prescribe it are fundamental aspects of privacy, 
the state could not restrict access to and use of Laetrile. Embarrassing 
and intrusive invasions of institutionalized inmatesf privacy were restricted 
in Iowa Dept. of Social Services v. Iowa Merit Employment Dept., --- 
Iowa ---, 261 N.W.2d 171 (1977) [surveillance of inmatest intimate body 
functions by officials of opposite sex] ; and In re Long, 55 Cal. '4pp. 3d 
788, 127 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1976) [same]. 
Generally, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a "two-tierw test in 
privacy cases, which is similar t o  tha t  employed i n  subs t an t i ve  due 
process and equal protection cases. Several state courts have expressly 
rejected this test in favor of a "sliding scalett test .  Cases employing this 
l a t t e r  tes t  include: Ravin -v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975); Minnesota 
State Board of Health v. City of Brainerd, 308 Minn. 24, 241 N.W.2d 624 
(1976); and Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). 
Statutory Privacy Protection 
The 1903 New York pr ivacy s t a t u t e  was t he  earliest s tatutory 
protection of privacy. It currently exists, as  amended, as N.Y.  CIV. 
RIGHTS LAW § §  50,51 (McKinney 1976). Wiretap s ta tu tes  include 
provisions of Title 111 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968, as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. SS 2510-2520 (west  Supp. 19781, as well 
as comparable s t a t e  provisions. The Federal Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), 5 U.S.C.A. S 552 (1977), contains nine exemptions from disclosure. 
Exemptions under the FOIA are  discussed in Anderson, D.A., and Janes, 
B.C., eds. 1976. Privacy and public disclosures under the freedom of 
information act. pp. 15-16. Austin: University of Texas Law School. One 
should see generally, Rose v. Department of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261 ( 2 d  
Cir. 1974), - affTdsub. nom. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, - 425 U.S. 
352 (1976). Sta te  laws opening official records to  public inspec t ion  
include: MICH. COMP. LAWS A N N .  55 15.231 e t  seq. (Supp. 1978-79); 
N.Y. PUB. OFF, LAW SS 84 et seq. ( ~ c ~ i n n e y  Supp. 1978-79); and FLA. 
STAT. SS 119.01 e t  seq. (1978). Concern over widescale gathering of 
personal data and the development of computerized retrieval systems led 
to  passage of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.A. S 552a (West 1977). 
General privacy and confidentiality considerations are discussed in Trubow, 
G.B. 1978. Privacy and security of criminal history information: an 
analysis of privacy issues. Washington, D.C.: United Sta tes  Department 
of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Criminal 
Justice Information and Statistics Service; Miller, A.R. 1971. Assault on 
privacy: computers, data banks, and dossiers. Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press; and Project, Government Information and the Rights of 
Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971 (1975). 
The Federal Privacy Act of 1974 contained no provisions governing the 
compliation or dissemination of criminal history files. An amendment to 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets  Act of 1968 authorized the 
U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 
(LEAA), to regulate the use of certain criminal history record information 
systems. These regulations are  se t  out i n  28 C.F.R. S S  20.1 e t  seq. 
(1978). General background information on the Privacy Act, the Crime 
Control  Act amendments, and the LEAA regulations can be found i n  
Zimmerman, M.A; King, D.F; and OfNeil, M.E. 1976. How to  implement 
privacy and security. San Jose: Theorem Corporation. S ta te  privacy 
provisions include the Minnesota Data Privacy Act, MINN. STAT. A N N .  SS 
15.162 e t  seq. (West Supp. 19791, and the lilassachusetts act,  MASS. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 6 6 A  ( ~ i c h i e / ~ a w .  Co-Op 19781, ch. 214, S 1B (;l;lichie/Law. 
Co-Op. Supp. 1979). The Utah act, UTAH CODE ANN. S S  76-9-401 et seq. 
(Supp. 1978), imposes criminal penalties on those who violate the privacy 
of others. 
Typical s t a t e  s ta tu tes  making certain classes of records confidential 
include: CAL. GOVT. CODE S 6254(c) (West Supp. 1978) [health records] ; 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 5 17006 (west 1972) [welfare case records]; 
FLA. STAT. S 63.162 (Supp. 1977) [adoption proceedings] ; MICH.  COMP. 
LAWS A N N .  S 257.733 (1977) [ t rzf f ic  crash reports]; OR. REV. STAT. S 
432.120 (1977) [birth certificates] ; OR. REV. STAT. §S 336.195, 341.290(19), 
and 3 51.06 5 (1977) [scholastic records] ; and VA. CODE. SS 16.1-301, 16.1-302 
(Supp. 1978) [juvenile proceedings] . With respect to  t raf f ic  records one 
should see  also, the Beacon-Journal, Lord, - and Donelson cases cited below. 
A comprehensive and fairly recent compilation of s t a t e  privacy s ta tu tes  
appears in Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 
MICH. L. REV. 971 (1975). 
Application of Privacy Rights to Highway Safety Issues 
The leading case in which the concept of "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" is discussed in Katz - v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The 
so-called "beeper cases," applying this concept t o  the remote electronic 
surveillance of automobiles, include United Sta tes  v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 
1322 (8th Cir. 1976) and United States v. Holmes, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 
1976). The "beeper casesT1 a re  also discussed with respect to the law of 
search and seizure in Section 8.2 of this volume and accompanying  
bibliographic materials. Surveillance programs were challenged in - Laird v. 
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), and Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 
(1970); however, challenges in both cases were rejected by the courts as 
"premature.!' The wiretap provisions of Tit le  IV of the  Omnibus Crime 
Con t ro l  and S a f e  S t r e e t s  Act of 1968 were  held not  to  apply t o  
photographic surveillance; in this regard -9 see  Sponick v ,  City of Detroit 
Police Department, 49 Mich. App. 162, 211 N.W.2d 674 (1973). General 
discussion of surveillance can be found in Belair and Bock, Police Use of 
R e m o t e  C a m e r a  S y s t e m s  f o r  S u r v e i l l a n c e  of Pub l i c  S t ree ts ,  4 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 143 (1972), a n d  W e s t i n ,  S c i e n c e ,  P r i v a c y ,  a n d  
F r e e d o m :  I s sues  a n d  P r o p o s a l s  f o r  t h e  1970Ts, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003 
(1966) .  
C a s e s  a l l o w i n g  i n t r u s i o n  of t h e  body include t h e  following: Schmerber  
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) [blood test1 ; Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 
( 1 9 2 7 )  [ s t e r i l i z a t i o n ]  ; J a c o b s o n  v. M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,  197 U.S. 11 (1905) 
[vaccination] ; and Minnesota S t a t e  B o a r d  of H e a l t h  v. C i t y  of B r a i n e r d ,  
308 Minn. 24, 241 N.W.2d 624 (1976) [flouridation of wa te r  supply].  
I n v o l u n t a r y  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  i n t r u s i v e  m e d i c a l  o r  p h y c h o l o g i c a l  
t r e a t m e n t  w a s  h e l d  t o  v i o l a t e  pr ivacy  in t h e  following cases: Runnels v. 
Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733 (9 th  C i r .  1974); M a c k e y  v. P r o c u n i e r ,  477 F.2d 
877  ( 9 t h  C i r .  1973); a n d  B e l l  -v ,  Wayne  C o u n t y  Genera l  Hospital, 384 F. 
Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974). In this  regard  one  should s e e  also: - S c o t t  v. 
P l a n t e ,  532  F.2d 939 ( 3 d  C i r .  1976); a n d  M e r r i k e n  v. Cressman,  364 F. 
Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973) [behavior-modification program] . 
Collection, Maintenance, and Dissemination of Personal  Da ta  
As c i t ed  above, an  amendment  t o  t h e  Omnibus Cr ime  Cont ro l  a n d  S a f e  
S t r e e t s  A c t  of  1968 d i r e c t e d  LEAA t o  e n a c t  regulat ions concerning t h e  
p r i v a c y  a n d  s e c u r i t y  of  c r i m i n a l  h i s t o r y  d a t a .  T h e s e  r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  
c o n t a i n e d  i n  28 C.F.R. S S  20.1 e t  seq. (1978). Classes of d a t a  exempted  
from t h e  LEAA p r i v a c y  p rov i s ions  a r e  s e t  o u t  i n  28 C.F.R. S 20.20(b)  
(1978). Fo l lowing  e n a c t m e n t  of t h e  LEAA regulations a number of s t a t e s  
h a v e  p a s s e d  l e g i s l a t i o n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  c r i m i n a l  h i s t o r y  r e c o r d s .  T h e s e  
s t a t u t e s  i nc lude :  CAL.  PENAL CODE SS 13100 et seq, (West Supp. 1979); 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, SS 157-78 (Michie/Law. C o - o p  Supp.  1979); a n d  
MINN. STAT. ANN. SS 15.165 e t  seq. (West Supp. 1979). 
Cour t  decisions dealing with t h e  use of a r r e s t  r e c o r d s  of u n c o n v i c t e d  
p e r s o n s  i nc lude :  D o e  - v. C o m m a n d e r ,  W h e a t o n  P o l i c e  Depar tment ,  273 
Md. 262, 329 A.2d 35 (1974); and  Eddy v. Moore ,  5 Wash.  App. 334 ,  487  
P.2d 211 (1971). In - Loder v. hlunicipal Cour t ,  17 Cal.3d 859, 553 P.2d 624, 
132 Cal. Rpt r .  4 6 4  (19761, t h e  c o u r t  i n  e f f e c t  he ld  t h a t  s ta te  s t a t u t e s  
r e g u l a t i n g  t h e  use  of a r r e s t  information provided suff icient  pro tec t ion  and 
therefore judicial protections were unnecessary. 
One case recognizing that  public policy may dic ta te  that  r e co rds  
labeled ffpublicf' be kept anonymous is Glow -v. State, 319 So.2d 47 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1975) [interpreting the Florida public record statute]. 
UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE $ 5  10-107(e), 10-112(a) (Supp. I1 1976) 
contemplates two kinds of t raf f ic  crash reports: one submitted by the 
involved driver or vehicle owner; the other by the investigating police 
agency. Under the UVC approach, the former class of reports a re  kept 
confidential while the l a t t e r  a re  open to public inspection. !Yhile many 
states follow this approach, some statutes declare all  such reports to  be 
confidential; - see, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. S 32-1213 (Cum. Supp. 
1977). 
Public access to traffic records was dealt with in the following cases: 
Lord v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 347 Mass. 608, 199 N.E.2d 316 (1964) -
[ p e r m i t t i n g  a c c e s s  t o  t r a f f i c  c r a sh  r e p o r t ] ;  and S t a t e  ex  re l .  
Beacon-Journal Publishing Co. v. Andrews, 48 Ohio St. 2d 283, 358 N.E.2d 
565 (1976) [permitting access to records of violation points in excess of 
statutory limits]; State ex rel. Collin v .  Donelson, 557 S.U7.2d 7 0 7  (Mo. 
1977), [denying access to traffic crash report]. 
Consequences of Privacy Chellenges 
Statutory penalties are  provided for violations of privacy legislation, 
and those provided by the  federal  s ta tu tes  a re  typical: 5 U.S.C.A. 5 
552(a)(i) (West 1977) [willful violation of the Federal Privacy Act made a 
misdemeanor]; and 5 U.S.C.A. S 552a(g) (West 1977) [providing c ivi l  
remedy for invasions of privacy]. Other statutory penalty provisions 
include: CAL. PENAL CODE SS 13302, 13303 (West Supp. 1978) [criminal 
penalties for knowingly furnishing data to unauthorized persons] ; MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 6 ,  S 178 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1979) [authorizing 
victims of privacy violations to bring civil actions] ; MINN. STAT. ANN.  
SS 15.166, 15.167 (West Supp. 1979) [providing civil penalties for violations, 
and criminal penalties for willful violations]; and N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW 
5 50 (McKinney 1976) [violation of state's right-to-privacy s ta tu te  made a 
misdemeanor] . 
11.0 COUNTERMEASURE IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH 
THE SANCTIONING PROCESS: 
DEFENDANTS AVAILABLE FOR SANCTIONING 
This sec t ion  examines  t he  implementa t ion  of h ighway  c r a s h  
counte rmeasures  on a selected group of drivers, namely defendants 
available for sanctioning. As used here, the term "defendant available for 
sanctioning1' (DAS) means a driver who has been convicted of-or at least 
charged with-a traffic offense. The DAS is most commonly a convicted 
t ra f  fic-law offender who has been placed on probation; however, an 
increasing number of drivers have become DASs as the result of pretrial 
diversion and earned charge reduction programs. In addition, some drivers 
have in effect become DASs as the result of driving restrictions imposed 
by administrative (driver-licensing) agencies. Every D,4S is subject to 
some restrictions on his liberty; therefore, the law-based constraints 
described i n  Section 6.0 through 10.0 have less constraining force with 
respect to countermeasures directed at  this group of individuals than they 
would with respect to the general driving public. 
11.1 Introduction 
In a criminal proceeding, sanctions are normally imposed on convicted 
offenders at  the time of sentencing; these include fines, incarceration, or 
both. Other sanctions--including restrictions on personal liberty-may be 
imposed in lieu of fine or incarceration; this is a routine practice i n  the 
criminal justice system (CJS).  Sentencing is not the only point in the 
modern criminal process a t  which a person's liberty may be restricted; 
pretrial and even precharging procedures have been developed which also 
could result in the imposition of restrictions on drivers. 
11.1.1 Sanctioning and Countermeasure Implementation. The imposition 
of restrictions on liberty can occur at  any of a number of stages of the 
criminal process. The usual stage is a t  sentencing; there, restrictions 
may be imposed as  t e rms  of probation under which a  convicted offender 
is permitted to remain in the community rather than suffer incarcera t ion ,  
provided he obeys ce r t a in  conditions. A convicted offender sentenced to 
prison for committing a  serious c r ime may be paroled, t h a t  is, re leased  
before  the  end of his te rm provided he abides by the conditions of his 
release.  However, t he  imposition of long prison t e rms  on of t r a f f i c  
o f f e n d e r s  i s  e x c e e d i n g l y  r a re  and therefore  parole  would rarely--if 
ever-be used as a  means of highway crash countermeasure implementation. 
C o u n t e r m e a s u r e  imp lemen ta t ion  may t ake  place through p re t r i a l  
diversion schemes. Under these programs, a  judge or prosecuting a t to rney  
may promise t o  dismiss a  charge, or substitute a  less serious one (such as 
reckless driving in l ieu of driving while in toxica ted  ! D W I ~ ) ,  aga ins t  a  
suspected t r a f f i c  offender  in exchange for his promise to refrain from 
ce r t a in  dangerous driving conduct  or t o  t ake  a c t i o n  t o  i m p r o v e  his  
d r iv ing .  Dismissals or reduct ions of charges of ten t imes  resul t  from 
earned  charge  reduct ion ( E C R )  procedures  involving t h e  e x e r c i s e  of 
discret ionary powers by judges and prosecutors. A number of states have, 
in the case of DWI prosecutions, established formal  procedures  by  which 
dr ivers  can  earn  dismissals of charges,  or avoid loss of the i r  driving 
privileges, by participating in rehabi l i ta t ive  programs. Thus t h e  driver 
m a y ,  a s  p a r t  of t h e  a g r e e m e n t ,  be  a s s i g n e d  t o  a  h ighway  crash  
countermeasure program. 
Sanctioning of the  t r a f f i c  offender  also may take place through the 
administrative (driver-licensing) sys tem.  A ser ious or  habi tual  t r a f f i c  
offender  may, as  an alternative to license suspension or revocation, agree 
to  r e s t r i c t  his driving and pa r t i c ipa t e  in a  c o u n t e r m e a s u r e  p r o g r a m  
designed to improve his driving behavior. 
11.1.2 Countermeasure Implementation and the Defendant Available for 
Sanctioning (DAS). The DAS population is a  more appropriate group for 
the imposition of highway crash countermeasures than the  general  driving 
public. F i r s t ,  because the  DAS has l imited constitutional rights, fewer 
l aw-based  c o n s t r a i n t s  wil l  be  e n c o u n t e r e d  i n  i m p l e m e n t i n g  of 
c o u n t e r m e a s u r e  programs d i rec ted  a t  this  group of drivers.  Second, 
i d e n t i f i e d  t r a f f i c  o f f e n d e r s  a r e  m o r e  appropr ia te  t a r g e t s  of 
coun te rmeasure  programs than  the  d r i v i n g  p u b l i c  a s  a who le .  
Experimental or innovative programs designed to improve driving can be 
imposed on t r a f f i c  o f fenders ;  should they  prove i n e f f e c t i v e ,  t h e  
expenditure of time and money on such programs will have been limited. 
11.2 Description of Principal Sanctioning Processes 
This section examines the three principal sanctioning processes through 
which highway crash countermeasure programs might be implemented. 
These are pretrial diversion, probation, and ECR.  Each process is first 
described, following which the requirements governing the manner in 
which sanctions may be imposed are discussed. 
11.2.1 Pretrial Diversion. Pretrial diversion is a sanctioning process 
t h a t  avoids a c r imina l  t r ia l .  It generally involves an exchange of 
promises between the prosecuting a t t o r n e y  and t he  accused:  t he  
prosecutor promises to  dismiss criminal charges; the accused, in return, 
promises to take some action to rehabilitate himself, for example, by 
seeking medical or psychological treatment, or avoiding alcohol or drugs. 
Several features are shared by the various pretrial diversion programs. 
First,  selection of individuals for diversion is a discretionary function 
exercised by the prosecutor, by the judge, or by both. Second, diversion 
requires the consent of the accused. Third, should the accused fail to 
observe the conditions of his diversion, the suspended criminal proceedings 
are reinstated. 
Pretrial diversion is distinguishable from the somewhat related concept 
of pretrial release. Under a pretrial release program, an accused may 
agree to the imposition of certain restrictions in  his behavior, in lieu of 
money bail, in exchange for his release from jail prior to trial. Pretrial 
release does not result in the dismissal of criminal charges, and conditions 
are imposed by the court rather than the prosecutor. 
Pretrial diversion, due to its relative novelty, has been the subject of 
few reported cases and very limited statutorv law. Several issues have, 
however, been suggested which could provide the basis for challenge to 
diversion or pretr ial  release schemes. These include the authority to 
d i v e r t ,  t h e  r i gh t  t o  a speedy  t r i a l ,  t h e  p rocedura l  due p r o c e s s  
requirement, and the equal protection guarantee. 
11.2.1.1 The Authority to Divert. A prosecutor, as mentioned before, 
is permitted to exercise discretion with respect to charging: he mav 
choose to bring charges against some suspected offenders but decline to 
charge others. Such discretion is permissible provided it is not abused, 
such as by irrationally or vindictively singling out suspects, or by using 
race,  sex, or religion as the criterion of whether to charge. So long as 
diversion is conducted under some s t a n d a r d s  reasonab ly  r e l a t e d  t o  
rehabilitation, it is a permissible aspect of prosecutorial discretion. 
Under common law, a prosecutor loses control over a criminal case 
once the accused had formally been placed under the court's jurisdiction. 
After that point, the prosecutor could not dismiss charges ( terminate  the 
proceedings) without the court's approval. In a number of states, statutes 
permit prosecutors to dismiss or amend charges, even while the case is 
before the court. Even where a prosecutor lacks the power to dismiss 
charges, judges frequently approve prosecutorsf decisions to do so; i n  these 
cases, however, a sort of working agreement between the court and the 
prosecutorfs office is necessary. 
In several s t a tes  where pretrial-diversion programs are established by 
s t a tu te ,  conflicts have arisen concerning t he  powers  of judges and 
prosecutors. For example, courts  have considered whether prosecutors 
may exclude classes of offenders (for example, persons charged with DWI 
or with marijuana possession) and they have reached opposite conclusions. 
This issue of prosecutorial "veto power" over judges is likely to arise i n  
other states where pretrial diversion is practiced. 
11.2.1.2 The Right to a Speedy Trial. Pretr ial  diversion schemes  
involve holding criminal proceedings i n  abeyance, possibly for many 
months. Extended delay between arrest  and tr ial  may violate the Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy trial. Whether the right to a speedy trial 
has been denied these depends on the  fac t s  and circumstances of the 
particular case and involves a balancing of several factors set out by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
The right to a speedy trial,  as is the case with other constitutional 
guarantees, may be waived by the accused. Because pretrial diversion is 
an exchange of promises, the accused's agreement to be diverted normally 
will suffice as a waiver provided he entered the  diversion program 
voluntarily, that is, without coercion, and knowingly, that is, with full 
knowledge of both the terms of his diversion agreement and the effect  of 
his participation in the program. 
11.2.1.3 Procedural Due Process. Diversion of an accused is part of 
the criminal trial process but not a "critical stageff of the process to  
which the full range of criminal trial protections applies. However, the 
liberty and property interests  a t  s take would call some procedural due 
process protection into play, 
Resumption of a deferred criminal prosecution, because it also presents 
threats to liberty and property rights, likely would be governed by some 
procedural due process protections. It remains an open question which of 
the specific protections se t  out  below would be required prior  t o  
resumption of a deferred prosecution. 
11.2.2 Probation. Probation is a sanctioning process by which a 
convicted offender is granted conditional liberty in lieu of incarceration. 
Probat ion is normally g ran ted  i n  connection with the suspended 
imposition or execution of a jail sentence; should the offender violate the 
condi t ions  of his r e l e a se  he faces a t  least the possibility of being 
incarcerated under the original sentence. All probation schemes have in 
common the following general characteristics: 
0 release in  lieu of incarceration; 
observance of conditions imposed by the court; and 
0 supervision by the probation agency (although there exists 
"unsupervised probationff for those convicted of minor 
offenses). 
Probat ion,  l ike diversion, requires the consent of the offender, and 
probation conditions cannot  be imposed on a person unwilling to accept 
than. 
If execut ion of the sentence was suspended, then violation of probation 
conditions is punishable by reinstatement of the original jail sen tence .  If 
the  imposition of s en tence  was suspended, then a subs t i t u t e  sentence 
could be imposed in place of the revoked probation. Where t h e  probation 
violation is deemed t o  be minor, the court may choose to reprimand the 
probationer, or impose addi t ional  probation te rms ,  r a t h e r  than  revoke 
probation and sentence him to jail. 
Several  a r eas  have been ident i f ied in which the  implementation of 
probation might be challenged. These include the  au thor i ty  t o  g ran t  and 
r e v o k e  p r o b a t i o n ,  the leg i t imacy of plea ag reemen t s  leading t o  t he  
imposition of probation, t he  requi rement  t h a t  probation conditions be 
r e a s o n a b l e ,  t h e  p r o c e d u r a l  due process  requi rement ,  and the  equal  
protection guarantee. 
11.2.2.1 Author i ty  t o  Grant  Probation. Authori ty  t o  suspend the  
imposition or  execut ion of s en tences  and grant  probation is given t o  
cour t s  by s t a t u t e s ,  which allow courts to exercise rather broad authority 
concerning who may be granted  probation and what t e rms  of probation 
may be  imposed .  There is no r ight  of an offender  to  be placed on 
probation, and statutes commonly forbid courts to place cer tain ser ious or 
habitual offenders on probation. 
Authori ty  t o  revoke probation is also governed by statute; here courts 
also have broad discretion, and they usually may revoke probation under a 
genera l  s tandard  of "good cause," such a s  commit t ing  a new crime or 
failing to abide by conditions. Both the initial grant of probation and t h e  
probation revocat ion process a r e  governed by the procedural due process 
requirements discussed below. 
11.2.2.2 The Legi t imacy of Plea Agreements. Plea agreements, like 
pretrial diversions, involve exchanges of promises: t h e  accused agrees  t o  
plead guilty t o  one or more charges; in return, the prosecutor agrees to 
dismiss a charge! or substitute a less serious one. Plea ag reemen t s  m a v  
be made a t  any s t a g e  of the  c r imina l  process  prior  to a formal 
determination of guilt. An integral part of many plea agreements is the 
recommendation made by the prosecutor to the sentencing judge that the 
defendant be placed on probation. Flowever, such a recommendation is not 
binding on the judge, who can refuse to follow it. This is because the 
sentencing power is exclusively vested in the judiciary. 
There exist two means by which a convicted offender might challenge 
the punishment he had received as a consequence of his guilty plea and 
sentencing on the plea. First,  i t  may be argued that the defendant did 
not "voluntarily and intelligently" offer a guilty plea, By pleading guilty, 
one waives certain important rights-such as jury trial and confrontation 
of witnesses--with respect to a c r imina l  t r i a l .  A waiver of such 
important rights, like a waiver of the right to a speedy trial discussed 
earlier, is invalid unless i t  is voluntary (not induced by harrassrnent or 
threats) and intelligent (made with an understanding of the terms and 
consequences of the plea). A second means of attacking a guilty plea 
may arise when a prosecutor makes certain promises to the accused in 
return for a guilty plea, then fails to fulfill them.  A prosecut ing 
attorney may be held to his promises concerning the charges he brings 
and the sentencing recommendations he makes; he cannot, however, be 
held responsible for the judgers refusal to honor his recommendations. 
11.2.2.3 Reasonableness of Probation Conditions. As a general rule 
judges are  granted wide discretion over the type of probation conditions 
they may impose. However,  probat ion c o n d i t i o n s  may n o t  be  
unreasonable; such conditions will be declared void. There exist four 
classes of unreasonable probation conditions: 
e condit ions not i n  accordance  with the intent of the 
probation statute; 
a conditions not reasonably related either to the offender's 
past or future criminality or to his rehabilitation; 
conditions that are illegal or impossible to carry out; and 
conditions that unduly restrict personal liberty. 
The l as t  of these grounds includes the specific constraints discussed 
individually in Sect ion 11.4. Probation conditions that might fall into one 
or more classes of unreasonable sanctions include: prohibiting a convicted 
robber from becoming pregnant  while unmarried; compelling a convicted 
draft resister to donate blood; and prohibiting a convicted burglar from 
playing col lege or professional basketball without the court's permission. 
On the  o ther  hand, the  following conditions were upheld: ordering a 
convicted bookmaker not  t o  have a telephone in his residence; forbidding 
a person convicted of fortunetelling and abetting prostitution from having 
visitors in her home a f t e r  dark; and forbidding a person convicted of 
assault and battery during a campus demonstration to ac t ive ly  pa r t i c ipa t e  -- 
in fu tu re  demonstrations. Conditions requiring traffic offenders to refrain 
from driving have been upheld as reasonable, as were conditions requiring 
persons  convicted of alcohol-related offenses to  abstain from liquor. 
There is no universal agreement a s  t o  what spec i f ic  sanc t ions  might be 
unreasonable; s tandards  of reasonableness a r e  applied differently from 
state  to s ta te  as well as from offender to  offender. 
11.2.2.4 Procedural  Due Process. The granting of probation occurs as 
part of the sentencing process and therefore is a "cr i t ica l  s tage"  of t he  
cr iminal  proceeding to  which the  full range of procedural  due process 
protections applies. Revocation of probation, on the  o ther  hand, occurs  
a f t e r  cr iminal  proceedings a r e  concluded, and therefore the procedural 
requirements of the criminal trial do not apply. However, a number of 
procedural requirements do apply to revocation proceedings as a matter of 
due process. These procedures, discussed more fully in t he  due process 
materials of this volume, include: 
written notice of the claimed violation; 
0 the opportunity t o  appear, speak, and present evidence in 
one's own behalf; 
the right to confront adverse witnesses; 
0 a neutral hearing officer or body of officers; and 
a w r i t t e n  s t a t e m e n t  by t h e  f a c t f i n d e r s  concern ing  
evidence relied upon and the reasons for their decision. 
11.2.2.5 Equal Protection. Because probation is both granted and 
revoked on a case-by-case basis, uniform treatment of probationers is 
impossible. With respect to probation revocation, differential treatment 
does not violate the equal protection guarantee provided racial, religious 
or other such groups are not singled out and treated differently from 
other classes of offenders. 
11.2.3 Earned Charge Reduction (ECR). In  addition to pretrial 
diversion and probation, a number of other sanctioning processes have 
been developed by courts. They vary widely from one another because 
they have been adapted to the statutes and court rules of each s ta te .  
These programs, referred to here by the general term "earned charge 
reductionft (ECIE) programs, are largely ftinformalff; that is, they result 
from the exercise of courtst general discretionary powers rather than 
specific statutes setting up specific procedures. ECR programs actually 
carry a wide variety of labels; however, all of them are similar in their 
intent and purpose, namely to enable offenders t o  avoid mandatory 
sanctions (jail and loss of driving privileges) by participating in some 
rehabilitative program. ECR differs from pretrial diversion because it 
normally occurs  af ter  the case has reached the court, and for that 
reason, i t  usually requires cooperation among judge, prosecutor, and 
defendant. These programs also differ from probation because an ECR 
participant is not legally "on probationff and is therefore not entitled to 
the procedural safeguards--such as a revocation hearing-that apply to 
probationers. One way in which a court might implement ECR is to take 
"under advisement" a driver's plea of guilty to the original charge (usually 
DwI); once the convicted driver completes a rehabilitation program, the 
original charge is dismissed (or reduced to a charge that does not carry 
mandatory sanctions). Another ECR scheme involves securing the driver's 
agreement to participate in a rehabilitation program in exchange for the 
opportunity to plead guilty to a less serious offense;  i f  the  driver 
completes the program the original charge against him is reduced and he 
avoids mandatory sanctions. 
ECR programs commonly arise out of guilty pleas and for that reason 
t h e  law-based requirements for guilty pleas will apply. In addition, 
offenders may not be assigned to ECR program on the basis of race,  
religion, or sex. 
11.2.4 Administrative Sanctions. Restrictions on driving after drinking 
or on driving per se might be imposed by the driver licensing authority as 
a condition of retaining one's driving privilege in cases where license 
revocation or suspension is a possible sanction. In  some s t a t e s ,  t h e  
l icensing au tho r i t y  is given power to impose driving restrictions in 
connection with granting a "hardship" or ffrestr ictedff  license. In most 
other states, however, driving restrictions are imposed by courts-either as 
probation conditions or under special hardship-licensing statutes. 
In those s ta tes  where the licensing authority has power to  impose 
driving restrictions in connection with granting a restr icted license, i ts  
exe r c i s e  of t ha t  power is bound by statutory constraints as well as 
general due process requirements. Sanctions must be reasonable and 
imposed in accordance with the statutory requirements, procedural due 
process must be afforded, and the equal protection guarantee must be 
observed. Where the enforcement of restrictions is accompanied by the 
placement of mechanical devices on a vehicle, the licensing authoritv's 
power to require such devices also may be subject to  s t a te  s ta tu tes  
regulating vehicle equipment. 
11.3 Authority for Limiting the Rights of the DAS 
The most significant distinction between the DAS and the unsanctioned 
individual is that the former possesses limited constitutional rights. This 
factor may permit the implementation of certain countermeasure devices 
that would not otherwise be constitutionallv permissible. 
Several legal theories have been recognized which justify limiting the 
rights of probationers. The rights of divertees and ECR participants are 
also limited, but a formal legal justification for limiting those rights has 
n o t  b e e n  ful ly  developed.  This s ec t i on  genera l ly  explores  t he  
justifications for limiting the rights of all DAS classes. 
11.3.1 Limited Rights of Probat ioners .  At l e a s t  t h r ee  l ega l  
justifications have been recognized for  l imi t ing the  probat ioner ' s  
cons t i tu t iona l  r ights .  F i r s t ,  i n  many s t a t e s  probation has been 
characterized as an llact of grace;lf under this reasoning any constitutional 
"rights1' i n  connection with probation status are granted at  the state's 
sufferance and not as an entitlement. Second, some s t a t e s  regard  
probation as a contract under which the probationer bargains away some 
or all of his rights in exchange for not being incarcerated. Third, still  
other s ta tes  consider the probationer still  to be in the state's custody; 
and therefore, any assertion of his rights against the state 's  interest is 
meaningless.  Another theory ,  t h a t  of " l imi ted rights," is gaining 
recognition within the CJS. This theory considers the probationer to have 
all rights enjoyed by other persons, except those that must be infringed 
to ensure the effectiveness of probation program. 
11.3.2 Limited Rights of P r e t r i a l  Divertees and ECR Program 
Participants. A person accused but not convicted of a criminal offense is 
considered innocent and in theory retains all rights enjoyed by other 
persons. As a practical matter,  an accused who is diverted submits to 
certain limitations of his rights as the condition of avoiding prosecution, 
and this apparently precludes any challenge by the divertee to restrictions 
on his liberty. Participants i n  ECR programs generally have already 
admitted their guilt of an offense; moreover, they have freely chosen to 
participate in the rehabilitation program. Thus an ECR participant cannot 
successfully challenge restrictions placed on this liberty. 
11.4 Specific Constraints on Countermeasure Implementation on the DAS 
Population 
This sec t ion  discusses the  e x t e n t  to  which speci f ic  law-based 
constraints may affect the implementation of countermeasure programs 
using the DAS population as a target  group. These constraints include: 
the substantive due process requ i rement ;  t h e  r ight  t o  t r ave l ;  t he  
prohibit ion against unreasonable searches and seizures; the privilege 
against se l f - incr iminat ion;  and privacy r ights .  -411 of these  a r e  
specifically t rea ted elsew here in this volume. Other constraints include 
the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, and the First Amendment 
freedoms of speech, worship, and association. These are  discussed i n  
order. 
11.4.1 Substantive Due Process. Pretr ial  diversion, probation, and 
administrative sanctioning all res t r ic t  the l ibe r ty  of t h e  DAS. The 
subs t an t i ve  due process requirement does not prohibit governmental 
restrictions of individual liberty, but  only forbids  unreasonab le  or 
unnecessary  r e s t r i c t i ons .  The implementa t ion  of highway crash 
countermeasure programs raises two issues associated with substantive due 
process: police practices that tlshock the conscience"; and the imposition 
of unreasonable sanctions. In  the case of Rochin v. California,  t h e  
fo rc ib le  pumping of an individual ' s  stomach to obtain evidence of 
narcotics use was held to violate due process on the grounds that  such a 
p r a c t i c e  was lfshocking to the c o n ~ c i e n c e ' ~  and offended widely held 
concepts of decency and justice. Cases decided sf t er Rochin emphasized 
that  only those police practices involving coercion, brutality, or violence 
would be declared unconstitutional, and moreover, that not every intrusion 
of the  human body would violate due process. Most contemplated 
countermeasure programs involve, a t  most ,  only minor physical  or  
psychological intrusion; therefore, the Rochin standard to these programs 
would hold them constitutional. 
Substantive due process also prohibits courts or administrative bodies 
from imposing unreasonable sanctions. These include the four classes of 
unreasonable probation conditions discussed earlier. 
11.4.2 The Right to Travel. The "right to travelT1 has g~tined explicit 
r ecogni t ion  as a bas ic  r igh t  of citizenship guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution. Travel is not an absolute right, and restrictions on personal 
mobility may be justified i f  they serve some important state purpose. 
Sanctioning programs, especially probation, could restr ict  the mobility of 
the DAS, either by  requiring that permission be obtained before traveling 
out of the court's jurisdiction, or by restricting the DAS1 right to operate 
motor vehicles. Challenges to these restrictions on travel have been 
rejected; the reasoning of the courts has been that  such restrictions are  
reasonable :  moreover, effective supervision of probation and other 
conditional-release programs would be unreasonably d i f f i cu l t  unless 
restrictions were imposed. 
In addi t ion,  the  l imi ted  r ight  to  drive (often referred to as a 
"privilegeff) is distinguishable from the constitutional right to travel. One 
who is forbidden to drive retains access to other forms of transportation, 
including public transportation and private vehicles owned by others. For 
that reason, as well as the relationship between driving restrictions and 
committing traffic-law violations, a DAS convicted of traff ic offenses 
validly may be placed under driving restrictions. 
The right to travel has not been the only grounds on which restrictions 
of mobility have been chal lenged.  Other  attacks--most of them 
unsuccessful-have also alleged unreasonableness, abuse of discretion, and 
cruel and unusual punishment. 
11.4.3 The Prohibition Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures. 
The Fourth Amendment neither prohibits sea rches  and se izures  nor 
requires a warrant in every case. It requires that searches or seizures be 
flreasonable71; i n  general, the chief element of reasonableness is the  
existence of sufficient cause. There is no single standard of sufficient 
cause: rather, the more intrusive a search or seizure becomes, t he  
stronger a showing of cause is needed; conversely, the more necessary 
searches are to a supervision scheme, the less cause is required before a 
DAS may be searched or detained. 
With respect t o  searches or seizures of a DAS, a mere hunch by a 
police or probation officer could meet the cause requirement. Some 
courts go even further and eliminate the cause requirement entirely, 
reasoning that a DAS has by  accepting conditional release waived or 
bargained away his Fourth Amendment rights. 
Fourth Amendment protection of the probationer is limited i n  another 
significant respect. The lffruitsff of an illegal search may be used against 
the DAS i n  certain proceedings, such as sen tenc ing  and probat ion 
revocation. Illegally seized evidence is not excluded from evidence-as it 
is in criminal trials-for two reasons: probation revocation hearings and 
similar proceedings are  not considered ffadversaryf! criminal proceedings; 
and exclusion of evidence frustrates the  operation of probation schemes 
by allowing individuals who are dangerous to the public to remain at  large. 
11.4.4 The Privileqe Against Self-Incrimination (PASI). One of the 
commonest features of any probation scheme is the requirement that the 
DAS report his activities to his probation officer, even when such a 
r epo r t  would con ta in  inc r imina t ing  in format ion .  While the Fifth 
Amendment PASI forbids the government from compelling unsanctioned 
individuals to furnish testimony that could result in  their being prosecuted 
for a crime, several justifications exist for infringing the PASI of the DAS. 
Grace, contract ,  or waiver theories all assume that the DAS enjoys no 
Fifth Amendment PAS1 because he never possessed i t  in the f irst  place, 
contracted i t  away in exchange for his release, or waived it by accepting 
probation status. A minority of courts have found the DAS to have a 
limited PASI, a t  least with respect to criminal activity unconnected with 
the offense that  gave rise to  DAS status.  However, the  r e su l t  of a 
limited-right approach is much the same: the probationer still must report 
his activities--including violations of probation terms--to appropriate 
authorities. 
The PASI, whether possesed by a DAS or the unsanctioned person, will 
not apply to compulsion of "nontestimonial!' evidence, such as mandatory 
t e s t i ng  t o  detect  the presence of narcotics i n  the bloodstream of s 
convicted drug offender. Nor does the PASI apply to civil proceedings 
such as license-revocation hearings, if the testimony heard there cannot 
be used in later criminal actions. Therefore the PASI has comparatively 
l i t t le  impact on the various highway crash countermeasures currently 
under consideration. 
11.4.5 Privacy Rights. The privacy of the DAS is by necessity limited 
because of the need to supervise his probation or divertee status.  Such 
programs could not e f f e c t i v e l y  o p e r a t e  wi thout  some deg ree  of 
survei l lance  over ,  and control of, the personal affairs of the DAS. 
Collection and gathering of the DASf personal data and surveillance of his 
conduct are invasions of privacy which are considered permissible because 
of their necessity. Nevertheless, supervision schemes might result in the 
generation of personal data,  the use of which is governed by privacy 
legislation. This, however, is not unique to the proposed counter measures, 
nor is it unique to the DAS population. 
On the other hand, privacy considerations apply with full force where 
a DAS is faced with highly intrusive physical or psychological treatment. 
These intrusions must be justified by an important governmental interest 
and even where justifiable may not be any greater  than necessary to 
further that interest. Informed consent, requiring the disclosure of any 
risks to the DAS and obtaining his permission to participate, may be 
required in some instances. Some intrusions may be so violent and so 
unrelated to the goals of sanctioning that they may constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment, The countermeasure programs now being considered do 
not involve highly intrusive treatment;  thus they likely will not violate 
D ASf privacy rights. 
11.4.6 Cruel and Unusual Punishment. The Eighth Amendment, in 
addition to prohibiting excessive bail, also forbids the imposition of cruel 
and unusual punishments. The term "cruel and unusual" is generally taken 
to include punishments that are contrary to contemporary standards of 
human decency. 
11.4.6.1 Definition of "Punishment." The characterization of a sanction 
as fftreatmentu does not immunize it from Eighth Amendment constraints. 
For example, the involuntary injection of sickness-inducing drugs into 
mental patients who allegedly violated institutional rules was held to be 
c rue l  and unusual punishment. Whether a sanction is ffpunishment" is 
determined by its substance and effect, not the label assigned i t  by the 
sanctioning authority. 
11.4.6.2 Ca tegor ies  of Punishment Prohibi ted  bv the  Eighth 
Amendment. Four categories of punishment are prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment. They are: 
e punishments that are cruel in kind or method; 
e punishments imposed in an arbitrary manner; 
punishments disproportionately severe in comparison to the 
offense committed; and 
a punishment based on a status rather than an act, 
Cruel punishments include such clearly vindictive sanctions as torture 
and disfigurement. Punishments causing indignity or humiliation, such as 
the compelled ingestion of sickness-inducing drugs, also may be considered 
cruel. It has also been argued that  sanctions involving "branding" or 
extreme social censure are prohibited by the Eighth Amendment as well. 
Arbitrary punishments are  those that fall unequally on certain classes 
of offenders, such as the poor or members of minority groups, or those 
that  are imposed so infrequently that there is little correlation between 
the degree of criminality and the sanction imposed. 
Disproportionate punishments include death or long prison terns  for 
the commission of relatively minor offenses. Normally, only the most 
f l ag r an t  i n s t ance s  of d i spropor t iona te  punishment are successfully 
challenged in the courts. 
Final ly ,  punishment for  an involuntary status,  rather than some 
criminal ac t ,  has been held to be cruel and unusual. The difference 
between "act" and T7status11 is based on voluntsriness: for example, the 
status of being an alcoholic may not be punishable, but  t he  a c t  of 
appearing in public while intoxicated, which is considered avoidable, could 
be punished. 
Because the Eighth Amendment prohibits only the most extreme forms 
of punishment, i t  is highly unlikely that  any contemplated sanc t ions  
con ta ined  i n  the  proposed countermeasure programs would be held 
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, sanctions that are not "cruel and unusual" 
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment might be unreasonable 
sanctions in light of the offense for which thev were imposed; if so, they 
would violate due process of law. 
11.4.7 The F i r s t  Amendment Freedoms: Religion, Speech, and 
Association. The First Amendment ensures individual freedo m to worship, 
speak, and assemble. These freedoms, however, are  not absolute; for 
example, the time and place of public speeches--even by unsanctioned 
persons-may be subject to reasonable regulations. 
In general, the religious or political beliefs of the DAS cannot be 
restricted. The political associations of a DAS-such as membership in a 
political organization-may be restricted, but only where the restriction is 
both related to his criminality and is necessary. The politically-based 
conduct of a DAS also may be regulated, provided there exists some 
important s t a te  interest in doing so. Courts are given wider latitude in 
regulating the DASf nonpolitical associations; typical probation conditions 
forbid a DAS from associating with lawbreakers or frequenting taverns. 
These conditions ordinarily will not violate the First Amendment, provided 
they are otherwise reasonable; for example, a condition forbidding a DAS 
to "associate with lawbreakersf1 could be unreasonable i f  his fel low 
employees include ex-offenders. 
In genera l ,  while First Amendment constraints on sanctions have 
become increasingly recognized by the courts, the sanctions involved i n  
the proposed countermeasure programs are unlikely to face them. 
11.5 Summary and Conclusions 
A "defendant available for sanctioning" (DAS) is a driver who has had 
some formal encounter with the CJS, usually conviction of a traffic-law 
offense, and who is permitted to  remain a t  liberty in lieu of actual or 
potential incarceration, provided he agrees to certain restrictions on his 
liberty. 
There are  three principal sanctioning processes through which a DAS 
or accused may be granted conditional l iber ty :  p r e t r i a l  d ivers ion,  
probation, and earned charge reduction. Another sanctioning process, 
parole, is not relevant to highway crash countermeasure implementation 
because  t r a f f i c  o f fenders  are  rarely sentenced to prison. Pretrial 
diversion involves deferring criminal proceedings against an accused i n  
exchange for  his promise to take appropriate steps toward his own 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n .  P r o b a t i o n  is the conditional release of a convicted 
offender in lieu of incarcerating him; i t  is normally accompanied by the  
suspended imposition or execut ion of a jail sen tence ,  which could be 
re ins ta ted  if conditions of probat ion  a r e  v i o l a t e d .  E a r n e d  c h a r g e  
reduct ion ( E C R )  involves the  dismissal or reduction of criminal charges 
against  a DAS in exchange for  his par t ic ipa t ion  in a r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  
program. ECR, unlike pretrial diversion, normally occurs a t  some point in 
the trial, usually prior to judgment or sentencing.  Another sanct ioning 
process,  imposed through the  administrat ive law system, involves the 
grant ing of a l imited driver 's  l icense, coupled w i t h  e x p l i c i t  d r i v i n g  
restrictions, in lieu of license revocation or suspension. 
The manner of imposing res t r ic t ions  on l iber ty  i s  g o v e r n e d  by a 
number of law-based cons t ra in ts ,  const i tut ional  and s t a tu to ry .  These 
include, first of a l l ,  l imits  on the  power t o  impose spec i f ic  sanctions. 
The form t h a t  sanct ions may t ake  and the manner in which sanctioning 
programs are  implemented also a r e  governed by law-based constraints .  
Where the  t a r g e t  of sanctioning programs is the DAS population and not 
t he  genera l  driving public, these  cons t ra in ts  a p p l y  w i t h  l e s s  f o r c e .  
Consequently,  highway crash countermeasures that restrict the liberty of 
t h e  DAS a r e  less  likely t o  be successfully challenged than t h e  s a m e  
restriction imposed upon an unsanctioned driver. 
There are a number of theories  supporting the  l imitat ion of ce r t a in  
const i tut ional  r ights  of a DAS. The DAS may be considered to  have 
waived his rights as part of a pretrial diversion or probation scheme,  or 
t o  have con t r ac t ed  them away in exchange for his conditional liberty. 
Some courts hold that individual rights in connection with probation s t a t u s  
a r e  a ma t t e r  of g race  and exis t  only so long as the s tate  is willing to 
recognize them. Even those courts  t h a t  do recognize t h e  r ights  of t he  
DAS view them as limited, giving way where necessary for his supervision 
or rehabilitation. 
O w i n g  t o  t h e  l i m i t e d  r i g h t s  of t h e  DAS p o p u l a t i o n ,  s p e c i f i c  
constitutional guarantees  a r e  par t ia l ly  or even total ly  inapplicable to  
countermeasure Programs d i rec ted  a t  them. Searches of probationers 
without probable cause have been upheld, a s  have compulsory self-report  
schemes, limitations on travel,  surveillance of activities and compilation 
and use of personal data. The associations of t he  D A S ,  especia l ly  
nonpol i t ica l  ones,  also may be regulated. In all cases, whether a 
probation condition is valid is judged bv a reasonableness standard, that 
is, whether a particular restriction on liberty is reasonably necessary for 
the probationer's supervision. One constraint on sanctioning that  does 
remain in ful l  f o r ce  is the  prohibit ion agains t  cruel and unusual 
punishment, which not only prohibits unreasonable sanctions, but also 
fftreatmentfl that offends human standards of decency. 
Planners intending to implement highway c rash  counte rmeasure  
Programs should take steps to ensure that the implementing authority has 
power to assign drivers to programs, and that  drivers are  assigned i n  an 
equal and fair manner. Particular attention should be paid to whether a 
restriction on liberty, which occurs in the course of a countermeasure 
program is reasonable i n  light of its intended purpose and the driver's 
traffic offenses. 

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY FOR THE DAS COUNTERMEASURE 
IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH THE SANCTIONING PROCESS: 
DEFENDANTS AVAILABLE FOR SANCTIONING (DASs) 
Introduction 
Int roductory  material on the DAS can be found in  the following: 
Kerper, H.B., and Kerper, J. 1974. Legal rights of the convicted. St. 
Paul: West Publishing Company; Killinger, G.G; Kerper H.B; and 
Cromwell, P.F., Jr. 1976. Probation and parole in the criminal justice 
system. St. Paul: West Publishing Company; Biel, M.R. 1974. Legal 
issues and characteristics of pretrial intervention programs. Washington: 
American Bar Association; and Rubin, S. 1973. The law of criminal 
correction. 2d ed. St. Paul: West Publishing Company. The application 
of highway crash countermeasures to the DAS is generally discussed in 
Joscelyn, K.B; Maickel, R.P; and Goldenbaum, T.M. 1971. The drinking 
driver: a survey of legal issues. (Court procedures survey, reference 
volume II.) Final report. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
report DOT-HS-800-609. In this regard one should see also, Little, J.W; 
Young, G; and Selk, S. 1974. Constitutional protections of convicted DWI 
offenders selected to receive special sanctions-alcohol countermeasures 
l i terature review. Final  r epor t .  National  Highway T ra f f i c  Safe ty  
Administration report DOT-HS-801-231. 
Descri~tion of Princi~al Sanctioning Processes 
Probation 
Typical probation statutes include 18 U.S.C.A. SS 3651 et seq. (West 
Supp. 1978), and CAL. PENAL CODE S S  1203 e t  seq. (West Supp. 1979). 
The standards for granting probation are rather general; typical of these 
is TEX. CRIM. PRO. STAT. A N N .  ar t .  42.12 5 3 (Vernon 1977), which 
s t a t e s  t ha t  probation is appropr ia te  "when it shall appear to the 
satisfaction of the court that the ends of justice and the best interests of 
the public as well as the defendant will be subserved therebyf1; one should 
see also, 18 U.S.C.A. S 3651 (West Supp. 1978); N.Y. PEN. CODE S S  65.00 
e t  seq.  (4lcKinney 1975) [which se ts  out more objective cri teria for 
g ran t ing  p roba t ion] ;  and t h e  gene ra l  c r i t e r i a  s e t  ou t  in A . R . A .  
STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION S 1.3 (1970). Some s ta tes  
specify conditions of probation that must be imposed in certain cases; - see 
in this regard, ALASKA STAT, S 12.55.100 (Supp. 1978) [effective January 
1, 19801; and TEX. CRIM. PRO. STAT. ANN. art. 42.12, S 6 (Vernon 1977). 
The absence of any "right to probationn is discussed in People v. Volz -9 
415 Ill. 183, 113 N.E.2d 314 (1953), and the requirement of the defendant's 
consent is t rea ted in State v. Ritchie, 243 N.C. 182, 90 S.E.2d 301 (1955). 
The standard of "reasonable causeff  f o r  revoca t ion  of probat ion is 
discussed in Jackson v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 380, 307 S.W.2d 809 (Crim. 
App. 1957), and the burden of proof in establishing violations is discussed 
in the Crowell, Johnson, and Coleman cases cited below. 
General information on plea agreements may be found in: A.R.A. 
STANDARDS RELATING T O  PLEAS OF GUILTY (1968); Brady v. United 
S t a t e s ,  397 U,S. 742 (1970); and Note ,  Gui l ty  P lea  B a r g a i n i n g :  
Compromises bv Prosecutors to  Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 
865 (1964). The relationship between waiver of rights and acceptance of 
a plea agreement is discussed in Shelton v. United States, 242  F.2d 101, 
reheard en banc, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957). The tr ial  record itself 
must reflect  a t'knowing" and uvoluntaryll waiver of rights; in this regard 
see, Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The requirement that  plea 
I
agreements be kept in good fai th is set  out in Santobello v. Yew York, 
404 U.S. 742 (1971). 
Procedural due process rights applicable to probation revocation are 
discussed in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), Mempa v.  Rhay, 389 
U.S. 128 (1967); see also, Whisenant v. State, 557 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Crirn. 
App. 1977) [procedural protections granted by s ta te  law held to  be more 
comprehensive than minimum safeguards required by U.S. Constitution]. 
Although procedural due p rocess  r equ i r emen t s  apply t o  probat ion 
revocation hearings, these hearings are not full criminal trials and are not 
governed by the full range protections that apply to trials; in this regard 
see, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); People v. Sweeden, 116 Cal. -
App. 2d 891, 254 P.2d 899 (1953); and Lynch v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 2 6 7 ,  
263 S.W.2d 158 (Crim. App. 1953). The possible application of procedural 
due process requirements to revocation of divertee status is discussed i n  
Per lman,  H.,  and Jaszi,  P.  1976. Legal issues in  addict diversion. 
Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, Inc. 
Probat ion may be revoked fo r  commission of a new crime, for 
committing illegal acts not themselves crimes, or for violating probation 
conditions, while on probation. Grounds for revocation are  discussed 
generally in Killinger, G.G.; Kerper, H.B.; and Cromwell, P.R., Jr .  1976. 
Probation and parole in the criminal justice system. pp. 182-95. St. 
Paul: West Publishing Company. Because the revocation proceeding is 
not considered a criminal trial, proof of violation need not be established 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, all that is normally necessary is a 
preponderance (majority) of the evidence; in this regard see, People v. -- 
Crowell, 53 Ill. 2d 447, 292 N.E.2d 721 (1973); and Johnson v. Sta te ,  537 
S.W.2d 16 (Tex.  Crim. App. 1976). Some s ta tes  may impose more 
demanding standards for proving violations; see e.g., -9 P e o ~ l e  v. Coleman, 
13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975) [requiring "clear 
and convincing1' evidence]. Cases discussing probation violations and 
grounds for revocation of probation include the following: People v. K x ,  
267 Cal. App, 2d 814, 73 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1968), cert .  den., 396 U.S. 1028 
(1970) [participation in campus demonstrations] ; Ex parte McVeitv, 98 Cal. 
App. 723, 277 P. 745 (1929) [failure to pay fine]; Olivas v. State, 168 Tex. 
Crim. 437, 328 S.W.2d 771 (Cr im.  App. 1959) [failure to pay child 
support]; Glenn -v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 312, 327 S.1V"J.d (Crim. App. 1959) 
[associating with lawbreakers]; House v. - State,  166 Tex. Crim. 41, 310 
S.W.2d 339 (Crim. App. 1958) [failure to report to probation officer] ; and 
Jackson v. - State, 165 Tex. Crim. 380, 307 S.W.2d 809  rim. App. 1957). 
The validity of probation conditions is discussed generally in Sta te  v. 
Rogers, --- Iowa -, 251 N.W.2d 239 (1977). Conditions of probation must 
be reasonably r e l a t ed  t o  of t h e  offender ' s  c r imina l i ty  or t o  h i s  
rehabilitation. This standard was discussed and applied in People v. 
Dominguez, 256 Cal. App. 2 d  623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1967) [involving 
condi t ion t h a t  defendant, convicted of robbery, not become pregnant while 
unmarried]. Other cases in which probation cond i t ions  w e r e  held  i l l ega l  
include: Arciniega v. F r e e m a n ,  404 U.S.4 (1971) (per curiam) [prohibition 
aga ins t  f fassoc ia t ingf f  wi th  ex-convicts  held  unreasonab le  insofa r  a s  i t  
prohibi ted incidental  and necessary contact  with fellow employees]; Butler 
v. District of Columbia, 120 U.S. App. D.C. 317, 346 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir .  
1965) [ requ i r ing  t h a t  a d e f e n d a n t ,  conv ic ted  of making f a l s e  report of 
po l i ce  b r u t a l i t y ,  w r i t e  a n  essay on why c i t i z e n s  s h o u l d  r e s p e c t  t h e  
police] ; Springer  v. Uni ted S t a t e s ,  148 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1945) [requiring 
tha t  a defendant, convicted of violating d r a f t  laws,  d o n a t e  blood t o  t h e  
R e d  C r o s s ] ;  Peop le  v. Brown, 133 Ill. App. 2d 861, 272 N.E.2d 252 (1971) 
[condition requiring defendant t o  divest  self  of ownership  in t a v e r n  held  
unreasonab le  in l igh t  of no d i rec t  connection between original conviction 
and ownership of tavern];  and People v. Higgins,  22 Vlich. App. 479, 177 
N.W.2d 716 (1970) [prohibi t ing a d e f e n d a n t ,  convicted of burglary, from 
playing professional or college basketball without t h e  cour t ' s  pe rmiss ion] .  
One should see  also, Kominsky v. Sta te ,  330 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1976), [holding 
that  imposing an 8:00 A.M. t o  6:00 P.M. c u r f e w  and  a 35 mph maximum 
s p e e d  r e s t r i c t i o n  on a person c o n v i c t e d  of d rug  possession were  void 
because  t h e y  w e r e  p r imi t ive  and  thus  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  r e h a b i l i t a t i v e  
purpose  of p r o b a t i o n ] ;  and - Louk v. Haynes, 223 S.E.2d 780 (I?. Va. 1976), 
[holding that  a condition requiring defendant, convicted of drug possession,  
t o  work in a s p e c i f i c  p l a c e  a t  work f o r  which he  was not suited, was 
void because  i t  imposed invo lun ta ry  s e r v i t u d e  and  amounted  t o  pena l  
c o n f i n e m e n t  r a t h e r  t h a n  p roba t ion] .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, the  following 
conditions of probation were upheld a s  reasonable :  Peop le  v. K l n g ,  267 
Cal.  App. 2d 814, 7 3  Ca l .  R p t r .  440 (1968), c e r t .  denied, 396 U.S. 1028 
(1970) [forbidding a c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in campus  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s ,  s i n c e  
o r i g i n a l  c o n v i c t i o n  g r e w  o u t  of v io len t  a c t s  t h a t  o c c u r r e d  in pr ior  
demonstration] ; S t a t e  v. Simpson, 25 N.C. App. 176, 212 S.E.2d 566 ( 1 9 7 5 )  
[ forbidding person f rom engaging in t r a d e  of building contractor,  since 
original conviction was for fraud committed in t h e  c o u r s e  of engaging in 
t h a t  t r a d e ]  ; and Sa l inas  v. S t a t e ,  514 S.TV.2d 754 (Tex. Crim. 1974) [9:00 
P.M. curfew for person convicted of drug possession, upheld a s  reasonab le  
means of preventing unproductive act ivi t ies  and dangerous activities]. 
One should see also, the cases cited upholding restrictions on drinking and 
driving, cited elsewhere in this bibliographic essay. 
Conditions of probation are illegal if they a r e  impossible t o  perform; 
in this regard - see, Sweeney v. United States, 353 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1965) 
[requiring chronic and habitual alcoholic t o  abstain from using alcoholic 
beverages of any kind].  However, conditions requiring a probationer to 
abstain from using alcohol have been upheld; typical decisions include: 
Upchurch v. - Sta t e ,  289 Minn. 520, 184 N.W.2d 607 (1971); Jennings v. 
State, 89 Nev. 297, 511 P.2d 1048 (1973) [prohibiting the use of drugs] ; and 
Sobota v. Williard, 247 Or. 151, 427 P.2d 758 (1967). In Sweeney v. United 
S ta t e s  353 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 19651, the  court  noted tha t  i t  would be 
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unreasonable t o  require a chronic alcoholic to refrain from using alcohol. 
The practice of requiring convicted offenders to  pay for  the costs  of 
their probation has been criticized by legal commentators; in this regard 
see, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO -
PROBATION S 3.2(f) (1970). However, some s t a t e s  continue to require 
payments by probationers who are financially able to pay costs;  see, e.g., 
NEB. REV. STAT. 4 29-2 26 2(2)(n) (cum. Supp. 1978). Provisions requiring 
convicted offenders  t o  pay costs  assoc ia ted  wi th  t h e i r  p rosecu t ion  
apparently a r e  constitutional;  in this regard -7 see  - Fuller v. Oregon, 417 
U.S. 40 (1974). 
Pretrial Diversion 
The f i r s t  pretr ia l  diversion program was instituted in 1965; currently, 
courts in a t  least thirty-five major urban areas  conduct such programs. 
Introductory mater ial  on pretr ia l  diversion can be found in Biel, M.R. 
1974, Legal issues and characteristics of pre t r ia l  intervention programs. 
Washington:  Amer i can  Bar  Association; and Goldberg, N.E. 1973. 
ItPre-trial diversion: Bilk or bargain?" National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association Briefcase 31:490-93. 
The right t o  a speedy t r ia l  was applied to the states as well as the 
federal government in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1961). 
Determination of whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated is 
a balancing process. In this regard -- see, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 
(1972), which sets out the factors to be balanced in such cases. One such 
factor is whether the defendant asserted the right. The right to a speedy 
trial also may be  waived. The genera l  s t andard  fo r  waiver of a 
constitutional right is se t  out in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 
(1973). 
The right to counsel and various other procedural protections govern 
all ffcritical stagesv of the criminal proceeding. f fCr i t ica l  s t age f f  is 
discussed i n  Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). The application of 
procedural due process requirements outside the criminal trial is discussed 
in Section 6.3 of this volume. In this matter one should see also, Balch, 
R.W. 1974. Deferred prosecution: The juvenilization of the criminal 
justice system. Federal Probation 38:46-50. 
The equal protection guarantee is discussed generally in Section 7.0 of 
this volume. Cases discussing the application of equal protection to  
prosecutorial conduct include: Oyler -v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Two -
Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); and 
United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972). Cases discussing 
selectivity in assigning persons to rehabilitative or innovative sanctioning 
programs include: Marshall United S t a t e s ,  U.S. 
[eligibility for narcotics rehabilitation program] ; - Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 
506 (4th Cir. 1964) ["defective delinquentTf status] ; State  v ,  Leonardis, 71 
N . J .  85,  363 A.2d 321 (1976) [admission criteria of pretrial diversion 
program]; and Commonwealth v. Kindness, 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 99, 371 
A.2d 1316 (1977) [participation i n  accelerated rehabilitation program]. 
The conflict between prosecutorial and judicial powers is discussed i n  
People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11 Cal.3d 59, 520 P.2d 
405, ll3 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1974); State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J.  85, 363 A.2d 321 
(1976); and Commonwealth v, Kindness, 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 99,  371 A.2d 
1346 (1977). See also, Cosgrove v. Kubinec, 56 A.D.2d 7 0 9 ,  392 N.Y.S. 2d 
733 (1977), holding that a judge cannot, on his own initiative and without 
the prosecutor's consent, reduce charges against a defendant. 
Introductory material on probation can be found in Kerper, H.B., and 
Kerper, J. 1974. Legal r ights  of t he  convic ted.  S t .  Paul: West 
Publishing Company; and Killinger, G.G; Kerper, H.B; and Cromwell, P.F. 
1976. Probation and parole i n  the criminal justice system. St. Paul: 
West Publishing Company. 
Specif ic  Constraints on Countermeasure Implementation on the DAS 
Population 
G e n e r a l  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  on DAS counte rmeasure  
implementation are discussed in Little, J.W.; Young, (3.; and Selk, S. 
Constitutional protections of convicted DWI offenders selected to 
receive special sanctions-alcohol countermeasures literature review. Final 
r epor t .  National  Highway T ra f f i c  Safe ty  Administrat ion report  
The leading case on improper police practices is Rochin v. California, 
342 U.S. 165 (1952). Rochin was limited in the subsequent cases of Irvine 
v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 
(19571, and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
Cases defining the right to travel include United States v. Guest -9 383 
U.S. 745 (19661, and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Probation 
conditions involving restrictions on travel, especially on the use of motor 
vehicles, have been upheld as valid. In this regard see: - -  State v. Sandoval, 
9 2  Idaho 853, 4 5 2  P.2d 350 (1969); City of Detroit v. Del Rio, 10 Mich. 
App. 617, 157 N.W.2d 324 (1968); State v. Gallamore, 6 N.C. App. 608, 170 
S.E.2d 573 (1969); and State v. Baynard, 4 N.C. App. 645, 167 S.E.2d 514 
(1969). The necessity of restricting the mobility of a DAS is discussed i n  
Berrigan v. Sigler, 499 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1974); but see, McGregor v. 
Schmidt, 358 F. Supp. 1131 (W.D. Wis. 1973). 
The general limitation of search and seizure constaints as they apply 
to the DAS is dealt with i n  the following cases: United S t a t e s  v .  
Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) [applying intent of the 
Federal Probation Act to limit searches of probationers] ; and Latta v. -
Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975) [upholding warrantless search of 
parolee's residence by parole officer]; i n  this regard compare, People v. 
Mason, 5 Cal.3d 759, 488 P.2d 630, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971) [probationer's 
rights with respect to search and seizure held to be totally extinguished 
by wa ive r ]  ; w i t h  -- P e o ~ l e  v. Peterson, 62 Mich. App. 258, 233 N.W.2d 250 
(1975) [wa ive r  of  p r o b a t i o n e r ' s  F o u r t h  A m e n d m e n t  r i g h t s  h e l d  t o  b e  
c o e r c e d ]  . An o v e r v i e w  of the  law of search  and seizure with respec t  t o  
t he  DAS is presented  i n  N o t e ,  T h e  Exc lus iona ry  R u l e  in  P r o b a t i o n  a n d  
Parole Revocation: A Policy Appraisal, 54 TEX. L. REV. ll15 (1976). 
Cases illustrating the  l imited n a t u r e  of a s a n c t i o n e d  o f f e n d e r ' s  PASI 
i n c l u d e  t h e  fol lowing:  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v. Manf redon ia ,  341 F. Supp. 790 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); People v. Zavala, 239 Cal. App. 2d 732, 49 Cal .  R p t r .  129 
(1966) [ compe l l ed  t e s t i n g  f o r  presence  of narcotics] ;  - S t a t e  v. Heath, 343 
So.2d 13 (Fla. 1977) [PASI he ld  t o  a p p l y  on ly  in  r e v o c a t i o n  p r o c e e d i n g s  
c o n c e r n i n g  a s e p a r a t e  criminal offense];  and S t a t e  v. U7ilson, 17 Or. App. 
375, 521 P.2d 1317 (1974), ce r t .  denied, 420 U.S. 910 (1975). 
T h e  g e n e r a l  s t a t e m e n t  t ha t  a DAS, by necessity, enjoys lesser privacy 
protect ion than t h e  unsanctioned p e r s o n  i s  found  in  L a t t a  v. F i t z h a r r i s ,  
521 F.2d 246 ( 9 t h  C i r .  1975). P r i v a c y  considerations a c t  a s  a constraint  
on the  involuntary administration of m e d i c a l  o r  p sycho log ica l  t r e a t m e n t ,  
T h e  fo l lowing c a s e s  a r e  illustrative: Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733 
(9th Cir. 1974); Mackev Iv. P r o c u n i e r ,  477 F.2d 877 ( 9 t h  C i r .  1973); a n d  
K a i m o w i t z  v. D e p a r t m e n t  of M e n t a l  H e a l t h ,  (Wayne County. Mich. Cir. 
C t .  1973). O n e  should  s e e  a lso :  N o t e ,  T h e  T e s t  C u l t u r e :  M e d i c a l  
E x p e r i m e n t a t i o n  on Prisoners, 2 NEW ENGL. J. PRISON L. 261 (1976); and 
Note, Medical and Psychological Experimentation on P r i s o n e r s ,  7 U. CAL.  
DAVIS L. REV. 351 (1974). 
G e n e r a l  m a t e r i a l s  on t h e  E igh th  Amendment  prohibition of c rue l  and 
unusua l  p u n i s h m e n t  inc lude:  Rubin ,  S. 1973. T h e  l a w  o f  c r i m i n a l  
c o r r e c t i o n .  2nd ed. pp. 417-49. S t .  Paul :  West  Publ i sh ing  Company; 
Schwi tzqebel ,  L i m i t a t i o n s  on  t h e  C o e r c i v e  T r e a t m e n t  of O f f e n d e r s ,  8 
CRIM. L. BULL. 267 (1972). What  c o n s t i t u t e s  '!punishment1! under t he  
Eighth Amendment was d iscussed  in  Trap v. Dul les ,  356 U.S. 86 (19581, 
and  K n e c h t  v. Gi l lman,  488 F.2d ll36 (8th Cir. 1973). The role played by 
social standards in determining what punishments  a r e  ' ' c rue l  a n d  unusual"  
i s  d i scussed  in  G r e g g  v. G e o r g i a ,  428 U.S. 153 (1976). In t he  following 
cases sanctions were  found t o  b e  c r u e l  a n d  unusual:  C o k e r  v. G e o r g i a ,  
4 3 3  U.S. 5 8 4  (1977)  [ d e a t h  p e n a l t y  f o r  r a p e  h e l d  t o  b e  g r o s s l y  
disproportionate1 ; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) [punishment 
based on status]; and Weems v. United States ,  217 U.S. 349 (1910) [cruel 
and disproportionate],  On the other hand, sanctions were upheld against 
Eighth Amendment claims in the following cases: Powell v. Texas, 392 
U.S. 514 (1968) [public intoxication];  Hacker v. Superior Court of Tulare 
County, 268 Cal. App. 2d 387, 73 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1968); and S t a t e  v. 
Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853, 452 P.2d 350 (1969) [prohibition on driving] . 
The constitutionality of the  common prohibition against associating 
with lawbreakers has been upheld; a typical case is In re Solis, 274 Cal. 
App. 2d 344, 89 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1969). A general prohibition against 
associating with people of similar political beliefs was upheld in Malone v. 
United States, 502 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1974) [members of Irish Republican 
Army] ;  however ,  d e f e n d a n t l s o r i g i n a l  convic t ion  was fo r  illegally 
transportation of weapons to that group. On the other  hand, res t r ic t io t~s  
on speech  or assembly placed on a DAS were found t o  violate First  
Amendment freedoms in the following cases: In re  Mannino, 14 Cal. App. 
3d 953, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1971) [forbidding probationer to become even a 
passive member of any protest group, and prohibiting him from writing in 
behalf of any such group; character ized as unreasonable restriction of 
association and prior restraint, respectively]; People v. Wright, - 275 Cal. 
App. 2d 738,  80 Cal .  Rpt r .  335 (1969) [forbidding probationer from 
expressing his views on narcotics laws; however, probationer could be 
prohibited from advocating or  encouraging violations of those 1arvs.l; 
Inman v. S ta te ,  124 Ga. App. 190, 183 S.E.2d 413 (1971) [p roba t ione r  
r e q u i r e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  s h o r t  h a i r c u t ;  h e l d  t o  v i o l a t e  r i g h t  of 
self-expression] ; and People v. Dunn, - 43 Ill. App. 3d 94, 356 N.E.2d 1137 
(1976) [same]. 

